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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Weak corporate governance as a cause of the Icelandic financial crisis 
Currently, the corporate governance has the agenda of categorizing reality and 
thereby determining which systems are more effective and efficient in a given 
context. A question is posed; how has the internationalization of markets, 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization adapted to rapid changes in 
traditionally based models of corporate governance? When corporate governance 
practices are exported from one country to another, they tend to be translated and 
customized to local practices before being adopted. The objective of this thesis is 
to examine this type of adaptation and explain the circumstances that led to a 
collapse of governance mechanisms, using Iceland as an example.  
Governance issues are interwoven with the Financial Crisis of 2008 and the 
effects of the crisis were perhaps the most devastating in Iceland, where the 
whole banking system collapsed, resulting in an economic and political crisis. 
The five years leading up to the 2008 Financial Crisis appear to have been 
characterized by high levels of strain on governance mechanisms. Therefore, the 
overarching research question for this thesis is; which governance mechanisms 
came under strain, broke, and triggered a complete collapse of a developed 
economy?  A follow up research question is; why did those governance 
mechanisms become so vulnerable? 
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This thesis addresses a number of governance issues on several levels: at 
governmental, firm, and civil society. Therefore, a hybrid research strategy is 
appropriate and subsequently the empirical basis for this research encompasses 
multiple case studies, longitudinal quantitative data, social network analysis, and 
evaluations by expert panels.  
The research reveals how fragile governance issues can become. However, by 
themselves, weak governance and misguided actions do not constitute an 
adequate explanation for a crisis; rather the findings suggest that it was the 
interaction between them that was most influential. Specifically, this thesis 
examines how the interaction of different governance mechanisms influences a 
collapse. The research contributes insight about the greater call for actor-centered 
analysis of firms and greater attention to the diverse identities and interests of 
different stakeholders and new actors. Furthermore, the research suggests the 
importance of introducing diverse perspectives to corporate governance based on 
culture, law, and politics, in order to recognize the many mechanisms and 
structures that might reasonably enhance organizational function.   
Another important contribution of the paper is insight regarding how procedures 
that created economic growth, when combined with a lack of governance over 
liberalization and privatization, a weak business culture, and a lack of 
transparency, led to challenges that ultimately were too big to solve. Treating 
privatization as a discrete act rather than part of a progressive process appears to 
have been a policy mistake in the case of Iceland. Liberalization and deregulation 
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bred entrepreneurship and greater risk taking, which governments should 
encourage to a certain extent, but governments also need to ensure that 
appropriate regulations and supervision are in place.  
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Resumé 
 
En svag virksomhedsledelse som årsag til Islands finansielle krise 
I skrivende stund forsøger virksomhedsledelse generelt at kategorisere 
virkeligheden for derigennem at fastslå, hvilke systemer er de mest 
virkningsfulde og effektive i en given sammenhæng. Det stille spørgsmål er: 
hvordan har internationaliseringen af markederne, liberalisering, deregulering og 
privatisering tilpasset sig de hurtige ændringer i de traditionelt baserede modeller 
af virksomhedsledelse?  Ved overføring af en praksis inden for 
virksomhedsledelse fra ét land til et andet bliver denne gerne fortolket og 
tilpasset til de forhåndenværende praksisser før den bliver indført. Målsætningen 
med denne afhandling er at undersøge denne type tilpasning og forklare de 
omstændigheder, der ledte til sammenbruddet i ledelsesmekanismerne. Island vil 
blive brugt som eksempel.  
Spørgsmål omkring ledelse og forvaltning er tæt forbundet med finanskrisen i 
2008, og virkningerne af denne var måske de mest knusende i Island, hvor hele 
banksystemet brød sammen og forårsagede en økonomisk og politisk krise. De 
fem år forud for krisen i 2008 synes at have være karakteriseret af et stærkt pres 
på ledelsesmekanismerne. Derfor er det overordnede research-spørgsmål i denne 
afhandling det følgende: hvilke ledelsesmekanismer kom under pres, brød 
sammen og afstedkom et fuldstændigt sammenbrud af en udviklet økonomi ?  Et 
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opfølgningsspørgsmål i min research er derefter: hvorfor blev disse 
ledelsesmekanismer så sårbare ? 
I afhandlingen stilles en række spørgsmål omkring ledelse på flere niveauer: 
regerings-, virksomheds- og samfundsniveau, og en hybrid research-strategi er 
derfor den mest hensigtsmæssige. Følgelig vil det empiriske grundlag for denne 
research omfatte multiple case-studier, kvantitative forløbsdata, analyser af 
sociale netværk og ekspertgruppers vurderinger.  
Undersøgelsen viser, hvor skrøbelige ledelsesmekanismer kan blive. I sig selv 
udgør en svag ledelse og ugennemtænkte handlinger imidlertid ikke en 
fyldestgørende forklaring på krisen. Resultaterne tyder derimod på, at det var 
samspillet mellem dem der havde den største virkning. Denne afhandling 
undersøger specifikt hvordan samspillet mellem forskellige ledelsesmekanismer 
har indflydelse på et sammenbrud. Undersøgelsen giver indsigt i den stigende 
efterspørgslen efter aktør-centrerede analyser af firmaer og den stigende 
opmærksomhed omkring de mange forskellige interessentgrupper, nye aktører og 
disses interesser. Yderligere peger undersøgelsen på vigtigheden af at indføje 
andre perspektiver i ledelsen af virksomheder, som ville være baseret på kultur, 
jura og politik. Formålet med denne ændring ville være at anerkende de 
mekanismer og strukturer der synes at have indflydelse og har potentiale til at 
øge organisatorisk funktion.  
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Et andet vigtigt punkt i afhandlingen er behandlingen af hvordan de procedurer 
der skabte den økonomiske vækst – når de blev koblet sammen med manglende 
ledelse gennem liberalisering og privatisering, en svag virksomhedskultur og 
mangel på gennemsigtighed – medførte problemer, der i sidste instans blev for 
store til at løse. Håndteringen af privatiseringen som et diskret projekt i stedet for 
som del af en progressiv proces synes i Islands tilfælde at  have været en 
strategisk fejltagelse. Liberalisering og deregulering resulterede i initiativ- og 
risikotagning hvilket regeringer til en vis grad bør tilskynde, men de må dog 
samtidigt sikre, at relevant lovgivning og kontrol er til stede.  
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THESIS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The backbone of this thesis is that corporate governance “… understood as the 
determination of the broad uses to which organizational resources will be 
deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in 
organizations” (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003) influences the performance 
of organizations. The study of corporate governance has become extensive 
over the last two decades and has ignited substantial interest in international 
comparison. Governance literature has historically divided the world into the 
binary systems of the Anglo-American corporate governance system, which is 
characterized by short-term equity finance, dispersed ownership, strong 
shareholder rights, active markets for capital control, and flexible labor 
markets, and the Continental European corporate governance system, which is 
characterized by long-term debt financing, concentrated block holder 
ownership, weak shareholder rights, inactive markets for capital control and 
rigid labor markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; 
Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Research that is more 
recent has refined these dual frameworks to fit better the empirical realities 
better in different countries. The Anglo-American and European Continental 
models seem only partially relevant to realities in East Asia, Japan, the 
emerging economies, and many of the European countries (Aoki, Jackson and 
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Miyajima, 2007; Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, and 
Very, 2005; Chung and Luo, 2008).  
The current agenda consists of categorizing the corporate governance reality 
and thereupon determining which system is more effective and efficient in a 
given context. To what degree the internationalization of markets, 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization has led to rapid changes in 
traditionally based models of corporate governance is the subsequent debate 
in this area. Therefore, when corporate governance practices are exported 
from one country to another, they tend to be translated and customized to 
local practice before being adopted. These adaptations can lead to new or 
hybrid forms of these practices (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Buck and 
Shahrim, 2005; Sanders and Carpenter, 2003). This type of adaptation is the 
core of the analysis presented in the papers of this thesis, explaining the 
circumstances that led to the collapse of governance mechanisms.  
Issues of governance are interwoven with the Financial Crisis of 2008 and the 
effects of the crisis was perhaps the most devastating in Iceland, where the 
whole banking system collapsed, resulting in an economic and political crisis. 
The five years leading up to the Financial Crisis appear to have been 
characterized by high levels of strain on governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
the overarching research question for this thesis is; which governance 
mechanisms came under strain, broke, and triggered a complete collapse of a 
developed economy?  A follow up research question is; why did those 
governance mechanisms become so vulnerable? 
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Iceland provides a valuable base for researching the governance changes 
antecedent to the Financial Crisis of 2008.  Few other developed countries 
endured a systemic collapse on the scale that occurred in Iceland. Most of the 
variables that could go wrong did, and a series of erroneous actions 
progressively assumed mountainous proportions. Governance appears to have 
been vulnerable on a number of levels, including the firm level, the macro 
level, and the policy level. By themselves, weak governance and misguided 
actions do not constitute an adequate explanation for the crisis; it was the 
interaction between them that was influential in the breakdown. Specifically, 
this thesis sheds light on how the interaction of different governance 
mechanisms influenced a collapse of a whole economy.  
This thesis consists of five papers. The first paper is “To Privatize Newly 
Nationalized Firms or Not”. It carries out empirical research on the operations 
of divested State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Iceland, particularly, the 
ownership change caused by the privatization process between 1992 and 2005 
which contributed momentously to the governance changes during the boom 
period in Iceland. The findings help to understand the antecedents to the crisis 
as well as the aftermath of it, during which policy makers must make 
decisions on whether to privatize badly hurt private firms that have been 
nationalized. Such decisions should not be made without analyzing the effects 
of previous privatizations. The second paper, “The Icelandic Bank Collapse: 
Challenges to Governance and Risk Management”, presents a case examining 
the governance failures that led to the systemic collapse in Iceland. The 
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failures were widespread: from deregulation and privatization being treated as 
a discrete act rather than a progressive process, to faulty governance 
arrangements within the financial sector.  
Based on the findings of the second paper, the research question for the third 
paper arose; what were the warnings signs leading up to the crisis? This paper 
provides a comparison of the recent Icelandic Crisis and the similar crisis in 
Scandinavia during the 1990s, with the objective of contextualizing the 
Icelandic experience by focusing on the similarities between the two crises 
and the possible contrasts. The paper concludes that warning signs did exist 
and were prominent.  
These findings are followed up in the next research question, which is 
examined in the fourth and fifth papers; were the governance weaknesses 
hidden, either deliberately or unintentionally? Papers four and five are 
entitled: “Weak Business Culture as an Antecedent of Economic Crisis: The 
Case of Iceland” and “Defensive Social Networks and the Loss of Policy-
System Transparency”. The fourth paper argues for the existence of concealed 
corruption and consequently the need to revise the mainstream concept of 
corruption. Corruption did play a role in the Icelandic Crisis, but the form of 
corruption in Iceland was unacknowledged by conventional corruption 
measures, and therefore conventional corruption measures did not identify 
practices that were corrupt in Iceland. The fifth paper reveals how a strong 
social network of stakeholders was quickly created as a response to foreign 
criticism of the Icelandic economy and the Icelandic banks. This defensive 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Little consensus exists regarding what factors explain, change, or potentially 
converge corporate governance practices over time. Subsequently, there have 
been many conceptualizations of corporate governance within and across 
disciplines, which is evident in the many definitions of corporate governance. 
Thomsen (2007) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate, that corporate 
governance has been defined broadly as the study of power and influence over 
decision making in firms, and more narrowly as the financial relationship 
between suppliers of finance and firms’ performance. This approach is the 
subject of researchers of corporate governance who come from a variety of 
disciplines, such as, economics, management, law, political science, culture, 
and sociology. The subject has also become a major undertaking in public 
policy around the world (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). As such, providing a 
clear and a universal definition of corporate governance is a challenging task. 
How the firm is conceptualized has also influenced the definitions of 
corporate governance.  
Some economists tend to look at corporate governance as the connection of 
contracts among owners who pursue private means in running their firms 
rather than taking societal stake (Zingales, 1998). Other economists approach 
corporate governance from an agency perspective, although within a 
discipline, such as Shleifer and Visnhy (1997) who argue that corporate 
governance “...deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure them of getting a return on their investment.” The 
19 
 
ideology is that shareholders in managerial managed firms will want to 
minimize the agency cost. Agency theory has been central to the research of 
many management scholars, offering different corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as, boards of directors, ownership structures and the control 
of firms (Dalton, Hitt, Certo and Dalton (2007).  
Theory of the firm has likewise inspired economists and management scholars 
toward new approaches to corporate governance, such as on the nature of the 
employment relationship (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005). Additionally, 
stakeholder theory has become a framework to clarify the wider relationship 
between the different stakeholders in the firm (Schneper and Guillen, 2004). 
Legal scholars define corporate governance more broadly, to contain items 
that go beyond private contractual arrangements. They tend to give a great 
deal of attention to the legal context, which shapes the rights and 
responsibilities of firm actors.  An example of a legal impacted corporate 
governance definition is “...the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional 
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who 
controls them, how control is exercised and how the risk and returns from the 
activities they undertake is allocated” (Blair, 1995).  
Organizational sociologists, who are mostly concerned with the power and 
authority relationships within the firm (Davis, 2005), take an even broader 
view. They are interested in the structures, processes, and institutions 
circulating the firm internally and externally. Political institutions and interest 
groups are the subject of political science, which identifies corporate 
20 
 
governance as the system that provides investors protection and growth as 
well as creating employment and equality of opportunities (Gourevitch and 
Shinn, 2005). An institutional actor-centered view of the firm is taken by 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003), in which the different stakeholders in the firm 
compete for resources, and corporate governance is defined as the rights and 
responsibilities of these stakeholders toward the firm. Furthermore, they state 
that corporate governance differs across different forms of firms, industries, 
and countries. The next section analyses the effects of ownership change on 
governance, in light of altered forms, by elaborating on the economy theory of 
privatization.  
  
The Governance of Ownership Change - the Economic Theory of 
Privatization 
The economic theory of privatization is a subset of the vast literature on the 
economics of ownership and of the role for government ownership (or 
regulation) of productive resources. The theoretical argument for government 
intervention is based on the grounds of efficiency, that the assumptions for 
markets have failed in some sense, and that the government can resolve the 
market failure. The assumptions include the requirements that there are no 
externalities in production or consumption, that the product is not a public 
good, that the market is not monopolistic in structure, and that information 
costs are low. Privatization, in turn, is a response to the failings of state 
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ownership. The impact of privatization should therefore depend on the degree 
of market failure. Subsequently, as welfare theory claims, privatization should 
have the most positive impact where there is the least need for the government 
to correct market failure (as when SOEs are placed in competitive markets, or 
when markets can become competitive) (Sheshinski and López-Calva, 1999). 
On the other hand, competition throughout industries may put pressure on 
SOEs to maximize productive efficiency without the ownership change of 
privatization (Shirley and Walsh, 2000).  
State versus private ownership can influence efficiency but definitions of 
ownership objectives are, most often, dissimilar. The shareholder wealth-
maximizing model has become common, partially because it has well defined, 
firm objectives, where governments have other objectives that can change 
from one administration to the next. On the one hand, lack of commitment to 
policy can reduce the efficiency an SOE’s operations and governance, and on 
the other, social welfare goals can often be difficult to measure (Hansmann 
and Kraakman, 2000). Another complication of state ownership is how diffuse 
it can become under the public (the nation’s citizens), where monitoring 
managers’ incentives become difficult. This is a subset of an argument based 
on property rights and agency costs. The ability to tie managers’ incentives to 
the returns of their decisions is difficult for the owners of the public firms. 
This is because there is a narrower range of monitoring devices under public 
ownership (Megginson and Netter, 2001). However, the government can 
intervene in the operations of any public or private firm of course, but it 
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should be less accessible in the case of the private firm. To the extent that 
government intervention has a greater cost than benefit, private ownership is 
preferred to public one. Welfare economics argues that greater efficiency can 
be achieved through increased competition, hence to the extent that 
privatization fosters competition, it will contribute to efficiency gains. 
Unavoidably, the development of markets will simultaneously have an 
influence on the effectiveness of privatization programs, thus the impact of 
privatization will vary between markets that differ in their strengths.   
The government aims of promoting development, incentivizing markets, and 
minimizing political intervention, locates the Icelandic privatization in the 
economic theory of privatization. Political interference and regulation had 
long plagued Icelandic financial markets, creating economic difficulties, 
which in the neo-liberalization era with its large-scale privatization programs, 
initiated a paradigm shift. On the one hand, the paper “To Privatize Newly 
Nationalized Firms or Not” reveals the success of the government’s 
privatization goal of increasing competition, decreasing political interference, 
establishing a stock market, and improving fiscal condition (National Audit 
Office, 2003). On the other hand, the paradigm shift described led to 
insufficient awareness of structural changes in corporate governance. 
Paradigm shifts occur regularly and Scandinavia experienced one in the early 
1990s (Jonung, 1999), making it harder for policy makers and regulators to be 
aware and understand the nature of the changes. The potential for a paradigm 
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shift following deregulation seems to be a neglected component in the 
literature of privatization.  
The privatization of the Icelandic banks led to harsh consequences (discussed 
in detail in the paper “The Icelandic Bank Collapse: Challenges to 
Governance and Risk Management”). The privatization outcome of other 
industries was more positive and in line with the economic theory of 
privatization, although the improvements were only marginal and less than the 
literature claims in the case of a developed country. An explanation could be 
that the Icelandic SOEs were already efficient under public ownership and 
kept on being so after privatization. Positive spillover effects for private firms 
were obvious because they benefited from the structural changes that created 
healthier competition when state guaranteed competing SOEs lost their state 
support.  
The result of the above findings makes it most likely difficult for the Icelandic 
government not to use privatization as a tool to improve the fiscal deficit and 
to stimulate battered industries. Following the 2008 Financial crisis, the state 
took over dozens of private firms from all industries. According to the IMF 
(RUV, 2011) more than 60% of all Icelandic firms needed financial rescuing 
because of the financial crisis. In a country where over-indebtedness was the 
norm, all firms were affected when the local currency lost half of its value. In 
such circumstances, it does not matter whether debt is in foreign currency or 
in the local one, the collapse is only at different levels. On the other hand, the 
export industries should flourish under such circumstances, but only those not 
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burdened with over-indebtedness. Grappling with more than two years of 
declining GDP and historically high unemployment, any government is most 
likely to consider privatization as a mean to fix the deficit and stimulate the 
economy.  
The lessons from the paper “To Privatize Newly Nationalized Firms or Not”, 
are in line with the economic theory of privatization; that privatizing state 
ownership greatly improves fiscal status, stimulates economic growth and 
increases the efficiency of firms, both privatized and private. The reduction of 
state employment will also ease government deficit, where managers, trying 
to maximize profits, have no interest in excess employment. However, the 
significant growth in the private sector will substitute for the decline in state 
employment (this experience is in line with the literature, for example see, 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Megginson, and Netter, 2001; Boubakri, 
Cosset,  and Guiedhami, 2001).  
The poor results from the privatization of the Icelandic state owned banks will 
most likely not only force the government towards re-establishing public trust 
in privatization, but also require gradual implementation of privatization, 
instead of putting into effect a comprehensive program and fast 
implementation. Priority should be given to privatizing those industries where 
consumer benefits are likely to be greatest. The potential benefits will depend 
upon the size of the industry, whether it has already received attention, and 
whether competition rather than monopoly is likely to ensue. In the light of 
the small size of Icelandic society, the government should consider at least a 
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partial sale to foreigners. The negative aspect of this small size is addressed in 
most of the papers, revealing a surprisingly high level of corruption, in part 
because of considerable degree of nepotism.    
The privatization process is complex and can become crucial to the health of 
an economy, as this thesis demonstrates. To generalize, the analysis of Iceland 
reveals that privatization is not to be treated as a discrete act but rather as a 
part of a progressive process. These complexities are discussed further in the 
next two sub-chapters, discussing corporate governance mechanisms through 
the lenses of the agency and public choice theories.  
  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Agency Theory 
Agency theory still prevails when it comes to corporate governance research 
(Dalton et al., 2007; Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya, 2003). The essence 
of the theory is the contact between principals (shareholders) and agents 
(managers), and appears to be a constant challenge in corporate governance. 
This separation of ownership and control calls for a mechanism to coordinate 
vested interests of the principals and agents (Fama, 1980). In the case of the 
shareholders, they are assumed to want to maximize their returns at a 
reasonable risk, while management might prefer growth to profits, or empire 
building to establish prestige, or higher pay (potentially maintaining costly 
standards above the necessary minimum). The dilemma shareholders face is 
that monitoring managers brings on agency costs: information is imperfect to 
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make qualified decisions, and contractual limits to management discretion 
may be difficult to enforce (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to minimize the 
agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms have been introduced, 
including the structure of ownership, board structure, executive compensation, 
the market for corporate control, accounting rules, the role of gatekeepers and 
more. Furthermore, blockholder control might solve agency problems, where 
one or few blockholders retain tight control over the firm through 
concentrated ownership and by this way can influence management (Morck, 
2005). It differs between countries how monitoring is performed. In some 
countries, large shareholders  monitor, because they have greater incentives, 
in others, shareholders are fragmented, and with greater liquidity, therefore 
they have less individual incentive to monitor. In many European countries, 
there are large blockholders such as families, banks, and corporations (Becht 
and Roell, 1999).  
The financial system can play a considerable role in determining the corporate 
governance structures of industries. The supply side of finance can be a 
critical variable determining the capacity of the banking sector to engage in 
industrial finance (Aoiki and Patrick, 1994, Cox, 1986) and equity stakes 
(Edwards and Fisher, 1994). Banks have a direct impact on governance when 
they acquire ownership stakes in industrial companies (Yanagawa, 2007). 
State policies towards banks can also explain the different corporate 
ownership patterns, where some states have encouraged their banks to 
facilitate and expand close lending and ownership ties between banks and 
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industrial corporations (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). This style of ownership 
pattern developed in Iceland after the privatization of the state owned banks 
and is discussed in the papers “The Icelandic Banks Collapse: Challenges to 
Governance and Risk Management” and “Learning from the “Worst 
Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Nordic Comparison”. The banks not 
only provided funding for projects, but also facilitated many of them using 
what can be called a “package effect”, where the banks followed their 
customers and often created partnerships in ventures. Early on, it became 
evident that partnership had turned into ownership where, in some instances, 
major customers had gained a considerable stake in the banks and were 
appointed to board positions. The banks had become equity partners with their 
clients in investments rather than keeping an arms-length commercial banking 
relationship.   
A continuation of the above-mentioned financing can be found in the 
economic perspective of stakeholder theory, which influences corporate 
governance. Under stakeholder theory, the firm is seen as a set of 
relationships between interrelated stakeholders that all have an interest in the 
firm creating a broad set of goals to be met (Freeman et al., 2010). The 
economic theory suggests that stakeholder participation is related to 
efficiency, resting on the commitment of stakeholders, their firm specific 
investments and risk sharing (Parkinson, 2003). On the other hand, the two 
papers mentioned above point out that apart from the few largest owners of 
the Icelandic banks, shareholders were weak and dispersed. They had to cope 
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with the increasingly complicated operation of the banks, where there were 
new financial products such as credit derivatives, swaps, and so forth to 
decipher. Deregulation made it possible for banks to diversify into related 
activities like insurance services and mortgages and to organize a substantial 
share of their activities in off balance sheet operations (Thomsen, 2009). 
Hence, shareholders had to rely on corporate governance mechanisms to 
protect their interests. These mechanisms were lacking. Shareholders were 
uneducated and did not rebel at annual meetings, elect new board members, or 
elect a hostile raider to clean up the operations. Performance related 
incentives were to overcome agency problems, but were ill structured. 
Another governance mechanism is reputational risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). It 
should motivate executives to perform well for fear of reputational loss, but 
the bank executives during the boom period were treated like celebrities. 
Agency problems cannot be completely eliminated, and the Icelandic case 
shows how fragile governance issues can become. 
It is possible for firms to contain stock of firm-specific capital invested by 
employees. This can change how boards are viewed, not only as agents of 
shareholders, but also as trustees of stakeholders. The economic cooperation 
of employees can be a way to increase trust between labor and management, 
facilitate investments, and improve internal information flows (Leibenstein, 
1966), decreasing the need for both parties to specify terms and conditions of 
employment. Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (2000) argue that the growing 
participation of employees should lead to rejection of the agency theory view 
29 
 
of the firm grounded on property rights over physical capital. Nonetheless, 
corporate governance scholars, inspired by agency theory, have not agreed on 
the degree of the role of employees in corporate governance, although most 
agree on that a role exists (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). As such, corporate 
governance is increasingly seen as an independent variable, which facilitates 
the concerns of human resource management, and conversely, employees are 
seen as an independent variable affecting corporate ownership. Drawing on 
agency theory, some scholars stress how employee rights can increase agency 
costs to shareholders. This could happen when a board’s power dilutes where 
collusion between management and employees increase (Pistor, 1999). Fauver 
and Fuerst (2006) ascertained that employee power is used in coalition with 
shareholders to promote greater accountability and this way it decreases 
agency costs through increased monitoring of managerial pay, demanding 
transparency, disclaim prestige investments and sometimes partnering up with 
shareholders in restructuring. Jackson (2007) found a positive relation 
between the use of stock options for management, equity-based performance 
measures, and increased market oriented employment patterns.  
Creating such a positive relationship, as Jackson (2007) describes, was a 
deliberate strategy of the just-privatized Icelandic banks. The CEO of one of 
the Icelandic banks explains:  
The glue that has kept this crew together rests on 
friendship, common vision and an aggressive incentive 
system. Kaupthing was a pioneer establishing the first 
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true investment banking incentive system in Iceland.  
(Sigurðsson, 2007). 
This strategy became regrettable. Kaupthing loaned its top executives nearly 
US $1 billion to buy shares in the bank. The only collateral were the shares 
themselves. These loans were bullet loans, where the debtor pays the principle 
at the end of the loan period, which in these cases were often extended 
(Special Investigation Commission, 2010). Some of the executives and board 
members of the banks were personally liable for their debts, making them 
extremely vulnerable to a downswing in the share price. The internal lending 
of the banks became excessive. For example, according to information 
recently leaked to the public (see wikileaks: 
http://wikileaks.org/leak/kaupthing-bank-before-crash-2008.pdf), Kaupthing 
bank lent around €6.5 billion to six companies, four of which were in non-
arm’s length relationships with the bank’s major shareholders (Mason, 2009).  
Either partial or no collateral for these loans was required.  Exacerbating the 
situation was that apart from a few largest owners of the banks, other 
shareholders were weak, dispersed, and unprotected. With little assistance 
coming from the regulatory agencies, these shareholders had to rely on 
corporate governance mechanisms to protect their interests, but unfortunately, 
these mechanisms were not enforced. The thousands of shareholders should 
have addressed these agency concerns because so many of the Icelandic 
public had a stake in the banks, due to the government successfully 
establishing incentives for share ownership. The public was inactive and 
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challenged neither the boards nor the executives. The boards, which should 
have been the most central internal governance mechanism, acted more as 
partners of the managers than supervisory bodies.  
Aguilera and Jackson’s (2010) argument correlates closely to what occurred 
in Iceland. Their argument is that corporate governance should be better 
grounded in the “micro questions” of how actors at the firm level define their 
own identities and interests. This argument demands a more actor-centered 
analysis on firms and greater attention to the diverse identity and interest of 
different blockholders and new actors. This view reflects Vogel’s claim 
(2006) that theories of corporate governance must be anchored in a more 
subtle understanding of how different owners expert power and influence at 
the firm level. The Icelandic story supports the need to introduce a number of 
other perspectives to corporate governance based on culture, law and politics, 
to recognize the many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably 
enhance organizational functioning. Interconnected ownership was established 
when adventurous entrepreneurs became the largest shareholders of banks 
and, as such, board members and managers became considerable owners of 
shares, creating a complex conflict of interests between them and other agents 
as other shareholders and stakeholders.   
In line with this, studies show that managers have quite different views on the 
reasons for the existence of the firm (Witt and Redding, 2009). Witt and 
Redding discovered that US managers strongly subscribe to shareholder value 
thinking, where other stakeholders are secondary, German managers value the 
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importance of serving society and balancing the interests of employees and 
shareholders and Japanese managers put their emphasis on the interests of 
employees and society. Neither German nor Japanese managers were positive 
towards shareholder value thinking.  
The new “Icelandic Model” veered closer to the Anglo-Saxon one than the 
European or the Nordic model.  The Anglo-Saxon countries, the US, Britain, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, established stronger capitalism. The 
vision in Iceland was to foster growth and employment by increasing the 
flexibility of the labor market, and lowering welfare benefits in order to 
increase the autonomy of people and enterprises (while restricting state 
interference). Historically, Iceland has related itself to the other Nordic 
countries, but that perspective changed during the boom period. The Icelandic 
story might be viewed as an extreme case of a Nordic European country 
instituting Anglo-Saxon corporate governance mechanisms. A remark from 
the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce demonstrates this change in a rather self-
evident way:  
The Icelandic Chamber of Commerce recommends that 
Iceland stops comparing it to the other Nordic 
countries, since we are more advanced than they in 
most areas 
(Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2006).  
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The Nordic countries were blamed for having an overgrown welfare system 
that produced problems in practice (Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2006). 
However, it was ignored that, historically, the Nordic countries have been 
ranked among the most competitive nations in the world. The Icelandic 
Chamber of Commerce was searching for role models in the more capitalistic 
countries where the corporate and free enterprise culture was prevailing, and 
where the workforce submits (Icelandic Confederation of Labour, 2006). It 
illustrates that neoliberalism was placed high on Iceland’s agenda during the 
boom period, with welfare placed second. That agenda was not solely created 
by the private sector. The public sector had a large stake in the ideological 
shift, and the following section discusses and extends the analysis of the 
interaction between the public and private agents of society.  
 
Little Public Choice and Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory has directed researchers to think about the individual 
incentives underlying government policies. These policies are not the result of 
a decision by the government, but rather a decision taken by individuals 
within government institutions (van Winden, 1999). The perspective of this 
analysis is that politicians and bureaucrats bring their own interest to the 
decision making process. The interaction between these agents is at the center 
of analysis and the core of the paper “Weak Business Culture as an 
Antecedent of Economic Crisis: The Case of Iceland”. Political tradition and a 
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history of heavy state intervention in the Icelandic economy helped to create 
an unprecedented bond between politics and business, where the political elite 
was making all the major decisions on who was going to be involved in and 
who was going to miss out on the best business opportunities (Jonsson, 2009).  
This, along with having political connections as a key guiding business 
principle, made both regulation and oversight close to impossible (Sibert, 
2009).  The privatization of state-owned banks and other companies had 
allegedly occurred in a similar manner.  The most valuable and sought after 
assets, such as banks, were transferred at under the market value to a limited 
number of closely connected groups most of whom had not had much 
experience in managing large and sophisticated financial institutions (Wade, 
2009).  Although the original goal of bank privatization was to attract a small 
but diverse group of international investors, in reality domestic political 
interests were given a priority. To return the favor, the newly privatized banks 
became the largest donors to the parties in government (Iceland National 
Audit Office, 2009). However, how corruption is conventionally defined does 
not include a weak business culture of the sort that Iceland showed, and that 
may contribute to the public’s lack of knowledge. The lack of supervision, in 
turn, led to an unsustainable expansion of the Icelandic financial institutions, 
which prompted partially the crisis.  
The Icelandic case shows how important is to take into account the social 
groups and organizations in a given society (see the papers “Weak Business 
Culture as an Antecedent of Economic Crisis: The Case of Iceland” and 
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“Defensive Social Networks and the Loss of Policy-System Transparency”), 
although it does not seem to have played an essential role in public choice 
research (van Winden, 1999). There has been a neglect of the importance of 
social groups (in both organizations and unorganized forms), even though 
there is strong evidence for what an essential role social groups play in the 
determination of individual behavior that is found in the social psychological 
literature.  Interests (motivation), beliefs (cognition) and decision making (a 
cognitive, motivational and emotional process) are deeply dependent on group 
influence and lack of information and control play a crucial role herein (van 
Winden, 1999). The consortium that people choose to belong to provides 
them with not only information and other resources to promote their interest, 
but influences their interest. Policymakers confront an information problem 
concerning the social and economic consequences of their policies’ as well as 
the valuation of citizens. This way a potential lack of information and control 
is more problematic for decision making in the political sphere than in the 
private sphere. A potential consequence is that policymakers focus more 
easily on groups of citizens, and are interested in receiving information on the 
likely consequences of their policies for these groups (van der Zee, 1997). 
Policymakers, who are sometimes framed as “spokesmen” representing 
interests, are explained by this phenomenon (van der Zee, 1997). This might 
not come as a surprise where politicians are representatives of parties who 
represent interests of various social groups, as may be seen in the case of the 
Icelandic bankers.  The analysis in the paper “Defensive Social Networks and 
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the Loss of Policy-System Transparency” shows why it was difficult to 
challenge the concept of “financial stability”, advanced by those who believed 
the Icelandic banks were stable. Challengers were likely to realize that it was 
hard to identify one group as the key advocacy force or one type of argument 
as the main basis for the claims of stability. Therefore, focusing on the views 
of one group or on one particular style of debate in hopes of breaking the 
network apart (and thus communicating an alternative perspective) was 
difficult. This meant that counter-claims to stability were likely to have a hard 
time finding an open forum.   
A number of useful concepts have been developed by public choice theorists 
to explain the motives for government intervention in society. The core 
assumption of public choice is that public officials, as people in general, react 
to incentives in the same way, and pursue their own interests, leading 
governments to shape legislation and policies in direction to maximize their 
power (Tasic, 2010). Another assumption is that politicians expect an 
uninformed and naïve public (Buchanan, 1995). This ignorance of the public 
allows corrupt or less responsible politicians, to cheat the public in that way. 
The assumption that individuals are rational and selfish but the public in 
general (voters) are ignorant about political issues became the landmark 
concept in public choice theory, just as rent seeking, budget-maximizing 
bureaucracy, and powerful interests groups did (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962). In the Icelandic case, the defensive social network adversely affected 
discourse over the need for, and the form of, policy interventions. Citizens 
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could not form a clear picture of whether a critical system was working or 
near collapse. It seemed that even the policymakers themselves did not 
receive reliable feedback to design necessary policy interventions or 
renovations. Furthermore, administrators could not determine the extent to 
which policy measures were implemented or were being effective. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation includes five research papers. The papers and their specific 
research questions follow a sequence reflected in the way they are presented 
here. The strategy has been to expose the papers in academic forums in order 
to obtain relevant feedback and critique. All the papers have gone through 
blind peer review processes and three of them have been accepted for 
publication in academic journals, while the other two are in the review 
process.   
The first paper, “To Privatize Newly Nationalized Firms or Not”, sheds light 
on the results of the governance changes from privatization in Iceland and is, 
at the time of writing, in the review process of an academic journal. The paper 
finds that the government can expect some improvements in privatized SOEs, 
but not significant ones. On the other hand, fiscal conditions will improve, 
and the influence on the private sector can be expected to be beneficial. 
Additionally, SOEs will immediately begin their improvement process 
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concurrently with the announcement of their privatization. Lost jobs in the 
public sector will be compensated for in the private sector.  
The sample for the study consists of all Icelandic privatized companies for 
which there were at least three years’ annual accounting data before and after 
privatization. The firms come from all types of industries and are of various 
sizes. Therefore, the database is free of a bias that is present in much of the 
previous research on privatization, caused by the unavailability of data for 
mid-sized and smaller firms. The database is also free of a “cream of the crop” 
selection bias, since it does not only include SOEs known to be a good fit to 
the market. During the privatization period of 1992 to 2005, the Icelandic 
government privatized 33 companies, which was close to all SOEs potentially 
fit for privatization. Most of the privatization took place in the form of SIP 
(Share Issue Privatization). On four occasions, an asset sale was used, leaving 
a sample of 29 firms. Where accounting data were not publicly available, the 
firms were contacted and visited. This second approach applied to most of the 
firms. On occasion data was not available, for example, when privatized firms 
merged with private ones within three years from privatization, or where 
privatization had already begun in 1992. In a few instances, the owners 
declined to make data available. Despite the compulsory delivery of annual 
reports to the Icelandic Directorate of Internal Revenue, not all firms follow 
that rule. Subsequently, the information encompassed the data for 20 
privatized firms.   
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A control group of privately owned firms, spanning a wide variety of sectors 
and firm sizes is included in the study. The ÍSAT2008 industry coding system 
was used in order to choose appropriate firms to create pairs of privatized 
SOEs and private firms. The ÍSAT2008 system is based on the European 
Union’s NACE Rev. 2 industry indexation, which applies to all member 
countries of the European Economic Area (including Iceland). A list of all 
private firms belonging to the same industry indexation as the privatized ones 
was obtained from the Directorate of Internal Revenue. Those private firms 
that matched the industry indexation, and that operated during the same three 
years before and after privatization, were chosen as the control group. The 
same rule applied for data collection from the private firms as for the 
privatized ones. When possible, public accounting data was gathered; where 
this was not available, the firms themselves were directly contacted. 
Ultimately, 29 private companies were fit for comparison purposes.  All data 
used for the analysis were adjusted for inflation (applying the consumer price 
index (CPI)), using the year of privatization (year 0) as a base year.  Local 
currency data (Icelandic krona) was employed in all analysis and ratios were 
computed using nominal data in both the numerator and the denominator. 
Overall, the study used 20 privatized firms and 29 private firms, which totals 
49 firms. 
This study uses the methodology introduced by Megginson, Nash and van 
Randerborgh (1994). Change in any given indicator of performance is 
measured by comparing the three-year mean or median operating and 
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financial performance of privatized firms to their own mean or median 
performance during their last three years as an SOE. It rests on six broad 
indicators of performance: (1) profitability, (2) operating efficiency, (3) 
output, (4) capital investment, (5) leverage, and (6) employment. Profitability 
was calculated using three ratios: operating profits to assets (ROA), net profit 
to total equity (ROE), and operating profit to sales (ROS). In order to capture 
changes in operating efficiency, three ratios were calculated: sales to number 
of employees, net profit to number of employees, and operating profit to 
number of employees. Change in output was measured with two variables and 
defined as sales as a proportion of total assets, and sales comparison between 
periods. The impact privatization had on investments was analyzed by 
examining the stock of fixed assets in relation to sales and total assets.  
Leverage was measured as the ratio of liabilities to assets. A simple measure 
of the number of employees before and after privatization was used for 
analysis of reduction of employment. The study controls for macroeconomic 
and industry factors by computing the same indicators used to describe the 
performance of privatized firms for the control sample of private firms. 
The second paper, “The Icelandic Bank Collapse: Challenges to Governance 
and Risk Management”, published in Corporate Governance: An 
International Journal of Business in Society (Vol. 10, Issue 1), covers the 
subject of the governance failures within the Icelandic economy antecedent to 
the Financial Crisis in 2008. Multiple governance failures are presented, 
which resulted in a society not adequately alert to the increased risk of 
41 
 
governance changes. The research was based on an in-depth case study of the 
evolution of the governance challenges facing the Icelandic financial industry 
and the research strategy was based on the suggestions of Yin (2003) for 
conducting case analysis. The analysis in the study was on both the process 
and the context of change related to the liberalization process in Iceland and 
the privatization of the state owned banks. Data was collected from within the 
three Icelandic banks and comparable banks in the other Nordic countries. 
Economic data on the Icelandic economy were also analyzed in order to 
compare balances between the state and the banks. Sources of the data 
included industry reports, annual reports and news media reports. Interviews 
were conducted with CEO’s and VP’s of the banks, a former governor of the 
Icelandic Central Bank (who held the post during the time of the 
privatization), and a CEO of a pension fund, in order to gain in-depth 
knowledge about the changes in the banks’ operations and their cultures. The 
interviews were transcribed and coded and documents were analyzed based on 
the same coding system as the interviews. The coding system included 
categories for changes in bank operations, changes in corporate culture and 
financial indicators, warning signs, fortuitous signs, and so forth. 
The third paper, “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland‘s Financial 
Crisis and Nordic Comparison”, was published in Thunderbird International 
Business Review (Vol. 53, Issue 2). Keeping the conclusions of the first and 
second papers in mind, the question of whether or not there were warning 
indicators arises. In order to answer that, paper three provides comparative 
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research to contextualize the experience Iceland went through. To this end, it 
compares the Scandinavian Crisis of the 1990s with the Icelandic Crisis, 
focusing on the similarity between the two crises and possible contrasts. For 
comparison reasons, a common time line for Scandinavia and Iceland was 
created. The starting point used is the beginning of the deregulation process in 
each case. This was 1982 for Scandinavia but 1999 for Iceland. Although the 
deregulation process in Iceland began somewhat earlier, it took longer and the 
effects were, for a long time, barely visible. The year 1999 is approximately 
four years prior to the beginning of the lending boom in Iceland, but also an 
approximation of when deregulation began to change the Icelandic financial 
landscape. Using these assumptions, 1982 is used as a starting point for 
Scandinavia in the paper and 17 years later for Iceland. Thus, the year 1999 is 
defined as Period 1 or T for Iceland and 1982 or T minus 17 for Scandinavia. 
The length of the periods differs somewhat, mainly because some data was no 
longer available after the Icelandic banks went into default.  
The findings show that Iceland, by a wide margin, had more significant signs 
of over-expansion than Scandinavia, in practically all aspects. Scandinavia did 
not experience, as Iceland did, questionable business practices at the firm 
level leading to the danger of extensive collapse via a domino effect. At the 
macro level, the experiences of both Iceland and Scandinavia suggest that 
fiscal and monetary policies must involve consistent goals. When monetary 
and fiscal policy were unrestrained, this created a destabilized economy, and 
the doors that deregulation had unlocked were thrown open. A common 
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denominator was the unrestricted inflow of foreign capital due to interest rate 
differences. Hence, at the policy level, authorities should have ensured 
sufficiently strict regulation to monitor the slack at both the firm and macro 
levels, but did not.  
Paper four, “Weak Business Culture as an Antecedent of Economic Crisis: 
The Case of Iceland”, was published in the Journal of Business Ethics (Vol. 
98, Issue 2) and displays how corruption, but not in its traditional sense, 
contributed greatly to the collapse of the economy. Iceland was ranked as one 
of the least corrupt countries in the world (the least corrupt one in 2005 and 
2006 by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)). 
The findings of the paper, on the other hand, demonstrate that the measures 
employed to determine the level of corruption did not account for the 
variations found in the Icelandic society. The paper argues that there was a 
high level of corruption in Iceland that existed, not in the form of particular 
incidents yielding concrete benefits to the parties involved, but as an overall 
attitude that allowed a weak business culture and unethical business behavior 
to flourish. In order to illustrate how the Icelandic business culture helped to 
create an atmosphere susceptible to unethical and corrupt business practices, 
several key experts were approached and asked to provide examples of such 
practices, and explain how these practices contributed to the ensuing 
economic crisis. The interviewees came from different positions, such as a 
Member of Parliament, a manager at the Financial Supervisory Authority, an 
advocate to the Supreme Court and others.  
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Why was it difficult to ascertain the financial stability of Iceland?  
Alternatively, if it was not difficult, why was there no public outcry for 
change? Paper five, “Defensive Social Networks and the Loss of Policy-
System Transparency”, poses these questions and is, at the time of writing, in 
the review process of an academic journal. The paper suggests that the 
Icelandic response to foreign criticism (especially from Danske Bank in 
2006),  involved a social network that included bank executives, analysts, 
politicians, academics and newspapers, making arguments against 
challengers. The network that the defenders formed made it difficult for 
outsiders to be heard. Hence, citizens could not form a clear picture of 
whether a critical system, such as the financial system, was working properly 
or drifting towards a collapse. Policy makers did not receive reliable feedback 
in order to design necessary policy interventions or renovations. Although not 
the first analysis to raise concerns about the Icelandic economy and banking, 
the Danske Bank report that was published on 21 March 2006 was the 
sharpest in its criticism. While the Danish bank’s challenge came in the form 
of technical economic arguments, the historic ties between Iceland and 
Denmark provided a particular emotional element to the debate that Icelandic 
groups were quick to bring to the fore, a strong characteristic of the hubris 
prevailing in Iceland at the time.  
Social network analysis illustrates how those responsible for the maintenance 
of a complex system defend challenges to that system’s stability. By using a 
sample selection of 31 articles written in the Icelandic press in response to the 
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Danske Bank challenge of 2006, the paper illustrates and analyses the dense 
network of people and arguments that were formed. Arguments are the 
rationalizations, speculations, or suggestions that people advance for the 
actions or positions taken by challengers, defenders, or others. Arguments fell 
into three broad categories: those based on data given in the Danske Bank or 
other formal reports (‘report-based’, seven items); those based on 
psychological affects or emotions (‘affective’, seven items); and issues or 
suggestions that were raised for parties to consider and act upon (‘issues’, four 
items).  An argument is counted only once per person per article. Each 
argument that a person made in an article is separately identified. Similarly, 
each person is counted separately, regardless of whether that person made the 
same argument as another person in the same article.  
 
RELEVANCE AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PAPERS 
The public at large relies on good corporate governance for the protection of 
its interests. As such, strong governance is central to economic health and 
social welfare. The relevance of good governance is considerable, and is a 
basis for institutions such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), who promote good governance throughout the world 
(OECD, 2010).  Some scholars choose to define corporate governance in a 
strict way, focusing on the financial aspects of corporate governance (see, for 
example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, a case such as the Icelandic 
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one requires a broader scope of the term “corporate governance”. Thomsen 
(2007) argues that corporate governance is a multidisciplinary topic, drawing 
on the fields of economics, law, sociology, psychology, and political science. 
The papers included in this thesis will support this argument.  
Publicly available information and processes are what stakeholders (whether 
shareholders, employees, customers, creditors or the public) use to be 
informed of a company’s actions, and hence they use this information for their 
decision-making. The premise is that both a company’s processes and 
information are valid. In an ideal democracy, politicians are the agents of 
citizens; bureaucrats are the agents of the politicians, and managers are agents 
of shareholders. Agents are expected to act on behalf of their principal. 
According to this approach, agency problems arise when agents renege on 
their agreements with principals, in favor of their personal interest (Lancaster 
and Montinola, 1997).   
Misleading measures and concealed information are outlined in the paper 
“Weak Business Culture as an Antecedent of Economic Crisis: The Case of 
Iceland”. It finds agency and public choice problems arising in all sectors of 
governance: the private sector, the public sector and in the civil society. It 
suggests that corruption in Iceland was at a high level prior to the Financial 
Crisis of 2008, while admitting that the unreliability of measures applied to 
identify corruption and the methodology used for collecting information are 
imperfect. The research shows that corruption is conventionally construed in 
such a way that it misses the practices that have the same impact as 
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corruption, but do not fall within the mainstream notion used by institutions 
such as the OECD or Transparency International. The consequence of this is 
that the public is unaware of the level of corruption and thus unable to address 
it properly, creating a dilemma of asymmetric information. 
The agency problem in the form of asymmetric information is the central 
theme of the paper “Defensive Social Networks and the Loss of Policy-
System Transparency”. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are 
noticeable, but as the paper shows, this is only when a strong network of 
defending stakeholders has been dismantled. Bank executives and politicians 
alike met foreign criticism about the stability of the Icelandic economy and 
banks prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis with great defiance. A “defenders’ 
network” was formed and defended the financial stability until it became a 
“black box”, meaning a concept or construct that is so difficult to challenge 
that it became taken for granted. Ideas can become “black boxes” as advocates 
build on the work of others, making it hard to dispute a present fact without 
implicitly challenging past facts (Latour, 1987). Social network analysis is 
used in the paper to illustrate how those responsible for the maintenance of 
the complex financial system within the Icelandic community defended the 
challenges that were posed by outsiders to the system’s stability. It 
demonstrates how this defense was structured to reduce the transparency of 
the system to members of the community. It also adversely affected discourse 
regarding the need for, and the form of, policy interventions. In this way, the 
public is not able to form a clear picture of whether the financial system is 
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working or is near collapse. Therefore, policy makers do not receive reliable 
feedback to design necessary policy interventions or renovations and 
administrators cannot determine the extent to which policy measures are 
implemented or effective.  
Agency problems are further revealed and discussed in the other papers. 
Thomsen (2007) presents a list of classical agency problems and many of 
them are highlighted in the paper “The Icelandic Bank Collapse: Challenges 
to Governance and Risk Management”. The paper discusses how a collection 
of governance failures accumulated, starting with deregulation and 
privatization, followed by  process of liberalization evolving into the laissez 
faire attitude of the government, and ending with entangled ownership issues 
within industries, preventing sufficient public debate to prompt reasonable 
criticism of both government and industry. Agency theory states that private 
ownership can decrease familiar threats found in public ownership. According 
to a former governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, this is what took place at 
the privatization of the Icelandic banks:  
[Before privatization,] managers of the public banks were not 
thinking too much about profitability. Things went fine if the 
institutions would show some profits but too much meant 
political difficulties. Then politicians would want to get that 
money for other projects. This all changed with privatization. 
Today there are thousands of shareholders in the banks and 
to them it is extremely important that the banks are efficient 
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and make profit. There is a complete change in ideology. 
(Gunnarsson, 2007).  
The “complete change in ideology”, as the governor puts it, appeared to have 
driven the vast growth of the Icelandic banks. However, soon the new owners’ 
ideology raised questions related to classic agency problems. Liberalization 
and privatization were, in the Icelandic case as in some others, treated as a 
discrete act rather than a part of a progressive process (examples can be seen 
from the Scandinavian Banking Crisis in the 1990’s, e.g. Jonung, 2008; 
Englund and Vihrala, 2007).  
Were there no warnings signs of the mounting governance vulnerabilities? 
The Scandinavian Banking Crisis took place only a decade and a half prior to 
the Icelandic Crisis and there is a substantial political and economic 
resemblance among the Nordic countries (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
and Denmark). Could Iceland have learned from what went wrong in 
Scandinavia? The paper: “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s 
Financial Crisis and Nordic Comparison” takes this perspective and asks if 
there were warning signs antecedent to the Icelandic Crisis.  
The similarities between the two crises are remarkable. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) defined the Scandinavian Crisis as one of the “Five Big Ones”. 
Although all instances showed signs of a threat, Iceland showed by a much 
wider margin substantial signs of a threat in practically all aspects. At the firm 
level, governance issues became more questionable in Iceland than in 
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Scandinavia, and were of such a scale that they ultimately facilitated the 
collapse. Close managerial relationships, cross-ownership, and cross-lending 
all established imbalances in favor of business over regulatory authority. This 
was not a problem in Scandinavia, since overexpansion there was mostly 
limited to real estate (Jonung, 2008). Nor did foreign criticism manage to 
influence the general discussion in the Icelandic media. The abolishment of 
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, allowing investment banks in the US to again 
become part of the general banking system, had adverse results. The outcome 
was that banks in the international arena imitated the mingling of commercial 
and investment banking. Icelandic banks took this further; they increasingly 
became investment banks rather than commercial banks, although they 
remained traditional banks on the surface. With a partial government 
guarantee, risk-taking bankers grew their institutions to nine times the 
country’s GDP, creating the circumstances in which all the banks stood a 
chance of failing, within parameters of certain negative events. At a policy 
level, deregulation both in Iceland and Scandinavia has been discussed as a 
primary root of the respective financial collapses. However, that is a 
simplification. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that a financial 
crisis is more likely in an unregulated environment where there is a lack of 
respect for the rule of law and corruption is widespread. However, when a 
laissez faire attitude reigns, and monetary and fiscal policy are unrestrained, 
deregulation and adventurous business culture is strongly embraced.     
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Privatization was a large and important part of the liberalization and 
deregulation process which provided economic benefits to Iceland, as the 
paper “To Privatize Newly Nationalized Firms or Not” reveals. As discussed 
earlier, the privatization process of the public banks could have been more 
successful, to say the least. After the collapse of the economy, the government 
was given a second chance to get privatization right, as it had taken over 
dozens of badly hurt private firms. The findings of the paper indicate that 
even though Icelandic State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) seem to be efficient, 
improvements follow privatization, and many of the side effects of 
privatization are positive. The private sector, being faced with new and 
structurally different competition following the privatization of the SOEs, also 
showed significant improvements in performance. In addition, the fiscal 
conditions of the state improved, for obvious reasons. The paper also reveals a 
strong “announcement effect” from the time of the privatization being 
reported, as announcing privatization immediately began driving the recovery 
of the SOEs.  To summarize, the findings support the prediction that 
privatization can have a significant role in creating economic growth, but the 
privatization process itself must not be careless or corrupt, as the Icelandic 
experience reveals.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Iceland’s experience exhibits procedures that created economic growth, which 
was combined with a lack of governance over liberalization and privatization, 
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requires widespread action. The papers show how important it is for policy 
makers to be aware of the structural elements of networks that can form 
around policy issues. A theoretical key point that is often neglected, but is a 
core of the thesis, is that what matters are the particular combinations of 
institutions, taking into account a range of possible interactions and 
complementarities among institutions. The resulting clusters or configurations 
of institutions are more complex than simple bipolar models of corporate 
governance such as shareholder versus stakeholder, market versus bank, or 
outsider versus insider (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  
Networks, as discussed here, arise to defend a community’s institutions, 
which can work against transparency. Without understanding the true state of 
complex systems, social policy can be misdirected. A valuable future research 
would be to design ways to map such networks quickly, as they are arising, in 
order to show the citizenry and others affected by the outcome of the debate, 
who is participating in the discussion and who is not. In the case of Iceland, it 
would have proven beneficial to citizens and legislators to highlight in a 
tangible way the ownership connections between companies, the connections 
between boards of directors, and the connections between media outlets, 
politicians, and companies. This challenge could be met by establishing an 
institution that can serve as a “translator” of such networks. Members of such 
an institution would have to be chosen before a crisis occurs, coming from 
trusted and separate segments of the community. Foreign representatives 
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would be important since Iceland is a small state; therefore, kinship ties 
closely link the community. 
Inadequate indices for measuring corruption reveal a different and possibly 
more menacing form of corruption, which was not detected using traditional 
notions and measurements of corruption. How corruption is defined should 
depend on evaluating corruption at the macro level. In this way, the weak 
business culture that flourished in Iceland might have been exposed. The 
proposed definition of corruption is: 
It is corruption when one or more sector dominates other 
sectors of the society and abuses that position in the 
organization of resources, public goods, or to exercise 
undue influence.  
This definition captures the situation when industries (such as the financial 
industry in Iceland) misuses its power to collect resources, whether private or 
public goods, and simultaneously diminishes the leverage of institutions, such 
as the FSA. Improving the indicators for corruption might enable policy 
makers to measure whether healthy power balances exist within a society. 
This would make an interesting new research. One indicator might be the 
relative size and influence of a particular sector. Another indicator could be 
the extent to which authorities enforce existing rules. The next indicator might 
measure the degree to which the public and supervisory authorities are 
engaged with the private sector to promote ethics and a responsible business 
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culture, since having rules and regulations often do not suffice. A further 
indicator could look into the relationship between the media and major 
businesses in a country and whether or not these entities are tightly connected 
through direct or indirect ownership. An important indicator, and related to 
the proposal of installing an independent supervisory institution, is the use of 
international experts, i.e. people not affiliated with any sort of political or 
business interest in Iceland.   
Business practices in Iceland have become questionable and the ownership 
structure and the organizational design of such a fundamentally important 
industry as banking should change. The extensive collapse was the result of 
managerial relationships, cross-ownership, cross-lending, and the bank 
owners themselves becoming large users of bank credit. One reason why 
things got so unmanageable is that the Icelandic banks operated as investment 
banks, imitating US banks’ operations after the Glass-Steagall Act was 
repealed in 1999, but becoming more investment banks than commercial ones. 
The impecunious supervisory authority had little chance to control the 
powerful financial players. The separation that existed between investment 
and commercial banking should be re-enacted. Another measure that should 
be taken is to enforce a legal separation between entities that banks have 
combined on a single balance sheet, thus providing separate capitalization and 
separate governance structures for different operations. Furthermore, 
transparency for stakeholders should increase, leading to better governance 
and by diminishing complexity, firmer action from regulators.  
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Neither boards nor shareholders seem to have understood the characteristics 
of the new and complex finance industry, undervaluing the risk the banks 
were running. The mechanisms to oversee and control management were not 
in place. A “fit and proper” criterion should be reconsidered for both boards 
and management. It is even worthwhile to consider whether such tests should 
be extended to a lower level of management. Furthermore, a new regulatory 
agenda should contain an increase in the minimum capital requirements and 
stricter rules on liquidity management, keeping in mind that the banks 
financed themselves through money markets that evaporated. The quality of 
assets and securities must be addressed, as these can be constraints on 
liquidity.  
This thesis addresses a number governance issues on several levels. These are 
governmental, firm, and civil society. Government obviously has a need to 
strike a balance between entrepreneurial growth, risk exposure, and balanced 
societal development. The Icelandic case describes a laissez faire attitude, 
where risk and balanced development issues were neglected. Furthermore, the 
civil society in Iceland cherishes welfare growth, but has lacked critical 
insights into core processes. Presumably, a critical non-governmental 
organization and analyst engagement with good information could have 
triggered a much more adequate public debate, which would in turn have put 
pressure on both government and industry.   
  
57 
 
REFERENCES 
Aguilera, R.V., and Jackson, G. (2010). Comparative and international 
corporate governance. Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 485-
555. 
Aguilera, R.V., and Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of 
corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants. Academy of 
Management Review, 28(3), 447-465. 
Ahmadjian, C.L., and Robbins, G.E. (2005). A clash of capitalism: Foreign 
shareholders and corporate restructuring in 1990s Japan. American 
Sociological Review, 70(3), 451-471.  
Aoki, M., and Miyajima, H. (2007). Corporate governance in Japan: 
Institutional change and organizational diversity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Aoki, M., and Patrick, H.T. (1994). The Japanese main bank system: Its 
relevance for developing and transforming economies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Becht, M., and Roell, A. (1999). Blockholdings in Europe: An international 
comparison. European Economics Review, 43(4-6), 769-787. 
Blair, M.M. (1995). Ownership and control: Rethinking corporate governance 
for the twenty-first century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.  
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1994). Voucher privatization. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 35, 249-266. 
58 
 
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.C., and Guiedhami, O. (2001). Liberalization, 
corporate governance and the performance of newly privatized firms 
(William Davidson working paper number 419). Michigan: The 
William Davidson Institute.    
Buchanan, J.M. (1995). The creation of public choice theory. Economic 
Insights. Dallas: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.  
Buchanan, J.M., and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: logical 
foundations of a constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Buck, T., and Shahrimi, A. (2005). The translation of corporate governance 
changes across national cultures: The case of Germany. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 26(1), 42-61. 
Chung, C.N., and Luo, X.W. (2008). Institutional logics or agency costs: The 
influence of corporate governance models on business group 
restructuring in emerging economies. Organization Science, 19(5), 
766-784.  
Cox, A.W. (1986). State, finance and industry: A comparative analysis of post-
war trends in six advanced industrial economies. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R., and Cannella, A.A. (2003). Introduction to special 
topic forum corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. 
Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 371-382.  
59 
 
Dalton, D.R., Hitt, M.A., Certo, S.T., and Dalton, C.M. (2007). The 
fundamental agency problem and its mitigation: Independence, equity, 
and the market for corporate control. Academy of Management 
Annals, 1, 1-64. 
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Certo, S.T., and Roengpitya, R. (2003). Meta-
analysis of financial performance and equity: Fusion or confusion? 
Academy of Management Journal, 46, 13-26. 
Davis, G.F. (2005). New directions in corporate governance. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 31, 143-162.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Detragiache, E. (1998).  Financial liberation and 
financial fragility.  Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-
1251813753820/6415739-1251813951236/demirguc.pdf 
Edwards, J., and Fisher, K. (1994). Banks, finance and investment in 
Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy 
of Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. 
Englund P., and Vihrala V. (2007). Financial crises in developed economies: 
The cases of Sweden and Finland. Stockholm: Handelshogskolan. 
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal 
of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. 
60 
 
Fauver, L., and Fuerts, M.E. (2006). Does good corporate governance include 
employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 673-710. 
Feenstra, R.C., and Hamilton, G.G. (2006). Emergent economies, divergent 
paths: Economic organization and international trade in South Korea 
and Taiwan. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Freeman, R.E., Harrison, J.S., Wicks, A.C., Parmar, B.L., and de Colle, S. 
(2010). Stakeholder theory: The state of the art. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gospel, H., and Pendleton, A. (2005). Corporate governance and labor 
management: An international comparison. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gourevitch, P.A., and Shinn, J. (2005). Political power and corporate control: 
The new global politics of corporate governance. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Hall, P.A., and Soskice, D. (2001). An introduction to varieties of capitalism. 
In P.A. Hall and D. Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of capitalism: The 
institutional foundations of comparative advantage (pp. 1-70). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Hansmann, H., and Kraakman, R. (2000). The end of history for corporate 
law. Georgetown Law Journal, 41(1), 123-141. 
Iceland Chamber of Commerce. (2006). Viðskiptaþing Íslands 2015. 
Retrieved from: 
61 
 
http://www.vi.is/files/1612898009%C3%8Dsland%202015%20Vi%C3
%B0skipta%C3%BEing%202006.pdf 
Icelandic Confederation of Labor. (2006). Lífskjör á Norðurlöndunum. 
Retrieved from: 
http://www.asi.is/Portaldata/1/Resources/upplysingarit/lifskjor.pdf. 
Jackson, G. (2007). Employment, participation and adjustment in Japan. In M. 
Aoiki, G. Jackson and H. Miyajima (Eds.), Corporate governance in 
Japan: Institutional change and organizational diversity . Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Jonsson, A. (2009). Why Iceland? New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Jonung, L. (2008). Lessons from financial liberalization in Scandinavia.  
Comparative Economic Studies, 50, 564-598. 
Jonung, L. (1999). Looking ahead through the Rear-view Mirror. Swedish 
Stabilization Policy 1975-1995. A summary. Stockholm: Ministry of 
Finance. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W. (1998). Law 
and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Lancaster, T. D., and Montinola, G.R. (1997). Toward a methodology for the 
comparative study of political corruption. Crime, Law & Social 
Change, 27, 185-206.  
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
62 
 
Lebenstein, H. (1966). Allocative efficiency vs. x-efficiency. American 
Economic Review, 56(3), 392-415. 
Lubatkin, M.H., Lane, P.J., Collin, S.O., and Very, P. (2005). Origins of 
corporate governance in the USA, Sweden and France. Organization 
Studies, 26(6), 867-888. 
Mason, R. (2009). Kaupthing loan book details culture of the collapsed bank. 
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/ 
banksandfinance/6796964/SFO-to-probe-collapse-of-Icelandic-
bank.html  
Megginson, W., and Netter, J. (2001). From the State to market: A survey of 
empirical studies on privatization. Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 
321-389. 
Megginson, W., Nash, R. C., and Randenborgh, M. (1994). The financial and 
operating performance of newly privatized firms: An international 
empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 49, 403-452.   
Morck, R. (2005). A history of corporate governance around the world: 
Family business groups to professional managers. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  
National Audit Office. (2003). Privatization of main state owned enterprises 
1998-2003. Retrieved from http://www.rikisendurskodun.is/fileadmin/ 
media/skyrslur/einkavaeding.pdf 
63 
 
OECD. (2010). Corporate governance. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37439_1_1_1_1_37439,00
.html 
Parkinson, J. (2003). Models of the company and the employment 
relationship. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41, 481-509. 
Pistor, K. (1999). Codetermination: A sociopolitical model with governance 
externalities. In M.M. Blair, and M.J. Roe (Eds.), Employees and 
corporate governance (pp. 163-193). Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution.  
Rajan, R.G., and Zingales, L. (2000). The governance of the new enterprise. 
In X. Vives (Ed.), Corporate governance: Theoretical and empirical 
perspectives (pp. 201-260). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K. (2008). Is the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis so 
different?  An international historical comparison.  University of 
Maryland and Harvard University. 
RUV. (2011). Silfur Egils. Retrieved from: http://dagskra.ruv.is/sjonvarpid/ 
4544845/2011/01/30/. 
Sanders, W.M., and Carpenter, M.A. (2003). Strategic satisficing? A 
behavioral  agency theory perspective on stock repurchase program 
announcements. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2), 160-178. 
Sheshinski, E., and Lopez Calva, L. (1999). Privatization and its benefits: 
Theory and evidence (HIID Development discussion paper 698). 
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University. 
64 
 
Schneper, W.D., and Guillen, M.F. (2004). Stakeholders’ rights and corporate 
governance: A cross-national study of hostile takeovers. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), 263-295. 
Shirley, M., and Walsh, P. (2000). Public vs. private ownership: the current 
state of the debate. World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal 
of Finance, 52, 737-783. 
Sibert, A. (2009). Could Greenland be the new Iceland? Retrieved from 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3857, accessed January 22, 
2010. 
Special Investigation Commission. (2010). Skýrsla rannsóknarnefndar 
Alþingis. Retrieved from: http://sic.althingi.is/ 
Tasic, S. (2010). The modern growth of government springs more from ideas 
than from vested interests. The Independence Review,14(4), 549-568. 
Thomsen, S. (2007). An introduction to corporate governance: Mechanisms 
and systems. Copenhagen. DJOF Publishing. 
van Winden, F. (1999). On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a 
group frame of reference in political economics. Public Choice, 1-2, 1-
29. 
van der Zee, F.A. (1997). Political economy models and agricultural policy 
formation: Empirical applicability and relevance for the CAP. PhD. – 
thesis, Landbouquniversiteit Wageningen.  
Vogel, D. (2006). The market for virtue. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.  
65 
 
Wade, R. (2009). Iceland as Icarus. Challenge, 52(3), 5-33.   
Yanagawa, N. (2007). The rise of bank-related corporate revival funds. In M. 
Aoiki, G. Jackson, and H. Miyajima (Eds.), Corporate governance in 
Japan: Institutional change and organizational diversity (pp. 205-223). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Yin, R.K. (2003). Case study research: design and methods (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Zingales, L. (1998). Corporate governance, The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law (pp. 479-503). London: Macmillan.  
 
APPENDIX. INTERVIEWEES 
Gunnarsson, B.Í., governor of the Central Bank of Iceland. 30 July 2007. 
Sigurdsson, H.M., CEO of Kaupthing bank. 15 July 2007. 
 
 
 
  
66 
 
 
PAPER 1: TO PRIVATIZE NEWLY NATIONALIZED FIRMS 
OR NOT 
  
 
Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson 
 
Under review for publication in an academic journal 
  
 
  
 
 
  
67 
 
Abstract 
Existing research suggests that privatization leads to both the financial and 
operating improvements of divested firms in developed (for example, Bishop and 
Kay, 1988; Vining and Boardman, 1992) and developing (Megginson and Jeffrey 
Netter, 2001) countries alike. This research uses data from the Icelandic 
privatization era of 1992-2005 and data from a comparison group of private firms 
during the same period. The data is free of a bias that is present in much of the 
previous research on privatization, namely the unavailability of data for mid-
sized and smaller firms, and also free of a “cream of the crop” selection bias, 
since it does not include only State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) known to be a 
good fit to the market. Since the financial crisis of 2008, many governments have 
taken over private firms, either in full or partially, and the decision whether to re-
privatize has to be taken. In Iceland, the government took over the majority of 
the country’s largest firms. It is important for future decisions on re-privatization 
to understand past outcomes.  This empirical research suggests that privatization 
did not lead to improvements of the divested SOEs in Iceland as their operation 
was efficient, both before and after privatization. Nevertheless, control groups of 
private firms perform better.   
 
Keywords: Privatization, Deregulation, Corporate Governance, Financial Crisis, 
Policy Making, Iceland. 
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I. Introduction 
The collapse of the Icelandic economy in the autumn of 2008 led to the 
nationalization of many of the country’s largest firms. Consequently, the 
government found itself in the position of having to decide whether or not to 
privatize, and having to consider the issue of whether private firms perform 
better than public firms do. Hence, the research question is; did the privatized 
SOEs of the 1992-2005 privatization era lead to operational improvements of the 
divested firms? This question is relevant for other countries in which the state 
has taken over badly hurt firms.    
 
Iceland carried out an extensive privatization program during the period from 
1992 to 2005 during which the government privatized more or less every SOE 
(33) fit for divestment (National Audit Office, 2003). The same right wing pro-
liberalization and privatization coalition governed for the entire period. 
Following the 2008 crisis, a new left wing government had to take over dozens 
of private firms, providing the government with a second opportunity to launch a 
privatization program. The issue for the government is whether or not to 
privatize, a decision that should not be made without analyzing the results from 
the initial privatization program of 1992 to 2005. This paper presents the findings 
of the first research on this privatization program.  
 
The literature is clear about the effects of privatization, suggesting positive 
improvements. Within emerging economies the results of privatization have 
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largely been successful (although the variance is great), but most success stories 
come from high or middle-income countries (Kikeri and Nellis, 2002). The 
Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland) have mostly 
been omitted from the literature on privatization and this type of research is non-
existent for Iceland. The Nordic countries have a well-established legal and 
institutional framework (OECD, 2006), which is an important premise for 
successful privatization. On the other hand, the Nordic countries’ SOEs are 
already efficient (Willner, 2003), which might reduce the gains to be expected 
from privatization.  
 
This research provides the first empirical estimates of the results from the 
privatization program in Iceland by analyzing privatized firms and comparing 
them with a control group of private ones. The results provide support for policy 
makers, both in Iceland and in other countries that are faced with decisions about 
whether to privatize nationalized firms or not.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the empirical literature. 
Section III describes the methodology and the data. Section IV presents the basic 
empirical results and Section V provides a summary and conclusion.  
  
II.  Literature 
Keeping in mind the necessary premises for a successful privatization process, 
the initial privatization program in Iceland should have been a success. The 
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premises are identified by, among others, Kikeri and Nellis (2002) and 
Megginson (2003). Political commitment is an important premise and one very 
much in evidence in Iceland during the entire privatization period. The same 
prime minister was at the helm throughout the program and his right wing 
cabinet established a strong coalition for change, providing both political and 
administrative commitment. Commitment from the public was secured by, in 
addition to other incentives, a considerable tax rebate on stock purchases of the 
privatized firms. This resulted in the public making up a large portion of the 
owners of the divested firms (Magnusson, 2007).  In addition, personal income 
and corporate taxes were reduced, reaching the lowest levels in Europe (IMF, 
2007). Another important premise is to ensure competition within the industries 
that the privatized firms were to enter. In order to ensure competition, the 
government prevented mergers within industries that were influenced by 
privatization (Sigurjonsson, 2010). Financial sector reform is another premise, 
which occurred gradually, a major milestone of this being the joining the 
European Economic Area (EEA) in 1993. Hence, Iceland adapted most of the 
EU´s legal and institutional frameworks. Deregulation goes hand in hand with 
successful privatization, which was a part of the government’s program in 
Iceland from 1979 (Sigurjonsson and Mixa, 2011). The aim was to strengthen the 
stock market by allowing institutional investors (e.g. pension funds) to invest in a 
domestic stock and bond market. Transparency is a key premise to ensure trust 
and positivity of both the public and investors. The National Audit Office in 
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Iceland regularly published reports on the progress of privatization with the aim 
of monitoring and providing transparency to the public.  
 
The privatization of the state owned banks was a somewhat different story. The 
banks were amongst the last SOEs to be privatized (in 2003) and the process was 
not a conventional one. The state privatization committee initially intended to 
offer the banks to a number of small institutional investors (where foreign 
ownership was to be a consideration), and individuals. However, the two ruling 
political parties focused on domestic political interests and therefore majority 
ownership was sold to domestic groups of investors who had no prior experience 
in commercial banking, but were closely tied to the political parties (Special 
Investigation Commission, 2010). The banks soon became the ruling parties’ 
greatest sponsors (Icelandic National Audit Office, 2009). Furthermore, the new 
owners were significant owners of Icelandic business, resulting in broad cross-
ownership and therefore creating a large risk of extensive collapse if one link in 
the chain was to fail. Because of this process, the new shareholders of the banks 
(many of them being the banks’ board members) also became the banks’ largest 
debtors (Vaiman, Sigurjonsson and Davidsson, 2011). Within a few years, the 
banks’ balance sheets grew to become nine times Iceland’s GDP. A lack of 
transparency soon became evident but criticism petered out as the media did not 
act as a watchdog for stakeholders, possibly because the media outlets were 
owned by the same investors as the banks. The conduct of corporate governance 
within the Icelandic banks did not foster sustainability (Vaiman et al, 2010; 
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Sigurjonsson, 2010), and within five years of privatization, the banks were all 
bankrupt.  
 
Even though the privatization of the banks was a failure (mainly because of to 
whom the banks were privatized), the government met most of the necessary 
premises for a successful privatization program. On the other hand, if a country 
already has efficient SOEs, the incremental benefits from privatization may be 
diminished.  
 
The vast literature on privatization suggests, almost without exception, that 
privatization brings benefits to society. The exceptions appear when the 
necessary premises for successful privatization are not in place. The benefits of 
privatization are traditionally measured as changes in operating and financial 
performance of the SOEs (Estrin et al, 2009), such as, SOEs becoming more 
efficient, more profitable, financially healthier and increasing their capital 
investment spending, both in developed and developing countries (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001; Bishop and Key, 1988; Vining and Boardman, 1992). The 
results have led to a widespread policy argument in favour of privatization.   
 
Divesting of ownership can be driven by various motives: financial, political and 
economic. Governments have financial motives where privatization is a source of 
revenue collection and eliminates subsidies to SOEs (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
The Icelandic government collected over 2.6 billion USD through privatization 
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and reduced the net public debt as a percentage of GDP from 33.7% to 7.4% 
(Icelandic Ministry of Finance, 2007). 
 
The political motives for privatization often include the argument that the market 
has a superior ability to allocate resources compared with the state’s weakness in 
this area. In addition, privatization may introduce foreign capital and institutional 
investors, which can help develop capital markets. The privatization ideology in 
Iceland was of this kind, although it did not open up to foreign ownership in the 
privatized SOEs (Special Investigation Commission, 2010). The superiority of 
private ownership over public ownership is argued in most of the empirical 
research on privatization (Boubakri, Cosset, and Guiedhami, 2001; Ehrlich, 
Gallais-Hamonno;  Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh, 1994; Ng and 
Seabright, 2001; Wei, Varela, D´Souza, and Hassanet, 2003). Although these 
findings state that privatization in itself does not have to be the main cause of the 
observed improvements in the performance of privatized firms. Factors that can 
influence performance after privatization might be management issues and 
competitiveness within industries. Policy reforms would have to be a prerequisite 
for successful transition (Svejnar, 1989; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Blanchard, 
Dornbusch, Krugman, Layard, and Summers, 1991; Aghion and Blanchard, 
1994; Choi and Silanes, 2010).  
 
The methodology of measuring the performance change of privatized firms has 
become classic; this methodology was introduced by Megginson and Netter, 
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2001; Megginson, Nash and van Randeborgh, 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; 
and D‘Souza, Nash and Megginson, 2000. They all use a similar methodology, 
using data from three years pre and post privatization and comparing financial 
and operational performance measures, in both developed and developing 
countries. The results of this are uniform. There is a statistically significant 
privatization improvement in the most common measures used (profitability, 
efficiency, output, leverage). They also name the most significant factors for 
improvement, these being changes in incentive and management structure along 
with improved corporate governance.  
 
However, not all studies show improvements in the divested firms. Research by 
Choi and Silanes (2010), where the performance of privatized companies up to 
10 years is taken into account, claims that measured improvements from 
privatization is a mere reflection of the world business cycle. Campbell and 
Bhatia (1998) found that through new investments, the poorer countries 
experienced an increase of their capacity utilization, new technology was 
introduced and markets were expanded. Boubakri and Cossett (1998) came to 
similar conclusions, but profitability, efficiency, output and leverage did not 
change much. However, positive fiscal effects have consistently been found, no 
matter the type of country (Davis, Ossowski, Richardson and Barnett, 2000). 
When the privatized firms begin to pay taxes, budget deficits declined, net 
transfers to SOEs are reduced and start to become positive (Sheshinski and 
Lopez-Calva, 1999). Taxes paid by privatized firms tend to be considerably 
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higher than pre-sale dividends (Kikeri and Nellis, 2002). The welfare 
consequence from privatization is a general increase in the total resources in the 
economy. However, it is rare for all stakeholders (sellers, buyers, consumers, 
employees and competitors) to gain welfare benefits out of privatization. This 
depends on how the transaction is organized, what the level of institutional 
development is, and the competence of the economy. An example of this is when 
a government prices an SOE lower than it might otherwise do. In this way, the 
government ensures that lower income, first time shareholders can participate in 
the issue, and the sale process itself should be swift and successful. Shareholders 
gain, but the seller collects less.  
 
III. Data and methodology 
Data 
The sample used to investigate the relation between changes in ownership 
structure and firm performance consists of all Icelandic privatized companies for 
which there was at least three years’ annual accounting data before and after 
privatization. The firms come from all types of industries and are of various 
sizes. Hence, the database is free of a bias that is present in much of the previous 
research on privatisation, namely the unavailability of data for mid-sized and 
smaller firms (Choi and Silanes, 2010). The database is also free of a “cream of 
the crop” selection bias, since it does not include only SOEs known to be a good 
fit to the market (Kikeri and Nellis, 2002). During the privatization era of 1992 to 
2005, the Icelandic government privatized 33 companies, which was close to all 
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the SOEs potentially fit for privatization (Sigurjonsson, 2010). Most of the 
privatization took place in the form of SIP (Share Issue Privatization). On four 
occasions an asset sale was used, leaving a sample of 29 firms (the method of 
asset sales led to the incorporation of the divested firms’ assets into the books of 
the purchasers; hence data is not available for research). Table 1 provides an 
overview of all the privatized SOEs, the year of privatization and the form of the 
privatization method. Where accounting data was not publicly available, the 
firms were contacted and visited. This second approach applied to most of the 
firms. On occasion, data were not available where privatized firms merged with 
private ones within three years from privatization. Where the privatization had 
already begun in 1992, in some cases the data were not available. On a few 
occasions, the owners declined to hand over the data. Despite the compulsory 
delivery of annual reports to the Icelandic Directorate of Internal Revenue, not 
all firms follow that rule. The missing 13 firms are spread over both in terms of 
industry and size. The data finally encompassed that of 20 privatized firms.   
 
A control group of privately owned firms, spanning a wide variety of sectors and 
firm sizes is included in the study. The ÍSAT2008 industry coding system was 
used in order to choose appropriate firms to create pairs of privatized SOEs and 
private firms. The ÍSAT2008 system is based on the European Union‘s NACE 
Rev. 2 industry indexation which applies to all member countries of the 
European Economic Area (including Iceland). The aim of the indexation is to 
secure parallelism in comparison between nations. A list of all private firms 
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belonging to the same industry indexation as the privatized ones was obtained 
from the Directorate of Internal Revenue. Those private firms matching the 
industry indexation, being of similar size and operating during the same three 
years before and after privatization were chosen as the control group. The same 
rule applied for data collection of the private firms as for the privatized ones. 
When possible, public accounting data were gathered.  Where this data was not 
available the firms themselves were contacted. Ultimately, 29 private companies 
were fit for comparison purposes.   
 
All data used for the analysis was adjusted for inflation (applying the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)), using the year of privatization (year 0) as a base year.  Local 
currency data (Icelandic krona) was employed in all analysis and ratios were 
computed using nominal data in both the numerator and the denominator. 
Overall, the study used 20 privatized firms and 29 private firms, which totals 49 
firms.  
 
 
Methodology 
Megginson, Nash and van Randerborgh (1994) first introduced a methodology 
for privatization studies. Change in any given indicator of performance is 
measured by comparing the three-year mean and median operating and financial 
performance of privatized firms to their own mean or median performance 
during their last three years as an SOE (Choi and Silanes, 2010). This study 
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(using the above methodology) rested on six broad indicators of performance: (1) 
profitability, (2) operating efficiency, (3) output, (4) capital investment, (5) 
leverage and (6) employment.  
 
Profitability was calculated using three ratios: operating profits to assets (ROA), 
net profit to total equity (ROE), and operating profit to sales (ROS). Using 
operating profits provided information on “pure” efficiency gains where net 
profit takes into consideration effects of changes in leverage, which often 
accompany privatization (Barber and Lyon, 1996).  
 
In order to capture changes in operating efficiency, three ratios were calculated: 
sales to number of employees, net profit to number of employees, and operating 
profit to number of employees. Operating efficiency ratios are interesting to use 
where SOE have been criticized for lacking efficiency (Frydman, Gray, Hessel 
and Rapaczynski, 2000; Kornai, 1998; Berglof and Roland, 1998).    
 
The privatization literature mostly documents significant increases in output 
following privatization (Choi and William Megginson, 2010). In this study, 
change in output was measured by two variables, and was defined as sales as a 
proportion of total assets and sales comparison between periods.  
 
The impact that privatization has on investments was analysed by examining the 
stock of fixed assets in relation to sales and total assets. Large capital investment 
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spending is required on some occasions in order to have well functioning 
infrastructure. It was therefore of interest to see what results privatized firms 
achieved in this respect. 
 
According to the literature, capital structure seems to change following 
privatization (Hansmann and Krakkman, 2000; Martin and Parket, 1997). SOEs 
may enjoy implicit or explicit loan guarantees enabling them to borrow more 
cheaply than private firms may. In addition, SOEs cannot usually issue stock. 
Therefore, it can be expected that they are more leveraged than private firms. 
Leverage was measured as the ratio of liabilities to assets.   
 
The literature reports evidence of both layoffs and wage cuts because of 
privatization (e.g. La Porta and Silanes (1999) report a reduction in employment 
by half) and no evidence of employment reduction (Megginson, Nash and van 
Randerborgh, 1994). In this study, a simple measure of the number of employees 
before and after privatization was used for analysis.  
 
The study controlled for macroeconomic and industry factors by computing the 
same indicators used to describe the performance of privatized firms for the 
control sample of private firms. Table 2 shows the indicators of performance 
change that were used for analysis.  
 
 
80 
 
IV. Results 
The performance of the privatized firms is presented in Table 3. Immediately 
noticeable is that five out of twelve variables change significantly after 
privatization. One out of three profitability ratios show a significant increase 
(p<0.1) (ROE). Return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA) do not change 
significantly, although ROS shows an improvement in profitability by 65% of 
firms.   
 
The three variables for efficiency, namely sales efficiency (measured by real 
sales per employee), net income efficiency (measured by net income per 
employee) and operating income (measured by operating income per employee) 
all change significantly according to the predicted relationship. They also show a 
significant improvement (p<0.05) in all measures for 75%, 70% and 75% of the 
firms, respectively. These results suggest that the Icelandic SOEs significantly 
improve their efficiency, an objective that governments launching privatization 
programs often emphasize.  
 
The results show a significant increase in real sales (p<0.05). The firms’ total 
output increased by 65%, from 4646165 (811422) to 12629330 (869008) (in 
Icelandic krona) after privatization. This seems to contradict the often-mentioned 
argument that SOEs tend to overproduce to satisfy political objectives (Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). An explanation could be that private firms often 
have more flexible financing opportunities and greater incentives for increased 
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output (Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994). Sales in relation to 
assets, on the other hand, do not show significant change, although 60% of firms 
show an increase of that ratio.  
 
Neither measures of change in investments show a significant increase. 
Nonetheless, half of the firms show movement in the direction of an increase. 
The literature suggests such a trend (Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 
1994), but a significant change does not apply here.  
 
The results report no significant change in the level of leverage after 
privatization. It was predicted that leverage would decrease as private firms do 
not have the same access to “cheap” money as SOEs do in some instances and 
SOEs do not issue stocks. A quite large share of the firms in fact moved in the 
direction of increased leverage (60%).  
 
Studies on privatization report mixed results in changes in employment of 
divested firms. La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) reported a significant 
decline in the number of employees where Megginson, Nash and van 
Randenborgh (1994) found a non-significant decline in employment. The result 
for the Icelandic case is non-significant.  
 
Comparison of the mean and median values reveals a difference between these 
two measures. For example, changes in employment. The mean increases after 
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privatization while the median declines. When concurrently examining the data 
for each industry, the financial industry stands out in its improvement (although 
an unsustainable one as earlier discussed). In Table 4, the financial industry is 
excluded from the sample. The results change from showing five measures 
changing significantly, to only two out of twelve measures showing a significant 
change. The ROE does not show a significant change in net profit per employee 
or in changes in output (real sales). More often, a significant change in direction 
is seen, or in six cases out of twelve.   
 
Research on privatization has been criticized for not controlling for the general 
level of economic activity before and after privatization (Choi and Silanes, 
2010). The argument is that such studies are incapable of distinguishing between 
changes in firm attributes arising from change in ownership and from ordinary 
fluctuations in economic activity. Iceland enjoyed economic growth from the 
time of the first privatization in 1992 until its last one in 2005. Hence, there is a 
reason for analyzing whether increases in profits, efficiency and sales growth of 
privatized firms are mere manifestations of economic and industry factors. Table 
5 presents a control group of the private firms used for this comparison. The 
private firms are “twin firms” of the privatized ones in the sense that they come 
from the same industries, have the same industry indexation (see Section III, on 
data and methodology) and the data comes from the same privatization period 
(the same three years before and three years after).  
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When the results for the control group are analyzed, it becomes evident that there 
is a significant change in eight measures out of twelve.  Table 5 shows these 
results.  Significant changes are found in many of the variables where the 
privatized firms do not show significant changes, such as investments in fixed 
assets, leverage and employment. The control group shows an increase in 
employment as well, a decrease in leverage and an increase in fixed assets. On 
the other hand, improvements in operating efficiency measures are seen in only 
one out of three, and significant changes in profitability measures are seen in 
only one out of three. When financial firms are omitted from the calculations, 
less significant changes are seen (as in the case of the privatized firms). The drop 
in significant variables is from eight out of twelve to five out of twelve. The 
private firms still show significant changes in one of the profitability measures 
(ROS), both measures of output and in leverage and employment (see Table 6). 
These improvements by the private firms could most likely be explained by the 
fact that they were faced with increased competition from their privatized “twin” 
firms.   
 
The profitability of the median Icelandic SOE is not too different from that of its 
private sector peer. Profitability grows noticeably after privatization, as the 
significant changes in performance of the SOEs indicate. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate 
this point by graphically showing the behaviour of the median profitability 
measures through time, for both the sample of SOEs and the control group of 
private firms. SOEs show ROE before privatization similar to private firms but 
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overtake them after privatization. Regarding the ROA measure, SOEs are lagging 
behind private firms before privatization but improve greatly after privatization. 
It is only in ROS where the privatized firms do not catch up with private firms, 
although they improve. See Figures 1 to 3.  
 
Operating efficiency measures are reported in the same descriptive way in 
Figures 4 and 5 (by sales to employees and net profit to employees). Operating 
efficiency increases after divestiture, supporting the idea that privatization can 
have a significant anticipation effect. This result would be consistent with Martin 
and Parker (1995) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). In all the measures for 
operating efficiency, SOEs show significant improvements. See Figures 4 and 5.  
 
On the other hand, the number of employees initially decrease considerably (a 
great deal prior to privatization (years -3 to 0), and moderately after that (nearly 
50%)). The private firms increase their number of employees for the comparison 
period. This indicates that employment cuts are a part of the story of observed 
gains in efficiency. See Figure 6.  
 
When combining the results into one table (see Table 7), excluding financial 
firms (therefore N=18 for privatized firms and N = 18 for private firms), the 
comparison reveals that privatized firms barely show significant changes (in only 
two out of twelve measures) whereas private firms do better and show a 
significant change in five out of twelve measures. In operating efficiency 
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measures, SOEs show significant improvements. Private firms show 
improvements in a variety of measures; profitability, output, leverage and 
employment. It does not seem that SOEs are able to catch up with industry trends 
in their post-privatization period, where private firms outperform them. There is 
a tendency of the two groups to meet the predicted direction of change for each 
measure (see the last two columns of Table 7). Although running a chi-square 
test on the two categorical samples (see Table 8), reveals that there is generally 
not a statistical significant association between the two groups.  
 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
The findings support the argument that Icelandic SOEs are efficient before 
privatization and continue to be so after divestment. Although there is little 
significant change in their operations after privatization, the general direction is 
towards improvement. Significant changes are only found in two measures out of 
twelve (when financial firms are excluded), or in sales to employees, and 
operating profit to employees. These two significant changes seem to be driven 
by the reduction in numbers of employees especially during the three years 
leading up to the privatization year (Figure 6 shows this trend).  
 
Controlling for potential market changes, privatized firms are equal to their 
private counterparts in many measures. On the other hand, when faced with new 
competition, private firms show significant improvements in more measures than 
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privatized firms do. Hence, the privatization effect on industry’s efficiency is 
positive. Private firms show significant improvements in a variety of measures 
(profitability, output, leverage and employees), where privatized firms show only 
significant improvements where decrease in number of employees is the 
denominator. This indicates that privatization does not lead to significant 
improvements unless reduction of employees is prior to privatization. Private 
firms, on the other hand, prepare themselves for increased competition and 
potential expansion into new markets by searching for efficiency and 
effectiveness. They improve on most categories of measures, although not on 
operating efficiency, the reason being the significant increase in number of 
employees.  
 
The fiscal effects of privatization are very positive, decreasing public debt to 
GDP in Iceland from 33.7% to 7.4%. State subsidies are also greatly affected as 
almost all SOEs are privatized. The announcement effects of declaring 
forthcoming privatization seems to be considerable as the 40% decrease of 
employment at SOEs prior to privatization indicates (years -3 to 0). However, the 
efficiency gains take a few years to materialize as figures one to five imply.   
 
The research question asks whether privatized SOEs improve their operations 
after privatization. The short answer is no. Nevertheless, the research shows the 
positive side effects of privatization. Privatized SOEs continue to be efficient and 
move in positive directions. Private firms improve their operation on a variety of 
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measures, although in running the chi-square test it shows that on two measures 
(leverage and employment) the private firms move significantly in the opposite 
direction to privatized ones. Private firms are 5.26 times more likely to move in 
the direction of decreasing their leverage than privatized ones and 3.57 times 
more likely to increase their number of employees than privatized ones. On the 
other hand, privatized firms are 5.26 times more likely to increase the Sales/Total 
assets ratio than private ones. On other measures, there is no significant 
difference in the direction privatized and private firms move.  
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Table 1. Overview of all privatized firms  
This table provides an overview of all privatized SOEs during 1992 – 2005, year 
of privatization and method of privatization.   
  Company  Year of privatization completed Method of privatization
1 Flugskóli Íslands hf. (aviation) 2005 Share issue privatization (SIP) 
2 Landssími Íslands hf.  (telecom) 2005 Mixed
3 Lánasjóður landbúnaðarins (finance) 2005 SIP 
4 Barri hf. (manufacturing) 2004 SIP 
5 Búnaðarbanki Íslands hf. (finance) 2003 Mixed
6 Íslenskir aðalverktakar hf. (construction) 2003 SIP 
7 Landsbanki Íslands hf. (finance) 2003 Mixed
8 Sementsverksmiðjan hf. (manufacturing) 2003 SIP 
9 Íslenska járnblendifélagið hf. (manufacturing) 2002 SIP 
10 Steinullarverksmiðjan hf.  (manufacturing) 2002 SIP 
11 Kísiliðjan hf. (manufacturing) 2001 SIP 
12 Stofnfiskur  (fishing industry) 2001 SIP 
13 Intís hf. (IT) 2000 SIP 
14 Áburðarverksmiðjan hf. (manufacturing) 1999 SIP 
15 FBA (finance) 1999 SIP 
16 Hólalax hf. (fishing industry) 1999 SIP 
17 Íslenska menntanetið hf. (IT) 1999 SIP 
18 Skólavörubúð Námsgagnastofnunar (retail) 1999 Asset sale
19 Skýrr hf. (IT) 1998 SIP 
20 Bifreiðaskoðun hf. (?? 1997 SIP 
21 Jarðboranir hf. (research) 1995 SIP 
22 Lyfjaverslun Íslands hf. (pharmaceutical) 1995 SIP 
23 Þörungaverksmiðjan hf. (manufacturing) 1995 SIP 
24 Þormóður rammi hf. (fish industry) 1994 SIP 
25 Rýni hf. (research) 1993 SIP 
26 SR-mjöl hf. (fish industry) 1993 SIP 
27 Ferðaskrifstofa Íslands hf. (tourist industry) 1992 Direct sale to employees
28 Framleiðsludeild ÁTVR (manufacturing) 1992 Asset sale
29 Íslensk endurtrygging hf. (finance) 1992 SIP 
30 Menningarsjóður (culture) 1992 Asset sale
31 Prentsmiðjan Gutenberg hf. (manufacturing) 1992 SIP 
32 Ríkisskip (transportation) 1992 Asset sale
33 Þróunarfélag Íslands hf. (finance) 1992 SIP 
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Table 2. Measures used in the research and predicted relationship 
This table presents the economic characteristics examined for changes resulting 
privatization. The predicted changes in the characteristics are detailed. The 
symbols a and b in the predicted relationship column stand for after and before, 
respectively.   
Characteristics Description Predicted relationship 
Profitability   
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Operating profits divided by total assets ROAa > ROAb 
Return on equity 
(ROE) 
Net profit divided by total equity ROEa > ROEb 
Return on sales (ROS) Operating profits divided by sales ROSa > ROSb 
Operating efficiency   
SALES/EMP Sales divided by the number of employees SALES/EMPa > SALES/EMPb 
NP/EMP Net profit divided by the number of employees NP/EMPa > NP/EMPb 
OP/EMP Operating profits divided by the number of 
employees 
OP/EMPa > OP/EMPb 
Output   
Sales /Total Assets 
(Sales/TA) 
Sales divided by total assets Sales/TAa > Sales/TAb 
Sales (SALES) Sales comparison between periods SALESa > SALESb 
Investment   
INV/Sales Increase in fixed divided by sales INVa > INVb 
INV/Total Assets Increase in fixed assets divided by total assets INVa > INVb 
Leverage   
Total  leverage (LEV) Liabilities divided by assets LEVa < LEVb 
Employment   
 (EMP) Number of employees EMPa < EMPb 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
Table 3. Results from test of predictions for the full sample of all privatized 
firms 
This table presents the empirical results for the complete sample of available 
privatized firms for the period 1992 – 2005. For each performance measure, the table 
provides the mean and the median values for the three-year period before and after 
privatization. Change in mean and values of the performance indicators are provided 
after versus before privatization in column five. The sixth column provides the 
Wilcoxon Z statistics for the difference in median values. The two remaining columns 
provide the proportion of firms whose performance changed as predicted and the 
significance test of this change from 50%.  ***, **, * denote significance levels of 
1.5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
Variables N Mean 
before 
(median) 
Mean 
after
(median) 
Mean 
change
(median) 
Z-Statistics for 
difference in 
medians (after-
before) 
Percentage of 
firms that 
changed as 
predicted 
P-value for 
proportion 
Test
Profitability 
ROA 
 
20 3.12 
(1.96) 
5.92 
(3.99) 
2.80 
(2.03) 
z = -0.971 ns 0.50   0.500
ROE 
 
20 
 
4.22 
(5.77) 
7.67 
(8.96) 
3.45 
(3.19) 
z = -1.755, p<0.1 * 0.70 
 
0.037**
ROS 20 -8.03 
(4.86) 
2.06 
(11.41) 
10.09 
(6.5) 
z = -0.859 ns 0.65 0.090*
Operating efficiency 
Sales/EMP 20 13993 
(12004) 
25209 
(14004) 
11216 
(2000) 
z =-2.427, p < .05 ** 0.75 
 
0.013**
NP/EMP 20 262 
(263) 
2272 
(992) 
2010 
(729) 
z=-1.755, p<0.1 * 0.70 0.037**
OP/EMP 20 679 
(561) 
1702 
(1182) 
1023 
(621) 
z= -2.165, p < .05 ** 0.75 0.013**
Output 
Sales/Total 
Assets 
20 0.8376 
(0.7045) 
0.9811 
(0.8468) 
0.1435 
(0.1423) 
z=-1.195 ns 0.60 0.190
Real sales 20 4646165 
(811422) 
12629330 
(869008) 
7983165 
(57586) 
z=-2.091,  p < .05** 0.65 0.090*
Investments in fixed assets 
Fixed 
assets/sales 
20 0.71 
(2.04) 
9.50 
(3.50) 
8.78 
(1.46) 
z=-0.560 ns 0.55 0.330
Fixed assets / 
total assets 
20 1.8440 
(0.6892) 
-1.0928 
(1.6215) 
-2.9368 
(0.9323) 
z=-0.485 ns 0.50 0.500
Leverage 
Liabilities/ 
Assets 
20 47.59 
(46.76) 
55.32 
(54.50) 
7.73 
(3.74) 
z=-1.008 ns 0.40 0.814
Employment 
EMP 20 244 
(86) 
324 
(60) 
80 
(-26) 
z=-0.112 ns 0.45 0.673
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Table 4. Results from test of predictions for the full sample excluding financial 
firms  
This table presents the empirical results for the complete sample of available 
privatized firms excluding financial firms. For each performance measure, the table 
provides the mean and the median values for the three-year period before and after 
privatization. Change in mean and values of the performance indicators are provided 
after versus before privatization in column five. The sixth column provides the 
Wilcoxon Z statistics for the difference in median values. The two remaining columns 
provide the proportion of firms whose performance changed as predicted and the 
significance test of this change from 50%. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1.5 
and 10 percent, respectively.   
Variables N Mean 
before 
(median) 
Mean 
after
(median) 
Mean 
change
(median) 
Z-Statistics for 
difference in 
medians (after-
before) 
Percentage of 
firms that 
changed as 
predicted 
P-value for 
proportion 
Test
Profitability 
ROA 
 
18 3.40 
(3.91) 
6.51 
(6.72) 
3.11 
(2.81) 
z = -1.154 ns  0.50 0.500
ROE 
 
18 
 
4.00 
(4.22) 
7.40 
(8.96) 
3.40 
(4.74) 
z = -1.502 ns  0.67 
 
0.079*
ROS 18 -9.97 
(3.95) 
-0.42 
(9.17) 
15.13 
(5.22) 
z = -0.4145 ns  0.61 0.170
Operating efficiency 
Sales/EMP 18 12419 
(10816) 
22555 
(12298)
10135 
(1482)
z = -2.069, p<.05 ** 0.72 
 
0.030**
NP/EMP 18 112 
(176) 
717 
(748) 
605 
(572) 
z=-1.198 ns  0.67 0.079*
OP/EMP 18 557 
(425) 
1279 
(887) 
721 
(462) 
z=-1.677, p<0.1 * 0.67 0.030**
Output 
Sales/Total 
Assets 
18 0.92 
(0.78) 
1.08 
(0.89) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
z=-1.372 ns  0.67 0.079*
Real sales 18 2361000 
(781267) 
2700600 
(764709) 
339600 
(-16558) 
z=-1.590 ns  0.61 0.170
Investments in fixed assets 
Fixed 
assets/sales 
18 -0.11 
(1.11) 
1.41 
(-0.55) 
1.52 
(-1.66) 
z=-0.152 ns  0.50 0.500
Fixed 
assets/total 
Assets 
18 1.95 
(0.55) 
-1.70 
(-1.35) 
3.65 
(-1.90) 
z=-0.762 ns  0.44 0.680
Leverage 
Liabilities/ 
Assets 
18 42.44 
(43.78) 
51.38 
(51.99) 
8.94 
(8.21) 
z= -1.154 ns  0.33 0.092*
Employment 
EMP 18 172 
(74) 
144 
(52) 
-28 
(-22) 
z=-0.719 ns  0.50 0.500
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Table 5. Results from test of predictions for the full sample of private firms (control group) 
This table presents the performance changes for the private firms (the control group). 
The table presents, for each empirical proxy the number of observations, the mean 
and median values of the proxy for the three year periods prior and subsequent to the 
privatization years, the mean and median change in the proxy’s value after versus 
before privatization. Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its z-statistic) is used as the test 
of significance for the change in median values. The two remaining columns provide 
the proportion of firms whose performance changed as predicted and the significance 
test of this change from 50%. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1. 5 and 10 
percent, respectively. 
Variables N Mean 
before 
(median) 
Mean 
after
(median) 
Mean 
change
(median) 
Z-Statistics for 
difference in medians 
(after-before) 
Percentage 
of firms that 
changed as 
predicted 
P-value for 
proportion 
Test
Profitability 
ROA 
 
29 6.83 
(5.43) 
6.44 
(1.22) 
-0.3894 
(-0.42145) 
z = -0.205 ns  0.48 0.570
ROE 
 
29 
 
5.32 
(5.65) 
4.65 
(4.98) 
-0.6625 
(-0.6781) 
z = -0.811 ns  0.45 
 
0.710
ROS 29 5.49 
(10.32) 
24.65 
(24.24) 
19.17 
(13.93) 
z = -3.03,  p < .05 ** 0.69 0.021**
Operating efficiency 
Sales/EMP 29 21439 
(24225) 
21949 
(19566) 
510 
(-4659) 
z =-0.097 ns  0.52 
 
0.436
NP/EMP 29 1578 
(1004) 
4924 
(1746) 
3345 
(743) 
z=-3.276,  p< .05 ** 0.72 0.008***
OP/EMP 29 876 
(726) 
896 
(788) 
20 
(62) 
z=-0.443 ns  0.48 0.574
Output 
Sales/Total 
Assets 
29 0.9495 
(0.7979) 
0.7894 
(0.6865) 
-0.1601 
(-0.1114) 
z=-2.952, p < .05 ** 0.21 0.999
Real sales 29 2646694 
(1272771) 
4777186 
(1437757) 
2130491 
(164986) 
z=-3.319, p < .05 ** 0.72 0.008***
Investments in fixed assets 
Fixed 
assets/sales 
29 -0.45 
(2.65) 
13.07 
(10.71) 
13.52 
(8.05) 
z=-2.887, p< .05** 0.76 0.003***
Fixed 
assets/total 
Assets 
29 -2.27 
(0.88) 
3.79 
(2.51) 
6.07 
(1.63) 
z=-2.087, p < .05 ** 0.76 0.003***
Leverage 
Liabilities/ 
Assets 
29 72.04 
(82.13) 
64.79 
(81.84) 
-7.25 
(-0.29) 
z= -2.519, p< .05 ** 0.72 0.008***
Employment 
EMP 29 128 
(62) 
165 
(72) 
37 
(10) 
z=-3.473, p< .05 ** 0.21 0.999
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Table 6. Results from test of predictions for the full control group sample 
excluding financial firms  
This table presents the empirical results for the complete sample of available 
private firms excluding financial firms. For each performance measure, the table 
provides the mean and the median values for the three-year period before and 
after privatization. Change in mean and values of the performance indicators are 
provided after versus before privatization in column five. The sixth column 
provides the Wilcoxon Z statistics for the difference in median values. The two 
remaining columns provide the proportion of firms whose performance changed 
as predicted and the significance test of this change from 50%. ***, **, * denote 
significance levels of 1. 5 and 10 percent, respectively.    
Variables N Mean 
before 
(median) 
Mean 
after
(median) 
Mean 
change
(median) 
Z-Statistics for 
difference in 
medians (after-
before) 
Percentage of 
firms that 
changed as 
predicted 
P-value for 
proportion 
Test
Profitability 
ROA 
 
18 11.15 
(9.16) 
10.55 
(10.95) 
-0.60 
(1.79) 
z = -0.109 ns  0.56 0.319
ROE 
 
18 9.46 
(9.21) 
8.77 
(10.12) 
-0.69 
(0.91) 
z = -0.370 ns  0.50 
 
0.500
ROS 18 7.03 
(11.03) 
25.98 
(26.21) 
18.95 
(15.18) 
z = -2.069, p < .05 ** 0.61 0.173
Operating efficiency 
Sales/EMP 18 15689 
(12977) 
14784 
(11612) 
-905 
(-1365) 
z =-0.457 ns   0.50 0.500
NP/EMP 18 784 
(383) 
1507 
(804) 
723 
(421) 
z=-1.590 ns  0.61 0.173
OP/EMP 18 1401 
(733) 
1436 
(1151) 
35 
(418) 
z=-0.457 ns  0.56 0.389
Output 
Sales/Total 
Assets 
18 1.45 
(3.25) 
1.21 
(0.99) 
-0.24 
(-2.26) 
z=-2.504, p < .05 ** 0.28 0.970
Real sales 18 1443826 
(1297738) 
2004309 
(1356869) 
560483 
(59131) 
z=-2.417, p < .05 ** 0.72 0.030**
Investments in fixed assets 
Fixed 
assets/sales 
18 2.16 
(2.94) 
4.41 
(3.64) 
2.25 
(0.70) 
z=-0.675 ns 0.61 0.173
Fixed 
assets/total 
Assets 
18 -3.21 
(2.99) 
4.60 
(6.22) 
7.81 
(3.23) 
z=-1.032 ns  0.68 0.079*
Leverage 
Liabilities/ 
Assets 
18 60.67 
(59.95) 
52.02 
(54.59) 
-8.65 
(-5.36) 
z= -1.807, p<0.1* 0.72 0.030**
Employment 
EMP 18 125 
(73) 
158 
(129) 
33 
(56) 
z=-2.983, p < .05** 0.78 0.009***
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Table 7. Results from test of predictions for the combined sample of 
privatized and private firms  
This table presents the combined performance changes for the privatized firms 
and the control firms. The table presents, for each empirical proxy the number of 
observations, the mean and median values of the proxy for the three-year periods 
prior and subsequent to privatization, the mean and median change in the proxy’s 
value after versus before privatization, and a test of significance of the mean 
change. Wilcoxon signed rank test (with its z-statistic) is used as the test of 
significance for the change in median values. The two remaining columns 
provide the proportion of firms whose performance changed as predicted and the 
significance test of this change from 50%. ***, **, * denote significance levels 
of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
Variables Type N Mean 
before 
(median) 
Mean 
after 
(median) 
Mean 
change 
(median) 
Wilcoxon Percentage 
of firms that 
changed as 
predicted 
P-value for 
proportion 
Test 
Profitability 
ROA 
Privatized  18 3.40 
(3.91) 
6.51 
(6.72) 
3.11 
(2.81) 
z = -1.154  0.50 0.500 
Private 18 11.15 
(9.16) 
10.55 
(10.95) 
-0.60 
(1.79) 
z = -.109 ns  0.56 0.319 
ROE 
 
Privatized  18 4.00 
(4.22) 
7.40 
(8.96) 
3.40 
(4.74) 
z = -1.502ns 0.67 
 
0.079* 
Private 18 9.46 
(9.21) 
8.77 
(10.12) 
-0.69 
(0.91) 
z = -.370 ns  0.50 
 
0.500 
ROS Privatized  18 -9.97 
(3.95) 
-0.42 
(9.17) 
15.13 
(5.22) 
z = -.415 ns  0.61 0.170 
Private 18 7.03 
(11.03) 
25.98 
(26.21) 
18.95 
(15.18) 
z = -2.069, p < 
.05 ** 
0.61 0.173 
Operating 
efficiency 
        
Sales/EMP Privatized  
 
18 12419 
(10816) 
22555 
(12298) 
10135 
(1482) 
z = -2.069, 
p<.05** 
0.72 
 
0.030** 
Private 18 15689 
(12977) 
14784 
(11612) 
-905 
(-1365) 
z =-.457 ns   0.50 0.500 
NP/EMP Privatized  18 112 
(176) 
717 
(748) 
605 
(572) 
z=-1.198 ns  0.67 0.079* 
 Private 18 784 
(383) 
1507 
(804) 
723 
(421) 
z=-1.590 ns  0.61 0.173 
OP/EMP Privatized  18 557 
(425) 
1279 
(887) 
721 
(462) 
z=-1.677, 
p<0.1* 
0.67 0.030** 
 Private 18 1401 
(733) 
1436 
(1151) 
35 
(418) 
z=-0.457 ns  0.56 0.389 
Output         
Sales/Total 
assets  
Privatized  
 
18 0.92 
(0.78) 
1.08 
(0.89) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
z=-1.372 ns  0.67 0.079* 
Private 
 
18 1.45 
(3.25) 
1.21 
(0.99) 
-0.24 
(-2.26) 
z=-2.504,  p< 
.05 ** 
0.28 0.970 
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Sales  Privatized  
 
18 2361000 
(781267) 
2700600 
(764709) 
339600 
(-16558) 
z=-1.590 ns  0.61 0.170 
Private 
 
18 1443826 
(1297738) 
2004309 
(1356869) 
560483 
(59131) 
z=-2.417, p < 
.05** 
0.72 0.030** 
Investment 
in fixed 
assets 
        
Fixed assets / 
sales 
  
Privatized  18 -0.11 
(1.11)
1.41 
(-0.55)
1.52 
(-1.66)
z=-.152 ns  0.50 0.500 
Private  18 2.16 
(2.94) 
4.41 
(3.64) 
2.25 
(0.70) 
z=-.675 ns  0.61 0.173 
Fixed assets / 
total assets 
Privatized  18 1.95 
(0.55) 
-1.70 
(-1.35) 
3.65 
(-1.90) 
z=-.762 ns  0.44 0.680 
Private 18 -3.21 
(2.99) 
4.60 
(6.22) 
7.81 
(3.23) 
z=-1.032 ns  0.68 0.079* 
Leverage         
Liabilities/ 
Assets  
Privatized  18 42.44 
(43.78) 
51.38 
(51.99) 
8.94 
(8.21) 
z= -1.154 ns  0.33 0.092* 
Private  18 60.67 
(59.95) 
52.02 
(54.59) 
-8.65 
(-5.36) 
z= -1,807, 
p<0.1* 
0.72 0.030** 
Employment         
Employment Privatized 18 172 
(74) 
144 
(52) 
-28 
(-22) 
z=-.719 ns  0.50 0.500 
Private 18 125 
(73) 
158 
(129) 
33 
(56) 
z=-2.983, p< 
.01*** 
0.78 0.009*** 
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Table 8. Results from Pearson chi-square test on the two privatized and 
private samples  
The test examines whether there is an association between the two categorical 
variables (privatized and private and whether they improve on measures or not, 
incident to privatization). The Pearson chi-square statistic tests whether the two 
variables are independent.   
 
 
Type N Firms increase 
on measure 
Firms 
decreasing on 
measure 
Chi-square Odds 
ratio 
Profitability 
ROA 
Privatized  18 9 9 X2 (1, N=36)  = 0.110, ns 
  
0.8 
Private 18 10 8 
ROE 
 
Privatized  18 12 6 X2 (1, N=36) = 1.029, ns 2.0 
Private 18 9 9 
ROS Privatized  18 11 7 X2 (1, N=36) = 0.000, ns 1.00 
Private 18 11 7 
Operating 
efficiency 
      
Sales/EMP Privatized  18 13 5 X2 (1, N=36) = 1.870, ns 2.6 
Private 18 9 9 
NP/EMP Privatized  18 12 6 X2 (1, N=36) =  0.120, ns 1.27 
 Private 18 11 7 
OP/EMP Privatized  18 12 6 X2 (1, N=36) = 0.468, ns 1.6 
 Private 18 10 8 
Output       
Sales/Total 
assets  
Privatized  18 12 6 X2 (1, N=36) = 5.461, p < .05 5.26 
Private 18 5 13 
Sales  Privatized  18 11 7 X2 (1, N=36) = 0.500, ns 0.6 
Private 18 13 5 
Investment 
in fixed 
assets 
      
Fixed assets / 
sales 
Privatized  18 9 9 X2 (1, N=36) =  0,.50, ns 0.64 
Private  18 11 7 
Fixed assets / 
total assets 
Privatized  18 8 10 X2 (1, N=36) = 1.800, ns 0.4 
Private 18 12 6 
Leverage       
Liabilities/ 
Assets  
Privatized  18 6 12 X2 (1, N=36) = 5.461, p < 0.05 0.19 
Private  18 13 5 
Employment       
Employment Privatized 18 9 9 X2 (1, N=36) = 3.010, p < 0.1 0.28 
Private 18 14 4 
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Figures 1 – 6 present performance proxies for the privatized firms and the 
control firms before and after going public, one accounting measure in each 
panel.  
 
 
Figure 1. Return on assets for privatized firms versus private firms 
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Figure 2. Return on equity for privatized firms versus private firms 
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Figure 3. Return on sales for privatized firms versus private firms 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Median ratio of sales over employees for privatized firms versus 
private firms 
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Figure 5. Median ratio of net profit over employees for privatized firms 
versus private firms 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of employees for privatized firms versus private firms 
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Abstract 
 
Purpose - The purpose of this article is to examine the extreme case of the 
Icelandic banking crisis in relation to critical governance issues at governmental, 
industry and civil society levels.    
Design/methodology/approach - Case study of the Icelandic banking collapse 
in 2008.  
Findings – The examination of governance failures within the Icelandic banking 
system reveals that government institutions need to find a balance between 
entrepreneurial growth, risk exposure and sustainable societal development. A 
euphoric attitude of laissez-faire, where risk issues and issues of balanced 
development are largely ignored create challenges for sustainable banking. The 
findings suggest that achieving the necessary balance requires stressing 
governance issues on three levels; at the government level; at the industry level 
and at the civil society level.    
Practical implications -  This paper illustrates why some of the corporate 
governance challenges facing sustainable banking should be addressed at 
multiple levels. Government should strive for realistic information and 
evaluation of societal risks; government should implement adequate regulatory 
frameworks; the finance industry itself should have effective self-regulatory 
procedures and mechanisms; and, from a civil society point of view, the public at 
large should have realistic expectations and be adequately alerted of the potential 
risks of governance failure.   
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Originality/value – This paper examines interactions between governance 
failures at different levels and has important implications for governance and 
policy makers, particularly those faced with re-structuring national financial 
industries.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the Icelandic banks in October 2008 was interwoven with 
corporate governance issues. The saga begins with deregulation and privatization 
through the liberalization process of financial markets and capital mobility in the 
1990’s, along with the EEA (European Economic Area) agreement. These 
conditions, initiated by the government, created an environment for the Icelandic 
financial service industry to thrive and where risk taking and an adventurous 
business culture were embraced. Not only was this embraced by government and 
industry, Icelandic society as a whole also participated. The lack of critical 
insights into core processes because of the largely laissez faire attitude of the 
government, lack of transparency, and entangled ownership issues within the 
industry prevented sufficient public debate to prompt reasonable criticism of both 
government and industry.   
 
In October 2008, the three largest Icelandic banks were put into receivership by 
the Icelandic government. This marked the end of a seven-year period of 
unprecedented growth in which the banks had grown from small local banks, 
serving mostly Icelandic clients, to become amongst the major players in Europe. 
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Only a few days after the collapse, it became evident that a severe crisis could 
not be avoided and the whole nation would suffer. The supervisory authorities 
should have stopped or limited the scope of the banks’ acts. The Central Bank of 
Iceland should have taken firm action on the mounting imbalances occurring 
over the preceding years. However, this did not occur. Policy makers, as well as 
practitioners in the financial sector, should bear the Icelandic case, which vividly 
demonstrates the necessity of particular governance measures, in mind.  
This article is organized as follows: First, the main characteristics of the 
evolution of the financial industry in Iceland in the 1990’s are analyzed, with 
primary emphasis on the resulting “boom” period. This provides a description of 
the sowing of the seeds of the crisis. Second, the governance changes within the 
Icelandic banks are examined—changes that led to a complete change in banking 
ideology. Third, the downfall of the Icelandic banks is described, highlighting the 
weak governmental measures taken, including bank privatizations that were 
treated as a discrete act rather than as a progressive process. Fourth, the findings 
of multiple governance failures resulting in a society not adequately alert to the 
increased risk of governance changes are presented. The final section discusses 
the policy recommendations that can be derived from the Icelandic case.   
 
2. FINANCIAL EVOLUTION IN ICELAND 
The Icelandic government implemented a program of market liberalization and 
deregulation throughout the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s. The motivation for 
this program was the need to adjust the Icelandic legislative and regulatory 
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structures to those of the European Union. This was necessary in conjunction 
with Iceland’s entry into the European Economic Area in 1994.  Table 1 shows 
the financial evolution in Iceland prior to and during the privatization phase.  
 
[Fix table 1 here] 
 
Part of the evolution was fueled by an attempt to increase economic efficiency 
through privatization. This resonates with agency theory, public choice theory 
and organization theory (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, 1991;  Martin and Parker, 
1997; Boycko and Vishny 1996; Bishop and Thompson, 1992; Villalonga, 2000). 
The privatization of socially important institutions as banks has often been 
received with reluctance by politicians (Jones, 1985; Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, 
1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Shleifer, 
1998; Sappington and Sidak, 2000; and Shirley and Walsh, 2000). A government 
argument for privatization is that it encourages entrepreneurship, but 
entrepreneurship involves risk-taking, which appears to be a factor largely 
neglected by governments.  
 
At the beginning of the 1980’s political interference and rigorous restriction of 
financial markets were creating a crisis in Iceland. Inflation was at double digits, 
resulting in high negative real interest rates that led, in turn, to a reduction in 
bank deposits, essentially halving the banking system. Dramatic structural and 
legislative reforms were implemented and the financial sector was opened up to 
international capital.  Interest rates and other prices reflected supply and demand, 
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and innovation was both encouraged and rewarded. The taxation system 
underwent a complete overhaul and tax rates were lowered considerably, 
becoming among the lowest in Europe  (Portes and Baldursson, 2007).    During 
and after the privatization reform era, there was a strong need for new investment 
opportunities. Liberalization of the financial markets was taking place, providing 
new opportunities for provisions of securities.   
 
The privatization of the public banks stimulated strong growth in the financial 
system. Landsbanki and Bunadarbanki were privatized in the period between 
1999 and 2003 (Bunadarbanki merged with the private investment bank 
Kaupthing in 2003). FBA, originally a public investment credit fund, was 
privatized in 1998 and merged with the private commercial bank Glitnir, then 
Islandsbanki. The Icelandic banking privatization was somewhat different from 
the process of privatization in other countries. While most countries had 
privatized their institutions with at least some foreign ownership, the Icelandic 
government initially decided to encourage foreign ownership, then backed away 
from that decision. Instead, individual domestic entities gained controlling 
interests in the banks. These investors had no prior experience in commercial 
banking (Sigurjonsson, 2010). A wave of consolidation followed closely on the 
heels of privatization, supplying the banks with the necessary instruments and 
scale for both domestic and international growth. Figure 1 shows the acquisitions 
of the Icelandic banks following privatization.  
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[Fix figure 1 here] 
 
In a domestic market of only 330,000 people, the future growth of the newly 
privatized banks would have to come from abroad. In the interest of seeking 
further consolidation and growth opportunities, a strategy of international 
acquisitions was implemented. The diversification of risk was also a significant 
concern. The banks needed to vary their revenue streams. At the beginning of the 
first decade of the 21st century, historically low global interest rates and 
decreased credit spreads brought into existence the ideal platform for fast growth 
strategies. At the same time, asset growth was strong in Iceland, especially in 
equity and real estate. The fast growing pension funds also controlled 
considerable equity (with assets amounting to 130% of GDP), and they searched 
for investment opportunities (Sigurmundsson, 2009). It was clear that the 
domestic economy could never provide an investment platform for this capital.  
  
The banks also benefited from the expansion of various other Icelandic sectors. 
Drivers for growth were identical to the ones for the financial industry; favorable 
international conditions, a mature domestic market and an essential 
diversification strategy to decrease risk. The banks were inspired to seek out new 
customers in their international expansion, many of them being Icelandic firms 
seeking growth abroad. Therefore, the banks not only provided funding for 
projects but facilitated many of them as well, using what can be called a 
“package effect”, where the Icelandic banks followed their customers and often 
created partnerships in ventures. Early, it became evident that partnership had 
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turned into ownership, where major customers had in some instances gained a 
considerable stake in the banks, and were appointed board positions.  
  
However, rapid growth and vast cross-border expansion could not occur without 
risk. The Icelandic banks encountered what has been called the Informational 
Crisis in early 2006 (Portes and Baldursson, 2007). Among others things, this 
arose from criticism by the Fitch rating firm and Danske Bank (Central Bank of 
Iceland, 2006; Valgreen, 2006). The criticism centered on the banks’ dependence 
on the wholesale market for financing, and on the practice borrowing short term 
but lending long term, leading the banks to become very sensitive to financial 
turmoil in international markets. Doubts about governance matters such as cross-
ownership, lack of transparency in strategy, operation and corporate structure 
drew criticism as well. A Danske Bank analyst wrote:  
 
The economy is clearly overheating, since the labour market is 
extremely tight, wage pressures are unsustainable, the inflation 
rate is among the highest in the OECD area despite an overvalued 
currency, and the central bank is stamping on the brakes 
(Valgreen 2006). 
 
These observed imbalances in the economy led to a downgrade by Fitch Ratings 
of Iceland’s state from stable to negative. The belief was that Iceland could not 
escape a crisis when forced to correct the imbalances.  
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The Icelandic economy has become increasingly dependent on 
foreign capital and international terms of lending. Iceland seems 
not only to be overheating, but also looks very dependent on the 
willingness-to-lend of global financial markets. This raises the 
question of whether the economy is facing not just a recession – 
but also a severe financial crisis. Valgreen (2006). 
 
The Icelandic banks were criticized for being transparent in neither their 
operations nor their media relations. The reality was that nearly all Icelandic 
newspapers and business magazines during this period became indirectly owned 
by the banks through their largest shareholders. The same largest shareholders 
were also their largest debtors. An attempt to institute legislation against media 
monopolies was declined by the president of Iceland who has veto power over 
parliament (Sigurjonsson, 2010). The international media became suspicious and 
investor confidence eroded. Dramatic headlines in the major international 
newspapers appeared and were full of skepticism: “Iceland’s poets of enterprise 
lose their rhythm” (Fleming, 2006), “Meltdown worries put Iceland’s UK raids 
under threat” (Padgham, 2006), and “Icelandic charm melts away as debt crisis 
grips” (Fletcher, 2006).  
 
This market suspicion led to a 25% depreciation of the ISK (Icelandic Króna) 
and the stock index fell comparably. In financing their rapid growth since 
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privatization, the banks had relied heavily on wholesale funding. At the time of 
this criticism, the maturities of the securities were relatively front-loaded. The 
banks had to alter their strategy, limit their reliance on the wholesale markets and 
raise retail deposits. The banks already had a dominant share in the domestic 
market, but through their subsidiaries and branches abroad, they managed to 
raise customer deposits.   
 
The privatized banks took the path of globalizing their market positions. Within a 
few years after privatization, growth was extraordinary, with asset multiples of 8 
to 12.  This growth, however, was from a small asset base. A broader income 
base and dispersed risk were intended to soften any setbacks that the Icelandic 
economy might suffer. On the other hand, large shifts in the values of the foreign 
assets and liabilities of the banks created problems of how to insulate the 
domestic economy, which depended on the regular flow of production of goods 
and services.  Over a period of a few years, the Icelandic banks leveraged their 
capital base to buy up banking assets worth several times the country’s GDP. If 
the value of these assets (mostly bought in the years of the banking and credit 
boom between 2003 and 2006) were to be revalued at much lower prices, the 
financial institutions would become insolvent.  
 
3. GOVERNANCE CHANGES 
Amongst the players within the finance industry there is no agreement on 
whether it was the deregulation and privatization or the entrepreneurial spirit of 
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the newly privatized banks that drove their growth. When interviewed, an 
executive from Glitnir responded that it was based more on the pre-privatization 
process and the foundation of necessary infrastructure, than on internal 
parameters:  
 
It was the privatization itself that unleashed the hidden force within the 
Icelandic economy. After years of economic growth, after the process of 
liberalization in nearly every aspect of the society, after extreme growth 
within the pension fund system and so forth, all this is being released 
into the privatization of the banks. The state owned banks were 
privatized in the framework of these circumstances so success was 
bound to happen (Kristjánsson, 2007). 
 
This view is in favor of the government policy and is supported by various 
elements, as Table 1 demonstrated. The government undertook a very large 
political commitment to enable the process and was in a good position to do so, 
as the government was in power for 16 consecutive years. It managed to build 
widespread public support for the process. A laissez faire policy was enacted, in 
which the newly freed market was supposed to take care of itself. Another view 
is that governance changes within the privatized banks were even more 
important. The noticeable changes were governance changes within boards and 
at executive levels, completely new and aggressive compensation systems, stock 
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option plans for employees and flat organizational structures. The CEO of 
Kaupthing explained: 
 
We have had the same leadership team since 1995, from the time we 
were a small investment bank prior to merging with the privatized 
Bunadarbanki. The glue that has kept this crew together rests on 
friendship, common vision and an aggressive incentive system. 
Kaupþing was a pioneer establishing the first true investment banking 
incentive system in Iceland.  (Sigurðsson, 2007). 
 
However, it remains unanswered how the risk profile was altered in response to 
these governance changes. The strategies and structures of the Icelandic banks 
began to differ from the other Nordic banks in many ways. The Icelandic banks 
were neither ordinary commercial banks nor pure investment banks, but 
somewhere in between. They followed many of their growing customers in 
cross-border acquisitions and often would do so more intimately than 
conventional banks. The Central Bank of Iceland was observing the financial 
institutions at this time. The governor explained: 
 
There were many young companies in Iceland carrying out to its full 
extent their international strategy and delivering rapid growth. The 
Icelandic banks took advantage of that, which led to their own increased 
international operations. Entrepreneurial spirit was very strong in 
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Iceland at that time, much stronger than it seemed to be in the other 
Nordic countries, at least on this scale (Gunnarsson, 2007).  
Arguments put forward in the agency theory become quite clear in the ownership 
transactions of the Icelandic banks.  As suggested by proponents of agency 
theory, private ownership eliminated familiar threats from the period of public 
ownership. This is explained further by the governor: 
 
Managers of the public banks were not thinking too much about 
profitability. Things went fine if the institutions would show some profits 
but too much meant political difficulties. Then politicians would want to 
get that money for other projects. This all changed with privatization. 
Today there are thousands of shareholders in the banks and to them it is 
extremely important that the banks are efficient and make profit. There 
is a complete change in ideology (Gunnarsson, 2007). 
 
The complete change in ideology, as the governor puts it, indeed seemed to have 
driven the vast growth of the Icelandic banks. However, soon the new owners’ 
ideology raised questions related to classic agency problems. When cross-
ownership was examined the lack of transparency became evident and corporate 
governance at the firm level became a real issue. The root of this is traced to the 
time when the banks began their growth period. In a small and fast growing 
economy, ownership was more entwined than in a larger economy. The most 
significant cases involved Kaupthing and Landsbanki. Kaupthing had acquired a 
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stake in Exista (a holding company) when the latter was established. Then, over a 
short period, Exista became the largest shareholder in Kaupthing.  Within a few 
years, Exista became the largest investment firm in Iceland with huge stakes in 
some Nordic financial firms. Kaupthing solved the cross-ownership issue by 
distributing its shares in Exista to shareholders of the bank itself. Then later the 
largest shareholders of Exista became the largest owners of Kaupthing and very 
sizable customers. In the other case, Landsbanki owned a substantial share in one 
of the largest investment banks, Straumur. Landsbanki aimed to solve the cross-
ownership dilemma by selling its shares in Straumur to Grettir Investments in 
May 2006. The major stakeholder in Landsbanki and chairman of the board, 
Bjorgolfur Gudmundsson, owned 28.52% in Grettir through his company Hansa. 
His son, Bjorgolfur Thor Bjorgolfsson, owned 20.66% in Grettir through his 
company Opera Investments. Bjorgolfur Thor was the chairman of the board at 
Straumur. After this transaction, firms under the control of the father and his son 
managed 37% of Straumur (see Nasdaq’s OMX Nordic news page). Corporate 
governance issues remained convoluted and opaque. 
 
It can be claimed that the responsibility of unsolved cross ownership issues 
rested with the boards. As can be anticipated the composition of the boards of the 
banks changed after privatization. The board members were practically all new. 
There was only one member serving on Landsbanki’s board who was there prior 
to privatization. At Kaupthing, all the board members were new. Board members 
should be able to exercise an objective independent judgment and have relevant 
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industry experience. But no “fit and proper” person tests were carried out. Board 
members consisted mostly of self-made entrepreneurs without any banking or 
financial experience. They were, on the other hand, the banks’ largest 
shareholders and debtors. This is unfortunate keeping in mind the specific role of 
corporate governance within banks. The liabilities of implicit or explicit 
government guarantee changes the role of corporate governance for shareholders, 
boards and executives in banks.  
 
At the executive level, vast changes were also made. At Landsbanki, seven 
people at the executive level, out of eleven, were new. Only one executive from 
the public Bunadarbankinn kept his chair at Kaupthing. None of these executives 
were foreign bankers with experience, because the government decided to 
privatize to Icelandic agents only. The very young Icelandic financial industry 
provided executives mostly in their late twenties or thirties. The banks went from 
public to private with considerable stock options for executive level managers. A 
completely new compensation policy was implemented, encompassing an 
aggressive investment banking style incentive system. This led to excessive risk 
taking. Glitnir provided employees in Corporate Finance Division bonuses for 
lending. They received 10% of the bank’s fee, which was normally 3-4% of a 
loan (DV, 2009). Kaupthing loaned its top executives some 50 billion ISK to buy 
shares in the bank. The only collateral were the shares themselves. These loans 
were bullet loans, where the debtor pays the principle at the end of the loan 
period, which in these cases were often extended (Morgunbladid, 2009). Some of 
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the executives and board members of the banks were personally liable for their 
debts, making them extremely vulnerable to a downswing in the share price. The 
lending of the banks became excessive. A leak of Kaupthing’s loan book unveils 
unusual lending practices (see wikileaks: http://wikileaks.org/leak/kaupthing-bank-
before-crash-2008.pdf). The highest loans (5.5 billion Euros) were given to 
companies that were related to six customers, four of them major shareholders in 
the bank. Collateral was none or only partial.  
 
These agency concerns should have been addressed by the shareholders, and 
there were thousands. Nearly all the Icelandic public had stake in the banks, as 
the government had successfully established incentives for share ownership. The 
public was inactive and challenged neither the boards nor the executives. 
Icelandic media, indirectly owned by the banks, did not provide constructive 
criticism. Rather, it reacted negatively towards the foreign criticism of the 
Icelandic banks. The politicians acted in a similar manner and denied any 
faultfinding (Schwarzkopf and Sigurjonsson, 2010). No institution, neither public 
nor private, provided public protection in terms of informative criticism. From a 
civil point of view, the public at large clearly had no realistic critical information 
and was not adequately alerted.  
  
4. THE DOWNFALL 
A period of economic growth had infused leaders with courage. Banks and 
companies had solid credit, and business opportunities were there for the taking. 
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The privatization era in Iceland had replaced a time characterized by restrictions 
with one characterized by optimism and risk taking. Access to cheap capital 
appreciated asset prices in whatever form by multiples. Real estate prices 
doubled and the stock market appreciated seven times in a few years. Assets were 
bought with the belief that prices would appreciate further, regardless of revenue 
stream. Then expectations and access to capital became a prime driver for a rise 
in asset prices. With assets booked at market value, equity appreciated, thus 
justifying further borrowing. Therefore, an asset bubble was created. This 
situation applied to most of the western world in 2007. The Icelandic banks took 
part in this bonanza, presumably more enthusiastically than most others did.  
 
The assets and liabilities of the Icelandic banking sector (denominated in foreign 
currency) amounted to ten times the Icelandic GDP within six years of 
privatization. These assets became extremely vulnerable in the liquidity crisis of 
2008. The Icelandic banks depended heavily on wholesale financing and 
deposits, resulting in a situation where creditors believed that other creditors 
would refuse to roll over present loans, and therefore refused to extend new 
credit. It is in circumstances such as these that banks usually fail.  
 
The months of September and October 2008 were decisive for the Icelandic 
banks. After the fall of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
money markets and interbank lending froze completely. The Central Bank of 
Iceland was unable to act as an effective lender of last resort to the Icelandic 
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banks. It simply did not hold enough foreign currency to do this. Glitnir bank 
was hit first. With short run credit lines closed, Glitnir had to request a short-term 
loan from the Central Bank of Iceland, which refused. The government put 
Glitnir into receivership, the first step towards a formal bankruptcy, on October 
6, 2008. The bank was not nationalized as the state would have become 
responsible for the bank’s huge liabilities. The consequence was a debt 
downgrade and a sharp fall in the already depreciated ISK. Figure 2 shows the 
crash of the ISK.  
 
[Fix figure 2 here]  
 
Short run funding evaporated and margin calls came from the European Central 
Bank. Landsbanki found itself unable to meet its commitments and was put into 
receivership on October 7. However, for the moment Kaupthing appeared viable. 
Landsbanki had operated the Icesave 1200 billion ISK deposit account out of 
Iceland as a branch (not as a subsidiary), passing the ultimate liability (the 
20,887 Euros liability per deposit owner) on to the Icelandic state. The Icelandic 
Central Bank made some remarks that were construed to mean that Iceland 
would not meet these obligations to British depositors. The reaction of the United 
Kingdom was to seize the UK assets of all the Icelandic banks by invoking anti-
terrorist laws. Kaupthing was ruined by the confiscation of its subsidiary, Singer 
and Friedlander, as covenants on loan agreements were activated. Kaupthing was 
then also put into receivership on October 9. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the 
banks’ stock prices, from privatization to a total collapse in October 2008. 
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[Fix figure 3 here] 
 
With the spectacular growth of the banks, their largest owners became highly 
leveraged. This led to a high level of vulnerability to financial shocks. The 
dramatic reversal was phenomenal. All the Icelandic banks had recently passed a 
stress test but, unfortunately, the test did not ask all the essential questions. The 
Financial Supervisory Authority’s (FSA) stress test did not account for 
vulnerability to a liquidity crisis. European laws applied (through the EEA 
treaty), but there was no attempt to adjust the tests towards Icelandic 
circumstances. The laissez faire policy had kept the FSA weak. The institution 
received only 18% increase in its annual budget and employees increased from 
27 to 45 during the years 2001 to 2007. Concurrently the banks grew ten times. 
An aggressive incentive system encouraged the out of control growth, and risk 
taking became excessive. There was no regulatory framework preventing 
Icelandic banks from opening branches (rather than subsidiaries) abroad, 
therefore they were transferring liability onto the Icelandic state. The 
privatization of the banks was treated as a discrete act, unfortunately, without 
necessary regulatory and governance measures taken.  
 
5. MAJOR FINDINGS 
In the case of Iceland, the results of the governance of liberalization and 
privatization are equivocal. The government‘s procedures seem to have bred 
economic growth. In that sense, the deregulation process led to efficiency gains. 
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On the other hand, governance measures taken post-privatization seem to have 
been lax. However, this failure of governance is similar to the process in many 
countries. Liberalization and privatization have often been treated as discrete acts 
rather than as parts of a progressive process. An example can be seen in the case 
of the Scandinavian banking crisis in the 1990’s (see, for example, Jonung, 2008, 
Englund and Vihrala, 2007).  
 
In their expansion, the Icelandic banks relied on market funding. As international 
conditions deteriorated—whether credit markets, equity prices or other factors— 
vulnerability became much greater than before. Neither the Central Bank of 
Iceland nor the National Treasury followed the banks’ growth by establishing the 
necessary reserves, which in the case of a considerable recession or liquidity 
crisis, leads to extreme difficulties. It was suggested earlier that liberalization and 
privatization breeds entrepreneurship and greater risk taking. This saga clearly 
supports that, where commercial banks turn unhindered into highly risk taking 
investment banks, encouraged by aggressive incentive systems, they leave the 
risk to the public.  
 
The public gained a false sense of security through both governmental and 
industry contentment with the development, and became fascinated by all the 
economic growth, as frail as it was. Critical insights into core processes were 
lacking. The close ties between banks and media did not encourage transparent 
and informative reporting. Correct information and critical analyst engagement 
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could have triggered a much more adequate public debate, which would have put 
pressure on both government and the banking industry. 
 
The corporate governance arrangements within the Icelandic banks failed for a 
number of reasons. A mismatch between incentive systems, risk management and 
internal control systems appeared to have been unseen by the banks’ boards. 
Self-regulatory procedures and mechanisms were not in place. The corporate 
governance aspect of risk management collapsed. Boards and other stakeholders 
(including government agencies) were at best ignorant of the risks taken. The 
evidence supports that boards were aware of the risk but decided to ignore it, 
expecting greater returns and higher share prices. Kaupthing’s loan book shows 
appalling practices in which a bank lends enormous amounts to holding 
companies and individuals so that they can buy shares in the bank. This is a way 
of appreciating share prices in the bank. The financial supervision had focused 
on regulatory capital ratios (as Basel I capital requirements). The liquid risk, 
which is not being measured, is crucial where banks are especially vulnerable 
towards marketability of securities. The Icelandic banks relied heavily on 
marketability of their securities for liquidity needs.  
 
Apart from the few largest owners of the banks, shareholders were weak and 
dispersed. They had to cope with the increasingly complicated operation of the 
banks, where there were new financial products such as credit derivatives, swaps 
and so forth to decipher. Deregulation made it possible for banks to diversify into 
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related activities like insurance services and mortgages, and to organize a 
substantial share of their activities in off balance sheet operations (Thomsen, 
2009). Hence, shareholders had to rely on corporate governance mechanisms to 
protect their interests. These mechanisms were lacking. Shareholders were 
uneducated and did not rebel at annual meetings, elect new board members or 
elect a hostile raider to clean up the operations. Performance related incentives 
were to overcome agency problems, but were ill structured. Another governance 
mechanism is reputational risk. It should motivate executives to perform well for 
fear of reputational loss, but executives of banks during the boom period were 
treated like celebrities. Agency problems cannot be eliminated altogether (Tirole, 
2006). Nonetheless, the Icelandic case shows how fragile governance issues can 
become. Only a few days after the collapse of the Icelandic banks, it became 
evident that a deep crisis was unavoidable and the whole nation would suffer.   
 
6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy makers as well as practitioners in the financial sector should bear in mind 
the Icelandic case, which demonstrates the governance measures needed to be 
taken by governments before liberalization and deregulation, as well as 
emphasizing the increased risk that goes along with it. Some proposals are 
highlighted below: 
 
1. Public financial education needs to be a priority in the future 
rehabilitation process complementing governance and regulatory reform. 
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An independent agency, free from uncertainty of financial support, should 
be established to gather, analyze and supply reliable information for 
stakeholders, government included. Legislation against media monopolies 
must be passed. Well-informed individuals react more efficiently and 
critically and will also better understand the need for change in both 
regulatory and governance practices. Furthermore, consumer protection 
in respect to financial products must be addressed, although the MiFID 
decree from 2007 provides some protection. The vast development of 
credit markets has made the public vulnerable to inappropriate financial 
products and selling strategies. A redress mechanism in the case of abuse 
should be implemented.  
2. The position of Chief Risk Officer should be established in each bank. A 
system that allows the incumbent to report directly to the board should be 
implemented, functioning as internal control and reporting to audit 
committees. These functions should be independent from management 
and with sufficient access to relevant information. The risk management 
role of the CEO’s is not to be diminished, rather the boards’ concerns are 
to be highlighted. In the light of the poor risk management culture of the 
Icelandic banks, more importance should be given on risk mechanism and 
the risk management culture itself, and less to checklists of innumerable 
possible risks.  Risk management should be more comprehensive in scope 
as well. The case of Landsbanki and its Icesave deposit accounts in the 
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UK shows that the legal borders of a bank can become wider than its 
economic ones. 
3. Changes must be implemented in terms of the organizational structure of 
the banks.  The fallen Icelandic banks contained on one balance sheet 
various entities as commercial banking, investment banking, asset 
management, an insurance arm, and a pension fund, creating contagion 
risk. An improved structure should entail a legal separation between 
entities and thereby separation of balance sheets that a non-operating 
holding firm could parent (the OECD is putting forward such 
suggestions, (OECD, 2009)). This way the entities become separately 
capitalized and can be listed or non-listed. Different reporting obligations 
can be applied as well as separate governance structures. Transparency 
for stakeholders should increase, leading to better governance. In times of 
difficulties, regulators can act firmly, not having to deal with the 
complexity of the existing structures. The risk of the commercial banks’ 
balance sheet will become less, an arrangement that would have saved the 
Icelandic public from a lot of damage.  
4. New types of bank owners must be sought, now that the Icelandic 
government is being given a second chance to create a healthy financial 
system. A laissez faire policy of risk and balanced development issues 
should be shelved. The sheer enormity of the banking sector in relation to 
the public resources was an evidence of bad policymaking. The 
government must demand much lower leverage and a higher equity base 
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in future banks. It should be aiming to bring new capital into the system, 
by not selling to existing financial institutions, but rather to foreign 
investors with modest leverage, preferably respectable and reliable major 
international banks. Once bitten, twice shy, the government should not 
sell the banks to agents likely to become users of bank credit. As 
proposed above, a new corporate structure for the future banks should 
provide for clear and transparent deposit insurance, and guarantee 
systems. Creditors of financial institutions not covered by explicit 
systems must realize that the institutions can fall. Risk should become 
transparently priced.  
5. Market conditions will guide how quickly the government can and should 
sell off the new public banks. A long-term government owned controlling 
might be feasible. It then becomes the responsibility of the government to 
secure changes in corporate governance arrangements within the banks. 
This responsibility should be given to a new administrative agency that 
ought to have the autonomy to prepare and implement needed changes. If 
and when a competitive sales process takes place, a selection criteria 
should identify the private buyer best suited to guarantee necessary 
changes. A pre-qualification process followed by bidding among selected 
candidates allows for a more careful selection process of preferred groups 
of investors. The selection criteria should be disclosed and the objectives 
for post privatization processes demanded. The restructuring of the banks 
might be necessary to minimize potential dominant market positions and 
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to encourage competition. Anti-trust regulation should be a part of an 
adequate regulatory framework where an element of monopoly is likely 
to persist.   
6. Financial supervision and regulation were weak and provided the wrong 
incentives, contributing to excessive risk taking. Neither the boards nor 
the shareholders seemed to understand the characteristics of a new and 
complex financial industry, undervaluing the risks the banks were 
running.  The mechanisms to oversee and control management were not 
in place. A new regulatory agenda will have to be created to address these 
failures.  This agenda should contain an increase in minimum capital 
requirements and stricter rules on liquidity management. The level of 
capital required should be increased relative to the risk being taken, 
keeping in mind how banks financed themselves through money markets 
that eventually evaporated. In addition to liquidity levels, quality of assets 
and securities, as well as funding, must be addressed, as these can be 
constraints on liquidity. Boards, or sometimes managers, did not always 
properly understand internal risk management models. The “fit and 
proper” criteria should also be reconsidered. The Icelandic Financial 
Supervisory Authority had introduced a competence test for CEO’s of 
financial institutions. It is worthwhile considering whether such tests 
should be extended to lower level management and to boards, ensuring 
these agents fully understand complex instruments and methods. Policy 
makers must also address the remuneration issues. Excessive levels of 
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remuneration became a matter of  social and political dissatisfaction, and 
motivated high risk-taking and short term thinking which impacted risk 
management negatively. Full transparency concerning incentives should 
also be guaranteed. The Financial Supervisory Authority must then 
oversee the adequacy of the incentive policies. It should be able to step in 
and get policies reassessed, or to require a bank to provide additional 
capital. Supervisors should be called upon frequently to inspect banks’ 
internal risk management systems. These systems must be fully 
independent within the banks and be made responsible for independent 
stress testing. The above-mentioned role of a risk officer should be 
created and hold a high rank in the hierarchy with a direct access to the 
board. Supervisory control should be considerable and enforced through 
frequent inspection regimes. 
 
The reforms proposed above stress governance issues, on a number of levels: at 
the government level; at the firm level; and at the civil society level. Traditional 
public government is not sufficient to address a number of critical issues in the 
modern economy. Government obviously has a need to strike a balance between 
entrepreneurial growth and risk exposure and balanced societal development. 
The Icelandic case describes a laissez faire attitude, where risk and balanced 
development issues were neglected. The sheer oversize of the banking sector in 
relation to the public resources is an evidence of this. Civil society obviously also 
cherishes welfare growth, but has lacked critical insight into core processes. 
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Presumably, a critical non-governmental organization and analyst engagement 
with good information could have triggered a much more adequate public debate, 
which would again have put pressure on both government and industry.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Financial Evolution in Iceland 
Event Year 
Financial Indexation Permitted 1979
Liberalization of domestic bank rates 1984-1986
Iceland Stock Exchange established 1985
Interest Rate Act: Interest rates fully liberalized 1987
Stepwise liberalization of capital movement begins 1990
Treasury overdraft facility in the Central Bank closed 1992-1993
New foreign exchange regulations marks the beginning of the 
liberalization of cross-border capital movements  
1992
Interbank market for foreign exchange established 1993
Iceland becomes a founding member of the EEA 1994
Long term capital movements fully liberalized 1994
Short term capital movements fully liberalized 1995
Foreign direct investment liberalized in accordance with EEA 
agreement 
1995
Interbank money market 1998
Interbank FX swap market 2001
Privatization of state owned banks completed 2003 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland. 
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Figure 2. Development of the ISK (the Icelandic trade weighted index) 
 
Source: Calculation by the author 
Figure 3. Stock Price of the Icelandic Banks, Icex15 and FTSE100. 
 
Source: Calculation by the author 
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Abstract 
This paper explores how the financial crisis in 2008 could have been partially 
avoided by Iceland through observing the warning signs. Iceland experienced the 
harshest consequences from the financial crisis in the western world such as the 
total collapse of its banking sector. This paper compares the prelude of Iceland’s 
financial crisis to the Scandinavian one, less than 20 years ago, providing an 
understanding of the sources of the crisis and its impact. Results show that signs 
of overexpansion in Iceland were clear and numerous. Iceland’s structural 
weaknesses resemble many other badly hit countries, simply more extreme. 
Keywords:  Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, Iceland, Policy Making, 
Scandinavian Crisis
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INTRODUCTION  
Iceland is a good illustration when drawing lessons from  the errors that resulted 
in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. No other developed country endured a 
systemic collapse in its banking sector on the scale that occurred in Iceland, or 
indeed, rarely in the history of finance.  Most of the variables that could go 
wrong undeniably went wrong, and the collection of these wrong doings 
systematically assumed mountainous proportions. Whether it was the fiscal 
policy of the government, the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Iceland, or 
the financial supervisory, corporate governance and risk management of the 
banks that were the causes; the situation turned out to be catastrophic. However, 
individually, these factors are an inadequate explanation. It was the interaction of 
these factors, which played an important role in the breakdown of the financial 
system.  
Consequently, the question of whether or not there were warning signs arises. 
Comparative research to contextualize the experience Iceland went through 
provides an understanding of the dynamics that led to the financial and economic 
collapse in 2008. Hence, this research compares the Scandinavian Crisis of the 
1990s to the Icelandic Financial Crisis, focusing on the similarity between the 
two crisis’ and possible contrasts, illuminating the severity of the current crisis in 
Iceland. The Scandinavian countries and Iceland (often referred to as the Nordic 
countries) all bear a resemblance in their economic and societal structure and 
considering there is less than twenty years occurring between the crises, provide 
a comparable viewpoint. The Scandinavian countries had to provide their 
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banking sector a considerable amount of public support and their crisis became 
widespread. However, an underlying question throughout this discussion is what 
went wrong within the banking institutions and how the changes within the 
public policy arena (itself being influenced by general social trends) may have 
contributed to the crisis.   
Firstly, this article will examine the main reasons for the sudden and 
extraordinary growth of the Icelandic banks. Resulting from this growth, the 
increased vulnerability of the banks and the following collapse is reviewed in 
part two. Thirdly, the paper compares the Icelandic Crisis and the Scandinavian 
Crisis, involving the examination of similarities between the two, and the 
identification of factors that are unique to either banking crisis. Lastly, is a short 
summary regarding what lessons may be learned from the recent crisis, and what 
policy recommendations can be derived from the situation.  Of special interest is 
the fact that the Scandinavian Crisis occurred within a banking environment 
where the separation of investment and commercial banking was mostly still 
intact.  Following the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999, the 
international banking landscape changed; meaning that banks’ risk appetite 
increased.  That complacency spread to the general public.  After the abolishment 
of the act, it took less than a decade for the international banking system to 
collapse, the meltdown being worst in Iceland.  It also appears that the 
Scandinavian Crisis was limited to abnormal lending growth, mostly related to 
mortgage loans, while Icelandic banks lent a great deal to holding companies, 
often with limited collateral. 
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1. A SUDDEN PROSPERITY   
Iceland experienced the worst financial collapse of any western country when its 
banking system fell apart in October 2008. Most of its financial system toppled 
when its three largest banks, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir, with 182 billion 
USD in assets, were taken into receivership, creating the third largest collapse 
after Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual (Bibler, 2010). They had grown 
from small local commercial banks into international commercial and investment 
banks with combined balance sheets amounting to ten times Iceland‘s GDP. 
International conditions had been optimal, supplying funding at historically low 
interest rates at a low risk premium (Central Bank of Iceland, 2009). As early as 
in 1993, when Iceland became one of the founding members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) agreement, Icelandic banks obtained the right to operate 
within the border of the EU countries. At the same time, Iceland instituted the EU 
regulatory framework for financial institutions and markets. Still, it was not until 
2003, when the Icelandic banks were privatized in full, that they capitalized on 
money market funding, opened branches abroad and acquired foreign financial 
institutions in large numbers (Sigurjonsson, 2010a).  
The banks capitalized on the rapid growth that much of Icelandic industry 
enjoyed during the first years of the 2000’s. These were industries such as 
pharmaceutical, retailing, real estate, food processing and transportation. The 
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drivers for this growth were similar to the drivers for the financial industry. 
These were favorable international conditions, a mature domestic market and an 
essential diversification strategy to decrease risk. The banks took advantage of 
this development and collaborated with both large and growing firms within 
these industries. The partnership did not only consist of lending but became, in 
many instances, joint ventures in which banks invested their own equity in their 
customer´s projects. That gave later rise to speculation regarding a conflict of 
interests and dependence on a few large customers, (some of whom were owners 
of the banks) and all were not necessarily geographically diversified nor 
diversified by industry (Portes and Baldursson, 2007).  
The privatization of Icelandic banking was conducted somewhat differently from 
the process of privatization in many other countries. Most countries privatized 
their institutions with at least some foreign ownership whereas the Icelandic 
government initially decided to encourage foreign ownership, but then backed 
away from that decision. Instead, individual domestic entities gained controlling 
interests in the banks. These investors had no prior experience in commercial 
banking (Sigurjonsson, 2010b).  
Within three years of privatization, (in 2006), the banks were hit by what was 
called the Informational Crisis (Portes and Baldursson, 2007). Fitch Ratings and 
Danske Bank were the strongest critics of the banks mostly focusing on how 
dependent the Icelandic banks were on wholesale markets for financing and how 
“short maturity they had on their borrowing“. The criticism was that these 
conditions would create great vulnerability in the case of financial turmoil and a 
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liquidity crisis. Concerns about potential cross-ownership, earning quality and 
lack of transparency in the banks’ operation drew criticism as well (Central Bank 
of Iceland, 2006a; Valgreen, 2006).  
When cross-ownership in Iceland was scrutinized, the lack of transparency was 
evident and corporate governance within the banks became a real issue. The root 
of these issues can be traced to the time when the banks began their growth 
period. In a small and fast growing economy, ownership was more entwined than 
in a larger economy. The young Icelandic financial industry promoted executives 
mostly aged in their late twenties or thirties. The banks went from public to 
private with considerable stock options for executive level managers. A 
completely new compensation policy was implemented, encompassing an 
aggressive investment banking style incentive system. This led to excessive risk 
taking.  
The criticism led to a depreciation of 25% in the ISK, and to a similar drop of the 
ICEX (the Icelandic Stock Exchange Index) during the early part of spring 2006. 
The banks had, until then,  relied on wholesale market financing with short 
maturities. Their income stream was vulnerable, with 50% of total income as 
none core income. The banks had no choice but to alter their strategies 
(Sigurjonsson, 2010a). With an already dominant share in the domestic market, 
they sought vast growth through their subsidiaries and branches abroad, where 
they managed to raise customer deposits, especially through Internet accounts. 
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The banks were successful in this strategy and managed to raise the total 
deposit/asset ratio to similar levels that other Nordic banks enjoyed. Growth 
continued at extraordinary levels as indicated by asset multiples of 8 to 12 during 
2003-2007 (annual reports of the banks 2003-2007).  Within 18 months, 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing managed to collect over £4.8 billion in the UK and 
€2.9 billion in the Netherlands through their Icesave and Edge Internet deposit 
accounts. The goal was to create a broader income base and distribute risk, 
intended to soften any setbacks that the Icelandic economy might suffer (Jannari, 
2009). On the other hand, large shifts in the value of the foreign assets and 
liabilities of the banks created problems of how to insulate the domestic 
economy, which depended on the regular production flow of goods and services. 
The Icelandic banks, over a period of a few years, had leveraged their capital 
base to buy up banking assets worth several times Iceland‘s GDP (Sigurjonsson, 
2010b)and the potential depreciation of assets made the leveraged banking sector 
highly vulnerable. There was thus little leeway for declining assets values, 
mostly purchased during the years of the banking and credit boom period of 
2003-2007, in preventing the banks’ equity to dry up. Neither the National 
Treasury nor the Central Bank of Iceland had the necessary foreign reserves to 
support any of the larger banks. A lender of last resort in foreign currency, 
therefore, did not exist in Iceland’s post-privatization era.  
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2. THE END OF PROSPERITY 
The Icelandic financial industry was gradually de-regulated prior to the 
privatization of the banks. At the time of the privatization, a laissez-faire policy 
of the Icelandic government fostered  a period of optimism and risk taking on 
behalf of the business community. With ample credit, business opportunities 
were there for the taking. Asset prices appreciated in an era of easy access to 
cheap capital. The belief in further appreciation encouraged people to purchase 
assets, regardless of revenue stream. With equity appreciating further and with 
assets booked at market value, continued borrowing was justified, eventually 
creating asset bubbles. Most of the Western world experienced a similar 
environment of low interest rate policies for some years, with the negative effects 
of such policies only surfacing in 2007 (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
In 2007, liquidity difficulties accumulated with mounting revelations of severe 
flaws in the US housing credit market. Trust within financial markets diminished 
and the trouble only accelerated in 2008. Less liquidity in asset markets made 
financing through bond markets yet more difficult. Central banks had to interfere 
and provide liquidity, among which was the Central Bank of Iceland. The 
Icelandic banks had been successful with their Internet deposit accounts abroad 
where they decreased their “loan/deposit ratio“ from 3.2 in 2005 to 2.0 in 2007 
(Carey, 2009). At the time the largest bank in Europe, HSBC, had its ratio as 0.84 
to 1.00. However, this initiative of the Icelandic banks provided merely 
temporarily relief. The fact that Landsbanki gained a larger market share in the 
UK than the largest Internet deposit bank internationally, ING Direct, should 
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have been a clue that the deposit growth was vulnerable; such depositors were 
probably inclined following whatever Internet bank provided the highest interest 
rates at any given time.  
The Icelandic banks became a gauge of the negative effects to come. Their assets 
became extremely vulnerable and when creditors began believing that other 
creditors would refuse to roll over present loans and extend new credit and the 
banks lost credibility. This is a classic situation that leads to the failure of banks.  
The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 did not have a great direct 
influence on the Icelandic banks but its indirect influence was catastrophic. The 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers demonstrated that a large financial firm could go 
bankrupt without the state rescuing it. International money markets froze 
completely, interbank markets became inactive, liquid resources vanished and 
assets became untradeable. This was the point of no return for the Icelandic 
banks. A bank run began, not on a single Icelandic bank, but the complete 
Icelandic financial system (some international foreign exchange dealers informed 
their Icelandic counterparts that their banks had ceased lending to Iceland). When 
short run funding evaporated, margin calls came from the European Central 
Bank. Glitnir bank was the first to search for a lifeline at the Icelandic Central 
Bank, which refused to help, and the bank was taken over by the government the 
next day, October 6th. Landsbanki, which could not meet its obligations, went 
into receivership. On October 7th Kaupthing appeared to be still viable and had 
received an 80 billion ISK loan from the government on  October 6th. The UK 
authorities had a substantial role in the events that followed. Landsbanki, with its 
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UK branch, collected 1,200 billion ISK through its Icesave deposit accounts. By 
operating a branch, but not a subsidiary, the bank had transferred the liability to 
the Icelandic state. Comments from the Central Bank of Iceland stating that the 
Icelandic state would not be able to meet these obligations led to an immediate 
reaction by the UK authorities, applying anti-terrorist laws to seize the UK assets 
of the Icelandic banks. Kaupthing‘s operation in the UK was ruined as covenants 
on loan agreements were activated, and Kaupthing was put into receivership on 
October 9th.  
Interestingly, all of the Icelandic banks had passed stress tests only a few weeks 
earlier by the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) (FSA, 2008), but 
unfortunately these stress tests did not account for vulnerability to a liquidity nor 
currency crisis1. While the banks’ assets grew ten times, the staff of the FSA only 
grew from 27 to 45 employees (FSA, 2009). Additionally, promising lawyers and 
economists at the FSA were swiftly ‘bought’ by the banks, maintaining an 
imbalance of corporate knowledge and skills in favor of the banks. The FSA 
became thus increasingly weaker, causing limited control of the banks’ growth, 
with aggressive incentive systems that encouraged excessive risk taking. Since 
there was not a regulatory framework preventing Icelandic banks from opening 
branches (rather than subsidiaries) abroad, the ultimate liability was transferred 
to the Icelandic public.  
 
                                                            
1 Kamallakharan & Tómasson (2009) describe why the test proved to be worthless, stating that 
the test assumed no more than a 20% fluctuation in the Icelandic Krona when in reality its worth 
against the currency basket fell more than 50% in a matter of weeks during the fall of 2008. 
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3. COMPARISON OF CRISES 
A study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) identified 18 financial crises from WWII 
until 2007 when the subprime crash unfolded.  Among the five “Big Ones” are 
the crises in Norway, Sweden and Finland at the beginning of the 1990s.  They 
conclude that the crises followed a similar pattern although the tipping point in 
each case seems to differ.  The crises usually follow a pattern in which regulation 
changes lead to some sort of increase in lending (Easy Money) that develops into 
an asset bubble.  When such bubbles burst, especially related to real estate, asset 
prices tumble with the consequence of mass bankruptcies.  Losses related to 
write-offs and asset depreciation causes a banking crisis that, along with a 
currency crisis, exacerbates losses, especially in circumstances where loans 
financed during the bubble were denominated in foreign currencies.  The 
consequence is a contraction in loans to companies that are still in business, 
adding further pressure on a systematic collapse and necessary governmental 
interference to assist the financial system (Englund, 1999). 
This paper focuses on the crises in Sweden and Finland. These crises had similar 
characteristics within the same timeframe, and are often called “twin crises”, 
while the crisis in Norway was somewhat different, regarding both time and 
external developments (Jonung, 2008). However, the figures used here still 
include Norway, in order to provide a fuller picture.  Adding Iceland to that 
equation, with its uncanny similarities, draws forth the possibility of  ”triplet 
crises”, the main difference being that Iceland experienced its boom and bust just 
under two decades later.    
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Even those who believe that the deregulation process itself did not cause the 
crisis usually attribute the beginning to the Scandinavian Crisis to the 
deregulation process that occurred at the start of the 1980s.  The processes of 
deregulation differed somewhat between countries, but the start and end points 
were similar (Englund, Vihriala, 2003). The main characteristics of this 
deregulation were the liberation of interest rates and the free flow of capital in 
international markets, importantly including financing (Jonung, Kiander, Vartia, 
2008).   
The new financial landscape was mostly unnoticed by regulators in Sweden 
where the laws remained largely unchanged following the rapid development and 
in addition, changes to the tax system resulted in incentives for households and 
corporations to increase lending (Honkapohja, 2009).   
Whilst the deregulation process took less than a decade in Scandinavia from start 
to finish, with the indirect effects in increased lending taking three to four years 
to materialize, the period in Iceland was much longer, as seen in Table 1.  It can 
be inferred that the Icelandic period was around 25 years, making comparison 
somewhat difficult.   
Table 1.  Financial Evolution in Iceland 
Event Year 
Financial Indexation permitted 1979 
Liberalization of domestic bank rates 1984-1986 
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Iceland Stock Exchange established 1985 
Interest Rate Act: Interest rates fully liberalized 1987 
Stepwise liberalization of capital movement begins 1990 
Treasury overdraft facility in the Central Bank closed 1992-1993 
New foreign exchange regulations marks the beginning of the 
liberalization of cross-border capital movements  
1992 
Privatization process launched 1992 
Interbank market for foreign exchange established 1993 
Iceland becomes a founding member of the EEA 1994 
Long term capital movements fully liberalized 1994 
Short term capital movements fully liberalized 1995 
Foreign direct investment liberalized in accordance with EEA 
agreement 
1995 
Privatization process of the Icelandic banks begins 1998 
Interbank money market 1998 
Interbank FX swap market 2001 
Privatization of state owned banks completed 2003 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland, 2006b and authors’ addition. 
The main years of deregulation were 1982 to 1986 for Scandinavia but for 
Iceland it was 1984 to 2003.  However, the lending growth period was immediate 
in Scandinavia from 1986 to 1990; while in Iceland such growth started during 
the latter part of the 1990s but the explosive growth, leading to the bust, began 
after 2003.  Nevertheless, the seeds of growth were planted once the interbank 
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lending started in 1998, which quickly spread to add fluidity in currency market 
dealings. 
The starting point for the comparison period may appear being subjective.  We 
look at the start of the deregulation process as a starting point in Scandinavia, i.e. 
in 1982.  In Iceland, the deregulation process began during a similar period, but 
took longer and the effects were for a long time barely visible.  Therefore we use 
1999 as the starting point in Iceland, which is four years prior to the beginning of 
the lending boom (which is the same as the Scandinavians starting point), but 
also an approximation of when deregulation began in reality to change the 
Icelandic financial landscape. At that time, the privatization processes in two of 
the three Icelandic state owned banks had just begun and rapid changes were 
implemented soon after.   
Using the above assumptions, we use the year 1982 as the starting point for 
Scandinavia in this paper and 17 years later for Iceland.  Thus, we define year 
1999 as Period 1 or T for Iceland and 1982 or T minus 17 for Scandinavia.  The 
length of periods differs somewhat, mainly because some data is no longer 
available after the Icelandic banks went into default.  
Lending Growth 
Following the deregulation process, the banks in Scandinavia decreased their 
emphasis on services and cost structure, and instead began to concentrate on 
pricing and added market share.  This resulted in additional risk taking 
(Honkapohja, 2009) and loans to new markets followed.  However, financial 
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institutions were working in a new environment where their ability to measure 
risk adequately became more difficult (Berg, 1998).  
Initially the lending increase caused no alarm.  After a long period of lending 
restriction, in which real rates were negative and thus there was some sort of 
privilege associated with receiving loans, a higher lending equilibrium was to be 
expected.  Added demand for money caused interest rates to rise, leading to an 
increased rate difference between domestic rates and international rates.  This 
made borrowing in foreign denominated currency even more tempting within the 
environment of free capital flow, making interest rate policies in Scandinavia 
increasingly toothless (Honkapohja, 2009).  Due to the pegging of domestic 
currencies to the German Mark, domestic loan takers perceived the likelihood of 
currency losses to be minimal.  Berg (1998) maintains that without the foreign 
capital inflow the increased lending growth would have been impossible.  
The privatization process of the banks began in Iceland 1997 with the aim of 
establishing a widely distributed ownership structure.  The policy change in 
2002, with the controlling interest in two of the three main banks falling into the 
hands of investor groups with little banking experience, set the stage for the 
banks’ transformation in which lending growth exploded in Iceland.  As in 
Scandinavia a few years earlier, the Icelandic banks (with savings banks 
following suit) began to concentrate on market share and pricing with added risk 
associated to their business model.  The true explosive lending growth period 
thus began in 2003 in Iceland, 17 years after the same development in 
Scandinavia. 
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A comparison of lending growth in Iceland and Scandinavia is shown in Figure 
1.  Since two different periods are compared, the starting point is defined as 
being T or Period 1, representing 1999 for Iceland and T minus 17 (or 1982) for 
Scandinavia, in line with the assumptions previously explained. 
Figure 1. Lending Growth Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia2. 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Iceland, 2009a. 
It is worthwhile pointing out that lending growth remained very high following 
the Informational Crisis in 2006, dipping a little the following year but was still 
higher than the other comparison periods in all comparison countries.  Lending 
growth was actually in a similar range in Iceland in the early part of the 
comparison period, as it was in the latter one in Scandinavia.  The later part of 
                                                            
2 Lending growth information is available for the first nine months of 2008.  Nominal growth that 
year is almost 60%.  The authors, however, assume that the depreciation of the Icelandic Krona, 
which during that period was approximately the same percentage as the nominal growth, is 
largely responsible for the increase (by that point ¾ of lending was denominated in foreign 
currency) in additional to inflation. 
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the comparison period shows that lending growth in Iceland was approximately 
double compared to Scandinavia, only with a short period in Finland being the 
exception.   
It was, however, not only the increased lending to households and companies that 
caused this increase.  Icelandic banks evolved quickly from being traditional 
commercial banks into becoming investment banks who took positions in their 
commercial customers’ projects.  Jannari (2009) explains this by stating that the 
majority holders who gained control in 2002-2003 had a mindset more like 
investment bankers rather than commercial bankers.  Incentive systems were 
enacted in line with common features abroad where short term profits were 
paramount.  This created an atmosphere in which the main objective was getting 
a deal done, as percentages employees received of loans provided could be 
around 0.3% to 0.4% in the form of bonuses.  Those bonuses were given 
regardless of long-term consequences and inherent risks associated with the 
deals.  In fact, as McLean and Elkind (2003) described the situation with Enron a 
few years earlier, an incentive scheme evolved in which it became advantageous 
to minimize the potential risk associated with deals taking place in order to make 
sure that they were completed and thus commissions paid. 
Once the contraction in lending growth subsided in the comparison periods, 
about 3 to 4 years after the common starting point (T and T-17), lending growth 
became much higher in Iceland compared to Scandinavia.  Another, and maybe a 
more descriptive, way to look at this is viewing the cumulative increase as shown 
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in Figure 2, representing the Icelandic lending growth compared to the 
“irrational” one in Scandinavia during the late 1980s. 
Figure 2.  Cumulative Lending Growth Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Iceland, 2009a. 
The cumulative growth was already much more than it had been in the 
comparison countries when the Informational Crisis hit in 2006.  The enormous 
continued growth shows how much more the expansion of the Icelandic banking 
system was compared to the Scandinavian countries during the 1980s.  This 
growth corresponds with the growth of Icelandic banks’ balance sheets, which 
combined were just under the size of the country’s 1999 GDP, but are estimated 
at being ten times larger than Iceland´s GDP in 2008 (Central Bank of Iceland, 
2009).  
One explanation of why the negative effects of deregulation filtered down so late 
into the Icelandic financial system is that the government retained its controlling 
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stake in the banking system whilst the changes were taking effect.  Thus, despite 
the free flow of capital, there were implicit restrictions on lending growth.  That 
is not to say that lending growth was non-existent during those years (as Figure 2 
demonstrates); but during that period it was understandable due to the easing of 
lending restrictions leading to a natural higher lending equilibrium. 
Information surfacing after the crash (for example, the leaked loan book of 
Kaupthing Bank) indicates that the loans were not merely ill considered but were 
even questionable from legal and ethical standpoints. The collateral for loans 
were in an abnormally low percentage range or even simply only the equity 
bought.  This raises the question why Icelandic banks did not simply buy the 
equity themselves and thus reap all the benefits themselves if they turned out to 
be successful.  In some instances, such loans were used to finance purchases of 
the bank’s own shares, so in effect banks were lending money to buy shares in 
themselves, with those shares being the only collateral. During the writing of this 
paper investigations are under way regarding market manipulation due to such 
loans, with banks accused of lending money in the attempt of keeping their share 
prices artificially high.   
As with Japan in the late 1980s, where loans were increasingly made to holding 
companies with the main purpose of investing in other companies (Chancellor, 
1999), loans by Icelandic banks were often related to cross-ownership or other 
relations between parties in which dubious collateral was placed (Jannari, 2009).  
This was not a concern in Scandinavia (Jonung, 2008).  Figure 3 shows the 
nominal increase in total lending Icelandic holding companies scaled to April 
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2005, compared to the growth in lending to domestic households, many of whose 
sole purpose was investing in equities of other companies (Jannari, 2009).   
Figure 3. Lending Growth to Icelandic Holding Companies and Households. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2009a). 
Despite the frenzied increase in lending to households, it pales compared to the 
increase in lending to holding companies.   Often with little (if any) collateral on 
the table, the owners of the holding companies stood a chance of striking it rich if 
they were successful in their investments, it appears that stockholders, 
bondholders and taxpayers may have to pick up a sizeable amount of the tab if 
unsuccessful. 
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Unemployment, GDP and (asset) Inflation 
Unemployment in Scandinavia was generally low during the 1980s (see Figure 
4).  In Finland, it gradually decreased during the latter part of the decade.  In 
Sweden, unemployment never went above 4% and for a period during that period 
was below 2%.  A common government policy in the region was maintaining full 
employment (Jonung, Kiander, Vartia, 2008).   
Figure 4.  Unemployment % Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source: IMF (statistical analysis, 2009). 
As with the Scandinavian countries during the 1980s, Iceland experienced almost 
non-unemployment, which is partially explained by major construction projects.  
Thus, the expansion in loans in both comparison periods created an illusion of a 
stable and healthy economy, only turning out to being an obvious mirage when 
unemployment skyrocketed following the bust. 
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Information from the IMF shows that unemployment in Finland reached 17% for 
a short period during the ensuing bust; that figure in Iceland, at the time of 
writing, hovers around 8% (Directorate of Labour in Iceland, 2010). 
All the countries showed a stable increase in GDP during the period, especially 
Iceland that had a mean annual growth of 4%. This is in contrast to the 2-2.5% 
mean annual growth in the comparison countries within the decade actually 
being 6% annually during the boom years 2003-2007 (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Real GDP Growth Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source:  IMF, 2009. 
What is probably most striking is the extraordinary high GDP growth in Iceland 
once the boom period took hold.  Monetary issues were not the only cause.  The 
government implemented enormous power plant projects that totaled 10.5% to 
12% of GDP in 2005 and 2006 (Central Bank of Iceland, 2009).  During the 
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same period municipalities engaged in various projects keeping demand for labor 
high.   
The comparison of inflation as seen in Figure 6 shows that it remained relatively 
mild in Iceland during the boom years.  That does not mean that it did not exist, 
the Central Bank’s goal of keeping inflation at or below 2.5% was seldom 
reached.  Inflation was, in a sense, partially hidden due to the strength of the ISK, 
making imports cheaper than otherwise.  Domestic factors were thus mostly 
instrumental in causing added inflation.  
Figure 6. Inflation % (end of period) Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source: IMF, 2009. 
When the ISK tumbled following the financial meltdown, inflation shot up.  Its 
strength had held back inflation for many years but when that development 
reversed inflation quickly spiked, as seen in Figure 6, since importers had little 
choice but to hand the added expense partially to the customers. 
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Adding insult to injury, many Icelandic companies had, on the surface, operated 
in a stable and profitable manner, by merely looking at the net income numbers.  
No study has been done yet in this particular field, as far as the authors are 
aware, but by scanning a few annual reports, it shows that by comparing 
EBITDA numbers to net loans and fixed assets, under normal circumstances 
companies were losing money on their operations.  However, by having a huge 
amount of their loans denominated in foreign currencies, interest costs were 
little, with artificially low interest rates and an increasingly strong ISK.  Once the 
ISK depreciated, the strengthening reversed and exposed the ‘hidden’ risk via 
currency fluctuations in financing, leading to many companies’ equity 
disappearing almost overnight.  
The monetary policies in Iceland and Scandinavia during the boom periods have 
been criticized for different reasons.  Many academics have questioned the 
pegging of the currencies to the German Mark (Jonung, 2008; Honkapohja & 
Koskela, 2000; Englund, 1999).  Although those thoughts are inconclusive, most 
argue that a floating currency would have resulted in a ‘corrective’ currency 
adjusting to interest rate spreads.  
Judging from Iceland’s recent experience, those arguments appear to be falling 
flat.  At the beginning of the decade, the ISK was floated with the aim of keeping 
inflation below 2.5%, which was the Central Bank’s main interest rate objective. 
This policy proved to be futile, as Figure 7 demonstrates, as was the pegging in 
Scandinavia during the comparison period, within an environment of free 
flowing capital.  While pegging created an imbalance too great between 
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currencies, the floating ISK with the Central Bank policy of increasingly higher 
interest rates led to an inflow of capital that strengthened the ISK.  Like the 
Scandinavians during the late 1980s, Icelanders (both households and 
municipalities) began taking foreign loans in large amounts.  The rationale for 
many people was that historically such loans had provided more advantageous 
interest rates and, maybe more importantly, the ISK showed no signs of 
weakening (this is a case of the short term memory the public has of financial 
markets, the ISK had weakened considerably 2001, and this seemed already to be 
a distant memory). 
The consequences proved to be dire.  Icelanders not only took foreign loans 
because of their belief in its continued strength but also, paradoxically, used 
much of that money to buy foreign goods, which had become so cheap because 
of the strong ISK.  Jannari (2009) maintains that this eventually resulted in the 
high interest rate policy of the Central Bank not only being toothless, but in 
reality with the free flow of capital adding to the inflationary pressure.  A lesson 
to be drawn is that monetary policies alone do not suffice within such 
circumstances, fiscal policies with the same aim are necessary. 
Therefore, measuring asset inflation during this period is difficult.  The 
underlying factors that were taking place did not necessary show up in normal 
studies.  A simple approach is looking at the nominal inflation price of real estate, 
which takes inflation, underlying inflation to some extent, and the level of risk 
appetite into account.  It also measures the consequences of access to money, or 
M1.  The case in point is Scandinavia during the 1980s.  Englund (1999) points 
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out that while deregulation may have opened the door to asset inflation, it was 
not until the Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio went from 75% to 90% in 1988, and 3 
years after deregulation had firmly taken place that real estate values went up 
35% within a short amount of time.  Until that, real estate prices remained stable 
and even lowered during much of the decade (Berg, 1998).  Furthermore, 
Englund asserts that a higher LTV ratio is, in a sense, a measure of risk appetite, 
which plummeted following the bust and the LTV ratio quickly fell again.  The 
ratio thus increased when there was no need for it, but decreased when liquidity 
problems surfaced.  The Swedes surely were aware of this, therefore the lesson 
simply was that a 90% LTV ratio is too high, even during bust periods.    
This development was even more extreme in Iceland.  The government decided 
to raise the LTV ratio in a few steps from 65% to 90%.  People began to take 
advantage of this by taking mortgage loans that were partially government 
sponsored in an indirect way and using the money, not only for household 
purposes, but also to increase spending and paying down overdraft loans.  The 
banks responded by lowering interest rates even more and in the spirit of gaining 
market share one bank began offering 100% LTV loans3.  The fierce competition 
led to a negative interest rate spread.  One of the major savings banks, for 
example, financed itself via long-term bonds paying 4.90% to 5.20% interest but 
lent its customers at the same time money to finance real estate at 4.15%. 
(NASDAQ OMX Nordic (2009).  
                                                            
3 http://www.sa.is/files/Sp%E1l%-
EDkan%20um%20%EDb%FA%F0afj%E1rfestingar_1723061657.pdf 
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Figure 7. Real Estate Nominal Price Inflation Comparison (index set at 100 as 
starting point) 
 
Sources: Berg (1998) and Icelandic Property Registry (2009). 
Figure 7 shows that the paths of Iceland and Finland, during the comparison 
period, were for many years almost identical.  However, prices kept on 
increasing in Iceland, and judging from the Scandinavian experience will 
decrease to about half of their value from their peak prices.  This prediction is not 
impossible. Various home builders joked during the boom period that there was a 
20/50 aim on new buildings, i.e. put 20 million in building an apartment and 
selling it for 50 million.  As Englund and Berg point out, prices in Sweden were 
stable for most of the period but as the LTV ratio was raised, prices shot up only 
to fall again concurrent with the lowering of the LTV ratio. 
The above factors demonstrate not only an overheating of the economy, but 
indicate how the general population perceived the economy, i.e. added optimism 
leads to added consumerism.  Therefore a vicious cycle forms, in which the main 
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driver of economic growth is consumption (of various forms) financed by loans. 
In a sense, the current lifestyle is funded by sacrificing the future, although that is 
usually not the general perception at such a given point.  Carey (2009) for 
example points out that the savings ratio of Iceland was negative during the 
boom years, 2003 to 2007.   
As previously mentioned, the high interest rate policy of the Central Bank may 
have increased underlying inflation, being expansionary in a sense. However, the 
monetary policy regarding Easy Money was clearly accommodating; broad based 
monetary aggregates such as M1 grew above 20% or more every year from 2002 
until the crash (Bagus & Howden, 2009).  As Woods Jr. (2009) explains, prices 
can only increase simultaneously (apart from decreasing supply of all goods) by 
increasing the amount of money in the economy.  Hence, despite a high interest 
rate climate, the Austrian School of thought maintains that monetary policy in 
tandem with fiscal policy was adding oil to fire as opposed to reigning in 
inflation.  Money was thus being flooded into society that invested it into long-
term projects, such as houses, but put the Icelandic nation on a short lease, as 
recent events underline.   
Berg (1998) asserts that the Scandinavian banks would have not been able to 
increase their lending growth without access to foreign capital.  This was the case 
in Iceland also, where people with loans in foreign currencies had enjoyed 
favorable interest rates for years and even had their underlying debts decrease in 
value due to the strength of the ISK.  This is further amplified when people see 
others making money by speculative trading (not limited to the stock market but 
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even to a larger degree housing loans in foreign denominated currencies), adding 
a tendency to follow the crowd.  Kindleberger (1996) described this as “Monkey 
see, monkey do”.  
Thus, by adding insult to injury, in the expansionary climate Icelanders began 
increasing their appetite for foreign loans considerably as the boom period 
continued.  Such loans increased a great deal in 2006 and at the start of 2008 
represented 14% of household debt (Carey, 2009).  During the fall of 2007, banks 
were beginning to shut down foreign denominated loans.  The increase, 
measured in ISK, is after that point mainly due to the weakening of the ISK.  
On paper, such loans were as safe for banks as the loans were denominated in the 
domestic currency.  Currency contracts were generally hedged but could only 
been done so to a certain extent, with fluctuations being assumed to stay within 
certain parameters.  Such hedges proved of limited use due to the discrepancy of 
the length of maturities between financing and loans provided. When the ISK 
plummeted in value, the hedging only provided support for the short term. Long-
term contracts were ‘naked’ against such fluctuations.  Carey (2009) also points 
out that although banks theoretically had adequate hedges against such 
fluctuations, their customers did not. Implying that while banks appeared to be 
safe, their customers simply could not pay back the loans under such different 
circumstances, therefore, write-downs became inevitable.    
A recent report by the Institute of Economic Affairs maintains that the root of the 
collapse for many US banks partially lies in the fact that the government 
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encouraged banks to increase mortgage loans to income groups with less money 
(Schwartz, 2009).  In Iceland, where a tradition of equality is rooted within 
society, such a development occurred to a higher degree with the increase of the 
LTV ratio.  Thus governmental policies contributed to this in both countries, and 
even internationally, in creating the real estate asset bubble via the Easy Money 
policy.  A lesson from this experience is that governmental controls must be in 
place during deregulation and Easy Money policy periods.  Such controls are 
paramount in keeping lending growth within reasonable levels and they need not 
be an infringement on the free market.  If banks were to lend recklessly without 
government guarantees, knowledgeable depositors and financers would take 
notice and withdraw their money, but lesser educated people might not, therefore 
leaving trust in the system at the mercy of speculators disguised as bankers.  A 
simple restriction of LTV ratios and foreign denominated loans would be the 
most effective strategy.  Without such simple measures, another crisis due to the 
same underlying factors would soon occur, only in a different form. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The similarity of the two comparison periods (T & T-17) is remarkable.  Despite 
the Scandinavian crisis being defined as one of the five “Big Ones” by Rogoff 
and Reinhart, Iceland shows, by a wide margin, more significant signs of over-
expansion in practically all aspects.    
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An obvious question is how Iceland came to be a victim of such a similar 
euphoria so shortly after a similar crisis by their neighbors.  Monetary issues are 
not the sole explanation.  Galbraith (1997) maintains that credit has on numerous 
occasions (for instance both before and after the “Roaring Twenties”) been easy 
without causing speculation.  As with deregulation, easy money by itself does not 
cause unsound speculation leading to disaster.  Galbraith states that the mood is 
far more important than the rate of interest, some sort of conviction that ordinary 
people should be rich.  The answer is in short provided by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009).  Icelanders, in line with a common syndrome associated with financial 
crises, thought that they were smarter and had learned from past mistakes; such 
crises only happened to other people during other times.  The reality was that not 
only had Icelanders not learned from past mistakes, but there are vast indications 
that past mistakes were visible both qualitatively and quantitatively.  Striking 
similarities are also to be found in recent examples in Argentina a decade ago, 
Asia during the 1990s, and even the “Roaring Twenties” in the US (Mixa, 2009). 
Iceland imitated all the main features of Scandinavia such as deregulation, a real 
estate boom, huge lending increase and an increased amount of foreign capital 
flow.  As the increase of lending to holding companies shows, lending growth 
was not only more prevalent in Iceland but had an added category where risk 
taking among insiders took constantly a bigger share of the lending pie.  Such 
added risk appetite was also prevalent in banks’ increased exposure in direct 
ownership of companies. 
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4.1 Firm Level 
Business practices in Iceland became questionable and of such a scale that they 
ultimately facilitated the collapse of the Icelandic economy. The close-knit 
society, partially created by managerial relationships, cross-ownership and cross 
lending, established imbalances in favor of business over regulatory authority. 
This consequence was an extensive collapse, where if one link in the chain was 
to fail a domino effect throughout the entire economy was created. As pointed 
out in this paper, this was not a problem in the other Nordic countries (Jonung, 
2008). The foreign criticism from financial institutions, rating agencies and 
foreign media in 2006 did not manage to influence the general discussion in the 
Icelandic media in such a way that the international expansion of the Icelandic 
banks was scaled down. On the contrary, the growth only escalated. In a country 
where nearly all the newspapers and business magazines are in ownership 
indirectly or directly by the banks themselves through their largest shareholders, 
attempts to criticize become negatively addressed and extinguished (Vaiman, 
Sigurjonsson and Davidsson, 2010). 
One possible reason why things got so out of control in Iceland is that the 
Icelandic banks operated as if they were investment banks.  In the shadow of the 
Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in 1933, separating 
commercial banking and investment banking.  During the Scandinavian crisis, 
those walls still held.  They were, however, abolished 1999 and it was within that 
landscape that the Icelandic banks grew so quickly.  It took the international 
banking system less than a decade to collapse after investment banking became 
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again part of the general banking system.  Icelandic banks, expanding partially 
because they had some sort of governmental guarantee, were the worst culprits 
and, as such, suffered the worst consequences.  This questions how systematic 
the crash was in reality, whether the similarity of the buildup created the 
circumstance in which all of the banks stood a chance of failing within 
parameters of certain negative events, with or without domino effects.  It can 
thus be argued that this experiment of abolishing the Glass-Steagall Act was an 
expensive one (Mixa, 2009), with Iceland suffering the highest cost.  This also 
raises the question why such separation has not been re-enacted. 
4.2 Macro Level 
The recent experience in Iceland and the experience in Scandinavia two decades 
ago suggest that fiscal and monetary policies must involve consistent goals.  
Interest rate tools within an environment of free flow of capital were used in both 
instances, in Iceland with the aim of keeping inflation at bay with a floating 
currency whilst the Scandinavian countries aimed at stabilizing the economy by 
pegging their currencies.  History shows that both these courses become toothless 
once speculation within an environment of rising asset inflation.  The real rate of 
interest was disguised with foreign denominated loans freely available.  During 
the prelude to the crash of 1929, the rate of interest of some margin loans for 
stock purchases went to 40-50% with added collateral required (Rappoport & 
White, 1994) without dampening the amount of speculation since the stock 
market had become a cornerstone in a sociological sense (Galbraith, 1997). 
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While the Central Bank of Iceland raised interest rates to keep the economy´s 
growth under control, the government increased to ceiling of LTV for housing 
purchases, lowered taxes  and kept an expansionary policy in the tight labor 
market.  The signals given by the Central Bank via higher interest rates and 
expansionary policy by the government and its subsidiaries raises the question 
what sort of policy was in place and partly answers the question why nobody 
warned against the buildup of foreign loans.   
4.3 Policy Level 
Much discussion has revolved around the effects of added deregulation in 
Scandinavia.  Englund (1999) maintains that such a view simplifies reality.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that a financial crisis occurs more 
likely in an unregulated environment, especially where a lack of respect is for the 
rule of law and corruption is widely spread.  They find, however, no correlation 
between financial crises and changes from a regulated environment to a lesser 
regulated one.  Englund (1999) concludes that what counts is a balanced macro 
environment in keeping the financial system stable within a deregulated 
environment.   
Claiming that deregulation was the root of the financial collapse in Iceland is a 
simplification.  Deregulation in neither Iceland nor Scandinavia was the cause of 
excessive lending.  However, once the monetary and fiscal policy got out of 
hand, creating a destabilized economy, the doors that deregulation had unlocked 
were opened.  The main impetus at first was real estate loans, leading to higher 
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real estate values in tandem with increased risk in lending.  In Iceland the 
privatization of the state-owned banks accelerated, where size was clearly all that 
mattered, and with  risk taking becoming much more via holding companies 
within a historically low interest rate environment. 
Banking is among the structural factors within societies today, just as schools, 
electricity and transportation to name a few.  Regulation issues within banking 
are thus of vital importance for the public.  Regulations – detailed or general – 
are not a substitute for proper business practices within banks (Gregg, 2009).  
Authorities must ensure that not only are such practices within the banks in line 
with general good practices, but also the interaction of banks and regulatory 
institutions and stakeholders.  It may appear clichéd, but prudent banking is 
needed to create trust, and banking is built on that basis.  Trust in the banking 
system is deservedly lacking in the banking system and needs to be re-built.  A 
lesson from what went wrong in Iceland is a good starting point. 
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Abstract 
The authors of this article contend that traditional corruption, which was largely 
blamed for the current situation in the Icelandic economy, was perhaps not the 
most fundamental reason for the ensuing crisis. The weak business culture and a 
symbiosis of business and politics have actually allowed for the bulk of self-
serving and unethical decisions made by the Icelandic business and political elite. 
In order to illustrate this point, 10 expert interviews have been conducted within 
the period of 6 months in 2009 to support in-depth research carried out by the 
authors. The article also discloses questionable business practices that have 
recently come to the attention of the public both in Iceland and abroad and that 
ultimately facilitated the downfall of the Icelandic economy. While traditional 
corruption has probably played its role in this downfall, the measures currently 
employed to determine its level did not account for various peculiarities of 
Icelandic society. The article thus argues that there was a high level of corruption 
in Iceland, but it was outside of the traditional definition. This other corruption 
has ultimately prevented the government from acting appropriately upon the 
questionable business practices mentioned above. The article also offers some 
general recommendations which should be useful to both policy makers and 
business leaders wishing to engage in business activities in a transparent, ethical 
manner and learn from the tragic Icelandic experience. Among these 
recommendations are the necessity to recognize the limitations of current 
definitions of corruption, as well as a word of caution to commercial enterprises 
to pay a close attention not only to commonly accepted indices and mainstream 
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reports but also to a country’s history, culture, and political environment, prior to 
making any sort of investment decisions in that country. 
KEY WORDS: business culture, business ethics, corruption, Iceland 
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Introduction 
The authors of this paper contend that, to an extent, the collapse of the financial 
sector and the subsequent economic crisis in Iceland in 2008 was not caused by 
corruption in its traditional sense, but mainly by the Icelandic society’s weak 
business culture, which enabled conditions conducive to corruption and 
questionable business practices that, arguably, should be considered as a different 
kind of corruption, the one outside of the traditional definition.  This weak 
business culture, which can be identified as the lack of tradition and 
consideration towards the set of explicit and implicit rules that facilitate business 
interactions in a society (adapted from the Oxford English Dictionary, 1989), on 
a micro-level was compounded by the lack of diversity and tight personal 
networks in managerial relationships and ownership which were characteristic of 
Icelandic business.  
Furthermore, to aggravate the overall situation, political tradition and a history of 
heavy state intervention in the economy helped to create an unprecedented bond 
between politics and business, where the political elite was making all the major 
decisions on who was going to be involved in and who was going to miss out on 
the best business opportunities (Jonsson, 2009).  It was this kind of societal 
nepotism alongside with a total disregard for commonly accepted business ethics 
standards, which greatly contributed to the incompetence of the civil service. 
This, along with having political connections as a key guiding business principle, 
made both regulation and oversight close to impossible (Sibert, 2009).  The lack 
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of supervision, in turn, led to an unsustainable expansion of the Icelandic 
financial institutions, which prompted the entire crisis.   
More specifically, this paper argues that traditional corruption, which was largely 
blamed for the current situation in the Icelandic economy, was not the most 
fundamental reason for the ensuing crisis.  This paper will demonstrate that it 
was the aforementioned weak business culture and a symbiosis of business and 
politics that was responsible for the bulk of self-serving, unethical, and corrupt 
decisions made by the Icelandic business and political elite. This combination, in 
turn, further exacerbated weaknesses in the Icelandic business culture.  To 
illustrate this point, the paper discloses questionable business practices on both 
the societal and company levels that have recently come to the attention of the 
public both in Iceland and abroad.  These practices reveal specific types of 
dubious business deals on a scale that ultimately facilitated the downfall of the 
Icelandic economy.  While corruption (as it is currently defined and measured) 
has probably played its role in this downfall, the measures currently employed to 
determine its level did not account for the various specificities of the Icelandic 
society.   
 
The paper thus argues there was a high level of corruption in Iceland that 
emerged not in the form of particular incidents yielding concrete benefits to the 
parties involved (as is the case is with traditional corruption), but rather as an 
overall attitude that allowed a weak business culture and unethical business 
behavior to flourish.  This attitude, created by close business and political 
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connections and the nepotism that is prevalent in the Icelandic society, has 
ultimately prevented the government from acting appropriately upon the 
questionable business practices.  That these practices were not identified using 
the mainstream concepts and measurements of corruption raises the question of 
whether they need to be adjusted to give an adequate warning to investors and 
potential business partners about the level of integrity in a given country.  
 
This paper also offers some general recommendations to both policy makers who 
would want to consider revising the mainstream concept of corruption, and to 
business leaders wishing to engage in business activities in a transparent, ethical 
manner and learn from the tragic Icelandic experience.  
 
Iceland: Rapid Economic Growth and Collapse 
Icelandic business culture1 is much younger than that of other European nations:  
Iceland has been able to transform itself from a very poor farming society to an 
advanced economy in around one century (Eyjolfsdottir and Smith, 1996).  
Today, Iceland is a developed democracy with a vibrant consumer economy 
based primarily on fishing and accompanying infrastructure industries, as well as 
tourism, aluminum smelting, and information technology.  Icelanders are among 
the world’s most educated people, with sophisticated preferences and tastes for 
both domestic and international consumer goods (Pálsson and Durrenberger, 
1996).  Largely due to financial deregulation, a strong performance by its fishing 
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industry, and an abundance of inexpensive energy, Iceland experienced sustained 
economic growth in the 1990s, which, after a short interruption in 2001, 
continued until 2008.  Iceland's economy is highly export-oriented, with marine 
products constituting the bulk of goods exports (Icelandic Trade Council, 
2009).  Other essential exports include aluminum, various alloys, machinery and 
equipment for the fishing industry, software, and woolen goods (see Table 1 for 
basic statistics on Iceland and its economy).   
Insert Table 1 about here 
In the autumn of 2008, Iceland started to experience extensive financial 
problems.  In the wake of the global financial crisis and unavailability of 
international credit facilities, Iceland's three major private banks collapsed and 
were taken into government administration with all of this happening practically 
overnight (Danielsson and Zoega, 2009).  The failure of the banking sector, 
which was several times larger than the entire Icelandic economy, along with the 
rapid depreciation of the Icelandic currency caused an extraordinary economic 
and financial crisis. 
The resulting contraction of the national economy has had an overwhelming 
effect on Iceland and its population.  External debt has soared, and sharp 
increases in both unemployment and inflation rates are now having substantial 
and adverse effects on people's lives (Wade, 2009a).  Only two years prior to the 
collapse, the average income in Iceland was 1.6 times of that of the U.S. Iceland 
also ranked at the top of the Human Development Index, which is a comparative 
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measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for 177 
U.N. member countries (UNDP, 2007).  Hence, how could Iceland literally 
overnight go from being the most prosperous country in the world to the country 
that fell first and hardest in the wake of the current financial crisis?  
In the frenzy of dialogue, interviews, articles, and blog entries that ensued 
because of the collapse, many commentators blamed corruption (Johannesson, 
2009). This view was reflected by a significant shift of attitude measured by 
Gallup International after the onset of the economic crisis. According to a survey 
issued in May 2009, 78% of Icelanders considered the private sector to be rather 
or very corrupt (grade four or five on the scale of five), a significant increase 
from the 62% that gave the same rating in 2007 (Capacent Gallup, 2009). A 
similar trend is observed in the public opinion of corruption among the members 
of ruling (so-called, governmental) parties as the numbers jumped from 12% 
from 2007 to 71% in 2009. In addition, according to the same 2009 survey, 40% 
of Icelanders considered their public officials to be corrupt. Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to compare this figure with any previous findings, since it was the 
first time such a question was asked (Capacent Gallup, 2009).  
These public concerns over corruption in Iceland are in contrast with Iceland´s 
apparent position as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.  In 2005 and 
2006, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked 
Iceland as the country with the least perceived corruption. These two years were 
merely the peak of an otherwise outstanding performance by Iceland.  Since 
2001 (the oldest figures on Iceland available from Transparency International) it 
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has always ranked among the top seven with a CPI score between 8.9 to 9.7 out 
of 10 (a high score indicating little corruption). According to the 2008 CPI index, 
which was issued after the collapse, Iceland retained its place in the top seven, 
receiving 8.9, and sharing seventh place alongside the Netherlands as the least 
corrupt country (Transparency International, 2009).  
This dichotomy between public opinion and CPI ranking both prior to and post-
collapse begs the question of the actual role of corruption in the dramatic 
downfall of the Icelandic economy and, if any, reasons why was it not detected 
by leading indices measuring corruption? In answering this question, it has to be 
noted that there have been no reports on actual corruption in Iceland by anti-
corruption agencies. However, the Council of Europe’s States against Corruption 
(GRECO) did dispatch a team to evaluate anti-corruption measures in Iceland, 
and some of their relevant findings are mentioned below. 
 
Corruption: definitions and measurements 
Corruption has existed as long as there has been power to corrupt, but the 
concept has evolved in line with dynamic changes in society.   Plato, Aristotle, 
and Machiavelli all used the word, referring to the moral health of whole 
societies, judged in terms of distribution of wealth and power, relationships 
between leaders and followers, sources of power, and the moral rights of rulers to 
rule.  This classical notion has today given way to a categorization that focuses 
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more on particular behavior rather than the moral fiber of society (Johnston, 
1996). However, the matter is in no way settled.  
 
One of the problems with defining corruption is evident when considering 
international anti-corruption efforts. The OECD is engaged in a range of 
activities to combat corruption and to that effect has developed a legally binding 
instrument: the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions. The Council of Europe also 
takes an active part in anti-corruption efforts and promotes both the Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption.  
The former lays down the criminal elements for various corrupt acts, whereas the 
latter requires its signatories to provide civil remedies to those harmed by 
corruption.  The issue is addressed globally through the UN Convention against 
Corruption, which is the most comprehensive international anti-corruption 
convention, having 136 signatories as of April 2009.  Nevertheless, none of these 
important instruments actually defines corruption. Instead, they establish 
offences for specific behavior, thus addressing certain forms of corruption 
without providing a generic offence of corruption.  For instance, the OECD 
convention prohibits the bribery of foreign public officials (active bribery); the 
Council of Europe Convention is more comprehensive, stipulating the liability of 
bribers as well as the liability of foreign officials who solicit or receive a bribe 
(passive bribery).  The UN Convention covers the broadest range of corruption 
offences including active and passive bribery, obstruction of justice, illicit 
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enrichment, and embezzlement.  The conventions thus establish crimes for 
specific acts of corruption instead of providing a generic offence of corruption.  
This reluctance to define corruption can be understood from a criminal law 
perspective, as generic definitions tend to lack the precision needed to enable 
prosecution.  Members of the Istanbul Action Plan, an anti-corruption agenda for 
certain Eastern European Countries, defined corruption as a specific crime but 
have had very few prosecutions or convictions for these offences (OECD 
Glossary on Corruption, 2008).  
 
Definitions for policy purposes, which are intended to guide policy development, 
raise awareness and develop anti-corruption strategies, do not have the same 
practical limitations as definitions for criminal law purposes. Various scholars 
and practitioners have attempted to define corruption without entering into the 
complex realm of law and legal requirements (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997). 
While there seems to be an agreement among those scholars that corruption 
"denotes deviation or perversion from some ideal state or natural condition" the 
problem remains to determine what the condition is that has been deviated from 
or perverted.  Some scholars define corruption as deviation from behavior in the 
public interest; others find that description as too open and define it as a 
deviation from legal norms. The third group sees corruption as a deviation of not 
only written rules but also from norms or moral standards (Lancaster and 
Montinola, 1997).  These definitions offer different angles from which to view 
corruption but share the same problem: they refer to terms subject to cultural 
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variations. The content of legal and moral norms is not the same across the world 
because what some consider as public interest may not be considered as such by 
others.  The understanding of corruption will thus vary depending on the laws, 
traditions, cultures, and other norms where the questionable conduct takes place.   
 
Other definitions look at the construction of public administration and whether it 
is based on the recruitment of personal dependents of the ruler rather than 
professional qualifications. Different ones offer a more base approach, 
considering it to be corruption when civil servants regard public offices as 
private businesses to allocate goods (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997). There are 
also scholars that define corruption as the perversion of the agency relationship 
that define democracy (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). In an ideal democracy, the 
politicians are the agents of their political supporters and bureaucrats are the 
agents of the politicians. Both are expected to act on behalf of their principal.  
According to this approach, corruption takes place when agents renege on their 
agreements with principals in favor of their personal interests (Lancaster and 
Montinola, 1997).  
 
Clearly, there is divergence of opinion regarding what constitutes corruption, 
with each approach having its strengths and weaknesses. The OECD has sought 
to create some clarity by pointing out that certain definitions are more common 
than others are, and submits that a frequently used definition covering a broad 
range of corrupt activities is "Abuse of public or private office for personal 
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gain". Apart from this general wording, which the authors also accept as an 
operational definition for the purposes of this paper, there does not appear to be 
any consensus about how to define corruption and what specific acts should be 
included or excluded (OECD Glossary on Corruption, 2008, p 22).  
 
In understanding corruption, agreeing on what corruption means is only the first 
step, the second requires measuring the level of corruption in a given country.  
This task is surrounded by numerous pitfalls including methodological 
difficulties in obtaining raw data.  Generally, one of the following two methods 
are used to measure corruption in a country.  Written documents such as press 
reports, judicial records, and records from anti-corruption agencies are compiled 
to give an indication of the level of corruption and then comparative statistical 
analysis is engaged in when events are recorded over a substantial length of time.  
Another method is to use data from surveys of the public, which is a relatively 
recent method.  The best-known tool to measure corruption is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index referred to above.  Developed by Transparency International 
(TI), it ranks approximately 180 countries based on perceived levels of 
corruption.  Its strength is that it is a composite index making use of a range of 
sources to enhance the reliability of measuring and comparing the level of 
corruption from one country to another. It is however subject to some criticism.  
For instance, Golden and Picci (2005) point out that the reliability of the 
information surveyed is largely unknown. For example, the information collected 
is based on surveys, and those questioned are not inclined to report on corruption 
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if they are actually involved in corrupt activities.  Additionally, those who are 
surveyed, and are not personally exposed to corruption, may not have reliable 
information.  A further problem is that the CPI does not record firsthand 
experiences of corruption but the perceptions of it.  Over time, the CPI may 
actually influence those perceptions so that those surveyed are not reporting their 
own perceptions, but they are reporting what they believe to be the level of 
corruption, based on the highly publicized results of the most recent TI index or 
information delivered by others such as media reports and political statements 
(Golden and Picci, 2005).  
However, the authors of this paper are less concerned about problems of 
methodology than whether the baseline approach to corruption is construed in 
such a way it misses the widespread practices that have the same impact as 
corruption, but do not fall within the mainstream notion used by the OECD and 
Transparency International.  When measuring corruption in Iceland for the 2008 
report, TI used five indices (out of 13 sources that are used by TI).  The first 
index was supplied by The Economist Intelligence Unit, which asked its panel of 
experts to assess the incidence of corruption using the common definition of 
misuse of public office for personal financial gain.  The second index was 
derived from The International Institute for Management Development in 
Lausanne from 2007 that surveyed representatives of business elite to assess 
whether or not bribing and corruption exist in a given country.  The third index 
came from Grey Area Dynamics Rating by the Merchant International Group 
compiled in 2007, which asked its panel of correspondents to assess levels of 
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corruption.  Corruption in their definition ranged from bribery of government 
ministers to inducements payable to the “humblest clerk”.  Fourth, The World 
Economic Forum 2007, which asked respondents to make an estimate of how 
commonly the firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes in their 
industry.  The final index was compiled by Global Insight (GI) 2008, which 
provided an assessment of the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials, where 
corruption was considered everything from petty bureaucratic corruption to 
grand political corruption (Lambsdorff, 2008).   
In general, TI recognizes that corruption comes in many forms and argues that 
none of the data included in the CPI emphasizes one form of corruption at the 
expense of another.  Looking at all the five indices, though, one cannot help but 
notice that there is a clear focus on traditional kinds of corruption that take form 
of bribery and other types of financial inducements.  In line with this approach, 
Transparency International has adopted a definition similar to that referred to by 
the OECD: "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". However, instead of 
looking at abuse of public power only, it applies equally to all three sectors of 
governance: the private, public, and civil society.  Moreover, according to this 
approach, corruption in Iceland was quite low.  This finding coincides with 
judicial practice in Iceland. For the period between 1997 and 2007 there was only 
one case of bribery leading to conviction (Council of Europe, 2008). 
The reason behind such considerable differences between these results and the 
public’s view of corruption is that there are some specific local peculiarities 
which fall outside of the traditional notion of corruption, but which the public in 
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Iceland see as pure and simple corruption.  In order to shed some light on these 
peculiarities, it is important to explore the way the Icelandic society evolved, 
identify some important characteristics of the Icelandic culture, and the way 
Icelanders do business.   
  
Iceland: History and Culture 
In order to fully understand the Icelandic specificities, it is important to venture 
into the history of the nation, which, along with its culture, has formed the 
attitudes and behaviors of its people. In turn, an understanding of the formation 
of Icelandic society and Icelandic cultural norms will assist in understanding the 
Icelander’s perceptions of corruption. 
Iceland was first settled in the ninth century by Vikings who embarked on a 
westward expansion that eventually took them to the eastern shores of the North 
American continent.  The first settlers were people of Scandinavian (Norse) and 
Celtic (Irish) descent – a fact that undoubtedly added some peculiarities to the 
character of modern Icelanders.  The settlements expanded quite rapidly, both in 
terms of population and civil society, and in the year 930AD the nationwide 
Assembly (Althingi) was established, effectively making Iceland one of the 
oldest democracies in the world.  Another pivotal event in the formation of 
Icelandic culture occurred in the year 1000AD. This is when Iceland became 
Christian, by a decision of the Assembly. 
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 In the second half of the 13th century, Iceland came under the rule of Norway, 
and subsequently Denmark, when Norway came under Danish rule in 1380.  This 
was one of the most important and fundamental events in the nation’s history. It 
facilitated the creation of a sense of national identity for Icelanders, and thereby 
affected the culture and national character of the Icelandic people (Durrenberger, 
1992).  This strong sense of national identification manifested itself in the so-
called "independence struggle" which started in the middle of the 19th century.  
To serve and support core ideas of that struggle, the nation developed 
idiosyncratic images of "Icelandness" reflected mainly in the country’s history, 
folklore, and proud literary tradition, which included the sagas2.  The central 
mission of the independence movement was to develop a national idea that 
would unite the people and prove that the patriotic power struggle could change 
the lives of ordinary people.  The main goal of this ideology was to protect and 
embrace the old order.  The ancient splendor of the sagas, for example, was 
hailed as a model, and even a number of national festivities were resurrected to 
emphasize the relationship between the past and the present.  Hence, Icelandic 
culture became an embodiment of the noble and glorious Norse experience and 
many people, especially in Northern Europe, started looking to Iceland for 
inspiration.   
Danish rule ended abruptly when the Nazis occupied Denmark at the beginning 
of World War II.  This prompted the British government (and subsequently the 
American government) to take Iceland under their protection, since the country 
served as an important Atlantic outpost for ships moving military and civil cargo 
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to both Europe and the USSR.  Towards the end of WWII, or more precisely on 
June 17, 1944, Iceland declared independence and became a republic.  
Accounting for population growth and availability of foreign capital, the 
Icelandic government made a decision to focus on the development of 
commercial fisheries as a backbone of its economy.       
At present, most Icelanders live in the capital area, and although they still cherish 
their cultural heritage, the Icelandic culture itself has undergone some changes. 
This has made it more susceptible to international (mainly US) influences.  
Despite this, Icelandic culture is quite close to that of other Scandinavian 
countries, both in terms of Hofstede´s dimensions and visible cultural artifacts.  
Even though there are no published cultural studies on Iceland, Hofstede, based 
on his preliminary data collected in the country, estimates that PDI (Power 
Distance Index) in Iceland is around 25-30, UAI (Uncertainty Avoidance Index) 
is 40, MAS (Masculinity index) is rather low at 10, and IDV (individualism 
index) is around 70 (Hofstede, 2009).   
These figures translate into the following cultural characteristics of the Icelandic 
society:  Iceland´s PDI is rather low, which means that people do not expect or 
accept that power in the society is distributed unequally, and that people are 
expected to make their own decisions and to take responsibility for their actions.  
An UAI of 40 is also on the low side, which means that Icelanders are willing to 
take considerable risks in their decisions and actions.  This also shows that 
Icelanders are quite open and tolerant towards other cultures – a fact that is very 
prominent in the daily lives of most Icelanders.   
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In regards to MAS, a score of 10 is also low.  This translates into greater equality 
between genders, both in terms of one’s position in society, and in terms of 
respect.  Other indicators of a "feminine" culture are a strong emphasis on social 
values (Iceland has a very generous social welfare system), freedom, and group 
decision making.  With the IDV index of around 70, Icelanders are quite 
individualistic – this means that there is a strong distinction between personal 
and work environments, as well as a higher importance of immediate family and 
closest friends over the rest of one’s relations.  Overall, these characteristics are 
somewhat similar to Hofstede´s description of what is referred to as the 
"Scandinavian culture". 
Extrapolating these and other cultural attributes of the Icelandic society to its 
business environment, Eyjolfsdottir and Smith (1996) ascertain there are two 
main characteristics that perfectly illustrate the most important values in 
determining the way Icelandic society, therefore, its organizations function.  The 
first one is egalitarianism, which is closely related to low power distance, high 
individualism, and high femininity.  In the world of business, these values might 
be exemplified in Icelanders by being consensus seekers, i.e. preferring to work 
in flat organizations with a harmonious atmosphere.  In addition, Icelandic 
business people can be characterized as somewhat courageous, original, 
resourceful, ambitious, and confident.   
The authors call the second characteristic a "reaction to adverse nature", which 
comprises of low uncertainty avoidance (due to the ambiguous nature of fishing, 
historically the main economic activity of Icelanders, and the tough natural 
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environment in which Icelandic people live) and a relaxed attitude towards time.  
This characteristic translated into strong optimism, excessive risk taking, and 
even adventurism among Icelandic business people, as well as the lack of self-
discipline.  All these cultural traits – and especially, both disproportionate risk 
taking and adventurism – played an important role in the Icelandic business 
culture, and consequently, in the events that transpired throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s and culminated in the events of late 2008.   
 
The Business Environment in Iceland 
As mentioned earlier, for several years Iceland has stood out as one of the least 
corrupt countries in the world.  In a piece appearing in US News & World Report 
(Cole, 2007) it asked what Iceland was doing right.  The CEO of Transparency 
International explained that the top countries had in place a "social contract 
between the government and the people" as well as "a culture of accountability".  
Mr. Olafsson, chairman of the Icelandic-American Chamber of Commerce, in the 
interview for the article added that the Icelandic public was educated, well 
informed, and active in politics.  Moreover, Iceland’s compact size, relative 
isolation, and cultural characteristics allegedly helped to create an environment 
where people knew each other and made it hard to do questionable things 
without being noticed (Cole, 2007).  Only a year later, the Icelandic financial 
sector collapsed literally overnight.  The numerous problems that have surfaced 
in the wake of the collapse suggest that the situation in Iceland was somewhat 
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more complicated.  The close links between individuals and other characteristics 
of the society turned out to be weaknesses rather than strengths, since they 
contributed tremendously to establishing an environment of unprecedented 
nepotism. This kept weakening the business culture, and furthermore created and 
maintained an atmosphere conducive to unethical business practices and 
corruption (Sigurjonsson, 2010a).  
 
Nepotism and Business Culture 
Even though Iceland was one of the founding members of the common European 
Economic Area (EEA) (a circumstance that allowed the country to enjoy many of 
its benefits, including free movement of goods, services, people, and capital) the 
political culture and a history of heavy state intervention in the economy created 
an unparalleled bond between politics and business (Jonsson, 2009).   The 
political elite were making decisions regarding who was going to get a piece of 
the "juiciest" business action and who was going to miss out on such 
opportunities – all based on the business owners´ loyalty and political affiliations 
(Sigurjonsson, 2010a). 
In order to illustrate how the Icelandic business culture helped to create an 
atmosphere susceptible to unethical and corrupt business practices, the authors 
approached several key experts and asked them to provide examples of such 
practices and explain how these practices contributed to the ensuing economic 
crisis.  Please note that in this paper the authors are reporting perceptions and 
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accounts of the interviewees, which, as opposed to objective evidence, may limit 
validity of the results.     
All ten interviews were conducted in person, between March and September 
2009.  The authors have taken certain measures to protect the confidentiality of 
respondents, given both the sensitivity of the topic and the ease with which 
people can be identified in such a small society as Iceland.  Nevertheless, the 
most important descriptions of the interviewees, such as their general area of 
work and the position in the organizations they represent, are presented in Table 
2, below.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
Primarily, the experts name nepotism as one the key features of the Icelandic 
business culture and point out that it is among the most important causes of both 
unethical behavior and corruption in the country.  For instance, this political 
favoritism was reflected in the adoption of the individually transferrable quota in 
fisheries. In essence, these public assets worth enormous amounts of money were 
“distributed” to a group of government loyalists (Interviewee #8, 2009).  The 
privatization of state-owned banks and other companies had allegedly occurred 
in a similar manner.  The most valuable and sought after assets, such as banks, 
were transferred at under the market value to a limited number of closely 
connected groups most of whom had not had much experience in managing large 
and sophisticated financial institutions (Wade, 2009b).  Although the original 
goal of bank privatization was to attract a small but diverse group of international 
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investors, in reality domestic political interests were given a priority. To return 
the favor, the newly privatized banks became the governmental parties’ largest 
donors (Iceland National Audit Office, 2009).  
 
Corrupt Practices as a Product of Weak Business Culture 
Many international experts, as well as the Icelandic public, now began to see that 
the financial and economic crisis in Iceland was brought about by the entire 
business culture. This culture was not as strong, open, and transparent as that of 
many other developed countries (European Commission, 2010; Sibert, 2009; 
Wade, 2009b).  Recently, situations that illustrate Iceland’s weak business 
culture have become apparent.  First, the system of checks and balances of 
business was ineffective due to the prevalence of strong connections between 
politicians and business owners.  This situation was aggravated by the existence 
of powerful corporations in a small country, which resulted in imbalances in 
favor of business over regulatory authority, making the latter hesitant or 
incapable of challenging complicated business transactions (Wade, 2009a).  In 
addition, general criticism of the ruling party and its close business and political 
allies was muted by the acquisition by big business of Iceland’s most important 
media assets (Sigurjonsson, 2010b).   
On a company level, the weak business culture was compounded by a lack of 
diversity and tight personal networks in managerial relationships, and by cross 
ownership.  In Iceland, the 10 largest business owners owned approximately 40 
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of the 100 largest corporations (Interviewee #2, 2009).  A report from the 
Icelandic Internal Revenue Directorate (Björnsson, 2009) stated that banks and 
other financial institutions had a confirmed ownership of the 300 largest 
corporations.  This became a serious issue, because one of the consequences of 
such cross ownership (when corporations own significant stakes in each other) 
was that the risk of extensive collapse was multiplied if one link in the chain was 
to fail.  Moreover, as practice showed, if financial institutions were amongst the 
corporations involved in such cross ownership, the damage could become 
critical, which is exactly what happened when a failure of one financial 
institution created a "domino effect" throughout the entire economy.   
Another emerging issue was that relatively small ownership (equity contribution 
of an investor) could bring along a great deal of control.   The owner of 15% 
equity of a corporation could acquire stakes in other corporations and that way 
leverage his or her control in excess of the original equity contribution 
(Interviewee #5, 2009).   Cross ownership – when companies own significant 
stakes of each other – also functioned as an upward or downward spiral, where 
corporations were counting profits or losses many times over for the purposes of 
offsetting each other´s earnings and paying less tax, or for the purposes of 
overstating profits and artificially increasing stock prices.  This sort of practice 
potentially led to much greater financial vulnerability and subsequent long-term 
instability (Interviewee #1, 2009). 
In addition, it now appears that in many cases the ownership of corporations was 
to some extent concealed (Davidsdottir, 2009).  The motives for such measures 
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were in most circumstances to avoid taxation, hide cross ownership, avoid 
compulsory notification regarding ownership in corporations (5% ownership 
stake or more), and to avoid obligations in case of takeover (minimum 30% 
ownership stake).  A variety of holding companies was registered in countries 
like Luxembourg and the Netherlands, despite conducting their business almost 
exclusively in Iceland.  While not being tax shelters, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands could offer other significant advantages.  For example, the Dutch 
legislation on holding companies made it especially attractive to register there, 
even though taxes were relatively high.  In Luxembourg there was and still is an 
effective banking law that protects customers’ right to privacy, which makes it 
easy to conceal information.  Actual tax havens, such as the British Virgin 
Islands, Cyprus, and the Isle of Man were also used to evade taxation and 
conceal ownership. Furthermore, there were cases when corporations were 
transferring a part of their balance sheets offshore to artificially improve their 
domestic balance and enhance their equity ratio (Interviewee #1, 2009).   
Another unfortunate development of the economic boom in Iceland was the 
increase in the dominance of major stockholders over the smaller ones.  This 
development resulted in larger shareholders receiving funding from the 
corporations where they were "big players" (both in terms of massive amounts 
and favorable interest rates), to an extent which was not available to the smaller 
shareholders (Interviewee #8, 2009).  Rules of maximum lending were exceeded, 
especially in cases when ownership was concealed.  The rules regarding 
collateral were also bent: while they clearly stated that lending for buying stocks 
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must not exceed 60% of their market value, actual cases showed that large 
shareholders were receiving lending which amounted to 100% of the purchase 
price.  Furthermore, the largest and most important shareholders were also 
receiving more favorable borrowing terms than the smaller ones, and were 
enjoying additional dividend payments (Interviewee #1, 2009).  Taking 
advantage of these encouraging conditions, large shareholders leveraged their 
positions and bought more shares of the corporations they owned (funded by the 
banks, with little or no collateral), in order to drive up the share prices 
(Interviewee #7, 2009).  The business culture in general also allowed for large 
imbalances in favor of businesses over regulatory authorities. This fact later 
proved to be fatal for the financial system in the country (Wade, 2009b).    
Change in a society’s business culture can take the form of a sudden 
transformation in lifestyle, leading to frivolity and excess, on the part of the 
business elite.  This was the case in egalitarian Iceland, and it was a rather 
dramatic lifestyle transformation (Interviewee #9, 2009).  Private jets, 
helicopters, winter palaces in Switzerland, summer palaces in France, apartments 
in London and New York are all examples of how assets were compiled in 
Iceland and transferred abroad (Interviewee #8, 2009).  There were countless 
other examples that demonstrated a deteriorating business culture in Iceland.  For 
instance, individuals were chosen to sit on boards of the privatized banks with 
little knowledge about the economy and business life.  There were unclear 
strategies in terms of corporate social responsibility, and little cautiousness in 
business operations prevailed throughout (Interviewee #6, 2009).    
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Furthermore, the conduct of corporate governance within the Icelandic banks did 
not foster sustainable banking. A mismatch between incentive systems, risk 
management and internal control systems appeared to have been unnoticed by 
the banks’ boards.  First of all, incentive systems were directed towards extreme 
risk taking, with risk management often in the hands of people in their late 
twenties or early thirties with no prior experience in risk management or internal 
control.  In addition, board members had no stimuli for reasonable risk 
management efforts, since many of them were the largest debtors of their 
respective banks (Special Investigation Commission, 2010).  
Moreover, self-regulatory procedures and mechanisms were lacking in day-to-
day operations, and most boards and large shareholders were ignorant of the 
significant risks taken (Interviewee #10, 2009). Within the banks, a radically new 
compensation system (encouraging aggressive investment strategies as well as 
excessive risk taking) was established (Sigurjonsson, 2010b).  Private and 
institutional lending also reflected such strategies.  For example, according to 
information recently leaked to the public3, one of the country’s major banks lent 
around €6.5 billion to six companies, four of which were in non-arm’s length 
relationships with the bank’s major shareholders (Mason, 2009).  What is even 
more amazing is that either partial or no collateral for these loans was required.  
Exacerbating the situation was that, unlike from a few largest owners of the 
banks, other shareholders were weak, dispersed, and unprotected. They had to 
cope with the increasingly complicated operations of the banks, where there were 
new financial products (derivatives, swaps, etc.) introduced nearly every month.  
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With little assistance coming from the regulatory agencies, these shareholders 
had to rely on corporate governance mechanisms to protect their interests, but 
unfortunately, these mechanisms were not enforced (Interviewee #4). 
While the banking system in Iceland was expanding at a tremendous pace, 
foreign financial institutions, international rating agencies, and foreign media 
began criticizing the Icelandic banks for the lack of transparency in their 
operations, strategy, and media relations.  The main point of their criticism was 
relating to the lack of direct and unbiased coverage of the banking expansion in 
the Icelandic media.  The reality was that nearly all the Icelandic newspapers and 
business magazines during this period were indirectly owned by the banks 
themselves through their largest shareholders (Interviewee #9, 2009). The same 
shareholders, many of them board members of the banks, were also their largest 
debtors. Any attempts to criticize the banks or institute legislation against media 
monopolies were promptly quashed by the government.  Moreover, although the 
banks had thousands of shareholders all around the country, in majority they 
were quite inactive in challenging either boards or bank executives.  Therefore, 
there was no media to act as a watchdog, and likewise, the politicians denied any 
wrongdoing on the part of the banks (Schwarzkopf and Sigurjonsson, 2010).  The 
close ties between the banks, the media, and the government did not obviously 
encourage transparent and informative reporting.  Ideally, the accurate 
information and critical analysis could have triggered both a much more 
adequate public debate and a closer regulatory supervision, which would have 
put pressure on both government and the banking industry to do business in a 
211 
 
more transparent and honest way.  Unfortunately, Icelandic business culture did 
not provide for such an ideal setting. 
All these practices led to a significant exaggeration of business capabilities, 
where projects that many corporations chose to participate in, and the new 
heights that the country’s banking sector was trying to reach, were way beyond 
their means.  Ignorance might be the cause of such business behaviors on some 
occasions, but when these behaviors and practices became a commonly accepted 
way of doing business, the business itself becomes unsustainable.  As soon as the 
international financial "springs" – an abundance of easily available and cheap 
credit – dried out, the Icelandic economy collapsed like a house of cards: all due 
to the highly unethical and blatantly corrupt business practices described above.  
To conclude, it is important to mention that similar business practices were not 
exclusive to the Icelandic economy and Icelandic enterprises, but what 
distinguishes the cases illustrated above from the rest is the unprecedented direct 
and indirect involvement of the political elite in the way that business was 
conducted (Haralz, 2007).  To extend the argument, both political favoritism 
(nepotism) and the weak business culture are to blame for the demise of the 
Icelandic economy and significantly, in Iceland these two factors are strongly 
interrelated.  According to Brynjarsson (2009), nepotism is the most significant 
reason for the weak business culture in Iceland.  It influenced not only how 
business was being conducted but also the capacity of the civil service to 
exercise restraint and oversight over the private sector. The ratio of political 
appointments to governmental positions is a striking revelation of this problem. 
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In the period between 2006 and 2009, approximately 50% of appointments to 
official positions were influenced by the political connections of the appointees 
leading to waste, inefficiency, and lack of talent within public administration 
(Kristinsson, 2009).  This nepotism, along with political connections being a 
guiding business principle, made both regulation and oversight close to 
impossible (Interviewee #3, 2009).   
Although nepotism is in some way an unavoidable phenomenon in a small, 
mono-cultural, and geographically isolated society, many, as Mr. Olafsson cited 
above, considered the small size of Iceland to be a guarantee of transparency in 
the conduct of affairs.  Small size, apparently, did entail risks of corrupt behavior 
due to the presence of close links between government and business community, 
as well as ever-present state interference in the economy (Council of Europe, 
2008).  The lack of supervision by public authorities subsequently led to an 
unsustainable expansion of the Icelandic banks, which prompted the entire crisis.   
To summarize this section, it is important to reiterate that all of the questionable 
practices presented above may be explained by a weak business culture in the 
society.  This weakness was compounded by a company-level lack of diversity 
and tight personal networks in managerial relationships and asset ownership.  To 
aggravate the situation, political culture and a history of extreme state 
intervention in the economy have created an unprecedented bond between 
politics and business, some sort of a symbiosis of the political and business elites 
(Jonsson, 2009).  The members of the newly created elite decided who was to be 
involved in lucrative business opportunities largely based on connections among 
213 
 
the individuals or companies involved.  This new symbiotic "entity" was 
vigorously making all the key business decisions in Iceland, and various 
regulatory and supervisory bodies simply could not, and in many instances, did 
not want to keep pace.   
  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is important to reiterate that given the Icelandic experience, 
indices for measuring corruption and common definitions of corruption proved 
inadequate, as they focused on acts and omissions of individuals rather than on 
the overall business culture. This created conditions conducive to corruption and 
failed to recognize that public officials could be corrupted without making a 
tangible personal gain.   
Of course, Iceland like any other country has to deal with corruption in the 
traditional sense, most commonly defined as the abuse of public or private office 
(entrusted power) for personal gain.  Iceland´s high ranking on TI´s composite 
Corruption Perceptions Index demonstrates, however, that the level of this type 
of corruption is relatively low.  Nevertheless, the collapse of the country’s 
economy has revealed that there was a different and possibly more dangerous 
form of corruption lurking in the environment that was not detected using 
traditional notions and measurements of corruption.   
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While there is still no direct evidence that Icelandic public officials have taken 
direct actions for their personal gain, all of them were subjected to circumstances 
that had the potential to corrupt their capacity to act (European Commission, 
2010).  This fact made it more difficult for them to monitor the economy and 
correct business behavior and business culture as necessary.  Such systemic 
wrongdoings in the business environment were extremely difficult to discover 
and act upon, since they had become the norm and the standard of accepted 
behavior (Caiden and Caiden, 1977).  As one could see from the multiple cases 
of concealed ownership, cross ownership, close managerial relationships, elusive 
leverage buyouts, etc., it was nearly impossible for public officials to monitor 
compliance with law and ethics.   
These instances demonstrate the potential to corrupt and are examples of 
circumstances where the actions and decisions of public officials (as well as 
business leaders) were actually influenced in a corrupt manner.  Yet it would be 
hard to fit them within traditional notions of corruption, as the Icelandic 
circumstances tend to involve systemic negligence, ignorance, and confusion, 
rather than direct abuse, and they did not necessarily result in concrete personal 
benefits for the officials involved.  Therefore, it would be fair to conclude that 
although there was a high level of corruption in Iceland, it transpired not so much 
in direct benefits to the parties involved but rather as an attitude that allowed a 
weak business culture and unethical business behaviors to flourish, and that the 
traditional measures of corruption proved inadequate in capturing it.   
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The consequence of this was that before the crisis businesses and the society as a 
whole were largely unaware of the level of corruption in Iceland and therefore 
unable to address it properly.  Plato, Aristotle, and Machiavelli would possibly 
have given a more useful warning about the risks of corruption in Iceland by 
focusing on the moral health of the entire society rather than individual actions of 
officials and their motives.  
 
Recommendations 
Based on the tragic experience of Iceland, it is important to make several general 
recommendations to both business leaders and policy makers wishing to engage 
in business activities in a transparent, ethical manner. 
One of the most important recommendations to policy makers would be to 
recognize the limitations of current definitions of corruption. In this article, the 
authors argue that definitions that focus on the actions of individuals, whether for 
criminal law or for policy purposes, are not adequate, as even the aggregate of 
individual actions may not give an accurate picture of the level of corruption 
within a given society. A more specific definition should therefore be used to 
evaluate corruption at the macro level. From that perspective corruption is seen 
as a mechanism of social domination, and could be defined in the following way:  
It is corruption when one or more sector dominates other sectors 
of the society and abuses that position in the organisation of 
resources, public goods, or to exercise undue influence.  
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Quite a few indicators will enable policy makers to measure whether healthy 
power balances exist within a given society. For example, one obvious indicator 
would be the relative size and influence of a particular sector. Another indicator 
could be the extent with which the authorities enforce existing rules.  The next 
indicator could measure the degree to which the public and the supervisory 
authorities are engaged with the private sector to promote ethics and responsible 
business culture, since having the official rules and regulations often do not 
suffice.  Yet another indicator could look into the relationship between the media 
and major businesses in a country, and at whether or not these entities are tightly 
connected through direct or indirect ownership.  The next indicator can stem 
from the attitudes that authorities in a given country have towards rapid growth 
and excessive risk taken by the country´s major business enterprises.  As one 
could observe, a relaxed and ignorant attitude can lead to devastating results for 
these enterprises, and sometimes, depending on the relative size and importance 
of these enterprises, the society as a whole. The last indicator should deal with 
the use of independent international experts, or in other words, people not 
affiliated with any sort of political or business interests in a given country, 
especially, if the country in question is a small and tightly knit society like 
Iceland.  The definition offered above, of course, needs to be validated through 
further research that should provide some more insight into its academic 
reliability as well as practical relevance.   
In regards to commercial enterprises, it is recommended that these enterprises 
pay close attention not only to commonly accepted indices and mainstream 
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reports but also to a country’s history, culture, and political environment, prior to 
making decisions on investing  in that country.  That is because corruption may 
be concealed in unusual forms, as demonstrated in the example of Iceland, 
making it difficult to understand local business practices and to estimate the level 
of corruption by relying simply on publicly available information.  
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. For the purposes of this paper, business culture is identified as a set of written 
and unwritten rules of conduct that facilitate social interactions in regards to 
business transactions (adapted from Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) 
2. According to the Merriam-Webster´s Dictionary, saga is "a prose narrative 
recorded in Iceland in the 12th and 13th centuries of historic or legendary 
figures and events of the heroic age of Norway and Iceland." 
3. For more information, please refer to http://wikileaks.org/leak/kaupthing-
bank-before-crash-2008.pdf 
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Table 1 
Basic Statistics for Iceland 
Population of Iceland:  306,694 (July 2009 est.) 
Inflation rate (consumer 
prices):  
12% (2009 est.) 
Labor force:  
 
189,000 (2009 est.) 
country comparison to the world: 172 
HDI (Human 
Development Index)  
3rd place (behind Norway and Australia), according 
to the UNDP Human Development Report. 
Unemployment rate:  
 
8.8% (2009 est.) 
country comparison to the world: 96  
1.642% (2008 est.) 
note: this figure climbed to 9.4% as of February 
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2009 
Life expectancy at birth:  
 
total population: 80.67 years 
country comparison to the world: 13  
male: 78.53 years 
female: 82.9 years (2009 est.) 
Literacy:  
 
definition: age 15 and over can read and write 
total population: 99% 
male: 99% 
female: 99% (2003 est.) 
GDP (purchasing power 
parity):  
$12.2 billion (2009 est.) 
country comparison to the world: 141 
GDP - real growth rate:  -6.3% (2009 est.) 
country comparison to the world: 198  
1.3% (2008 est.) 
5.5% (2007 est.) 
GDP - per capita (PPP):  $39,800 (2009 est.) 
country comparison to the world: 19  
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$42,800 (2008 est.) 
$42,600 (2007 est.) 
note: data are in 2009 US dollars 
GDP - composition by 
sector:  
agriculture: 5.2% 
industry: 24% 
services: 70.8% (2009 est.) 
Sources: Statistics Iceland, 2009; CIA World Factbook, 2010 
 
Table 2 
Interview Details 
# Position 
1 Manager at the Internal Revenue Directorate 
2 Analyst at the Internal Revenue Directorate 
3 Historian at an Icelandic university 
4 Manager at Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) 
5 Editor in Chief of an Icelandic business magazine 
6 CEO of a media research firm 
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7 Advocate to the supreme court 
8 Chairman of the Board of a large Icelandic pension fund 
9 Member of the Icelandic Parliament 
10 Professor at an Icelandic university 
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Abstract 
Those entrusted with the administration of a community’s complex systems can 
present an instable system as stable. Actor-network theory suggests that these 
defenders of the constructed ‘fact’ of system stability will form defensive social 
networks that can adversely affect transparency and policy discourse. We 
illustrate this by examining details of the network that formed in Iceland, a close-
knit community, in response to a Danish bank’s warning of Icelandic banking 
instability. We show how this network made it difficult for the Danish challenge 
to incite discussion and policy review within the community. We suggest ways to 
improve transparency when challenges to complex policy systems that are 
critical to close-knit communities arise.  
 
Key words: actor-network theory, Denmark, Iceland, media coverage, social 
networks, network stability. 
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Introduction 
The effectiveness of social policy relies heavily on stable complex systems, since 
these policy systems not only deliver detailed interventions to the community but 
also provide information about citizen needs and feedback on the effectiveness of 
interventions. However, one of the lessons of the recent economic crisis is that 
assessing the stability of a complex system is difficult. As long as the system’s 
‘customer-facing’ operations function in the way users are accustomed to, its 
long-term stability—that is, its ability to continue to provide assistance to the 
public and further government’s strategic aims—can avoid being questioned. But 
without an understanding of long-term stability, those evaluating policy 
effectiveness risk making faulty assessments, leading to inefficient 
administration if not misguided interventions or neglected needs. Added 
complications come from the incentives those parties entrusted with the system’s 
operations have to give signs that the complex system is stable. Of course, if the 
public does not take for granted that the system is stable, doubt could cause the 
system to experience high costs to avoid the panic that would cause the 
instability that the public dreaded in the first place. Problems arise, however, 
when an inherently unstable system is presented as stable. Rather than addressing 
the instability, those entrusted with the system’s operations may spend time and 
effort defending the system against claims that it is unstable. That is, the 
‘defenders’ are defending a fact that they have created, whether the fact can stand 
scrutiny or not.   
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In general, challenges to policy systems have value to the extent that they bring 
about reviews of legislative or administrative strategy and implementation. Well-
founded challenges prevent systems from becoming ‘stale’—failing to meet new 
or changed needs in the community. More specifically, challenges to claims of 
system stability raise awareness of taken-for-granted policy delivery methods 
and strategic intent. 
The resulting loss of transparency that can be engendered by a defence of system 
stability adversely affects the design, implementation and administration of 
social policy. Citizens are unable to get a clear picture of whether a critical 
system or institution in their community is working smoothly to meet their needs 
or is near collapse. Policymakers do not receive reliable feedback to design 
necessary policy interventions or renovations. Administrators cannot determine 
the extent to which policy measures are reasonably implemented or effective. 
Actor-network theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005; Law, 2009) shows the forms 
this defence can take and the costs it can impose on those who hope to challenge 
the ‘fact’. In this paper, we use actor-network theory to demonstrate how this 
defence can be structured to reduce the transparency of the system to members of 
the community and outsiders. Using social network analysis, we illustrate how 
those responsible for the maintenance of a complex system within a close-knit 
community defend themselves against outsiders’ claims that the system has 
stability problems. We show how the types of arguments used in defence of the 
system form connections among different groups within the community. We also 
demonstrate how connections form between different types of arguments—data-
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based and emotional—to construct or activate1 dense networks that make it 
difficult for those inside or outside the community to judge the system’s true 
stability. We show a wider application for actor-network theory than previously 
discussed in the literature at the same time as we draw implications of defensive 
network formation or activation for policymakers and administrators. 
Our analysis focuses on reactions in the Icelandic press to a report issued in 2006 
by a leading Danish bank (Danske Bank, 2006) that cautioned that the Icelandic 
banking system was not as stable as it appeared. As a small, close-knit 
community, Iceland provides an excellent example of reaction to an outsider’s 
challenge2.  While the Danish bank’s challenge came in the form of technical 
economic arguments, the historic ties between Iceland and Denmark (which 
ruled Iceland from 1380 until 1918) provided a particular emotional element to 
the debate that Icelandic groups were quick to bring to the fore. The defensive 
network used in 2006 effectively delayed discussion of institutional stability 
among Icelanders until the system’s collapse in 2008. Although banking is a 
commercial enterprise, its role in economic development and consumer well-
being, together with the involvement of politicians and government officials in 
its defensive network, brought it to prominence in Icelandic social policy. In our 
conclusion we discuss the value of attention to defensive networks in other social 
policy areas. 
We next describe actor-network theory as the foundation for our inquiry, before 
providing details on the Danish challenge to Iceland’s banking system.  We then 
present our research method, results, and analysis. We conclude with a 
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discussion of the implications of our findings and suggestions for further 
research. 
 
Actor-network Theory 
Actor-network theory holds that one cannot explain the workings of society by 
appealing to social constructs, because those concepts are themselves built by the 
society one is trying to study (Latour, 2005). Thus, one must look at the activities 
undertaken within society and describe how those activities are interpreted and 
presented by the parties undertaking them. That is, one must see how society is 
constructed by its participants, rather than assume that there is a social force that 
does the construction (Latour, 2005).   
This view of ‘constructing society’ arose from a series of studies into the 
workings of the natural-science community (e.g., Latour, 1987, who cites Fleck 
[1979 (1935)] as a predecessor in this line of inquiry). Among the principle 
findings of these studies are insights into the ways in which scientists interpret 
natural phenomena and present these interpretations as ‘facts’. These ‘facts’ in 
turn form the basis for further interpretation and presentation unless they are 
successfully challenged. (A parallel line of thought concerning these challenges 
can be found in Kuhn’s [1970] notion of ‘paradigm shifts’. Kuhn also 
acknowledges Fleck’s role as a pioneer in this area.) 
Two of actor-network theory’s noteworthy contributions to our view of society 
inform the motivation and structure of this research. First, those who form a fact 
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will try to defend it until it becomes a ‘black box’—a concept or construct that is 
so difficult to challenge that it becomes taken for granted (Latour, 1987). Ideas 
become ‘black boxes’ as scientists build on the work of others, making it hard to 
dispute a present fact without also implicitly challenging past facts. To make 
present concepts difficult to challenge, defenders will form networks—that is, 
connections of actors. Thus a challenger must not only discredit the ‘inventor’ or 
chief advocate of the fact, but also those upon whose work this person relied in 
constructing the fact or those who agree with the chief advocate in his or her 
interpretation of a phenomenon.   
The second contribution of actor-network theory that we use is the idea that an 
actor need not be human or animate. Latour (1987) points to the need for 
challengers of a fact to ‘argue’ against the tools and laboratories that scientists 
use for their research. In this vein, Callon (1986) shows how the behaviour of 
non-human actors (scallops) played a part in disrupting a network that marine 
researchers had established to advance their view of effective shell-fish 
harvesting, while Law (1986) illustrates how navigational tools were part of the 
network of exploration. Thus, challengers must not only dispute people but also 
must fight the tools people use. 
Putting these ideas in the context of our research, we expect that those charged 
with the maintenance of the banking system in Iceland would form a network to 
defend the ‘fact’ of the system’s stability in the face of the Danish challenge. 
While there may be many actors in such a network, we focus on people and the 
arguments they present, as these are most easily traceable in the historic record.   
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Actor-network theory has been used in research into economic and industrial 
development (Murphy, 2006) and public sector initiatives (Heeks & Stanforth, 
2007), among other areas. Although there has been a reasonable amount of 
research done with actor-network theory as its base, there is a scarcity of work 
that actually shows the network that forms. Therefore, one of our research 
questions is: What does the defenders’ network look like? That is, what kinds of 
people-actors and argument-actors are involved, and what are the relationships 
among them? Before we describe our approach to these questions, we discuss the 
situation upon which we focus. 
 
Icelandic Banking and the Danish Challenge of 2006 
As of 2006, Icelandic banks had been operating in a liberalised marketplace for 
only twelve years. Through a period of growth and consolidation following the 
opening of the banking market, three large banks emerged to form the core of the 
Icelandic international banking system: Glitnir, Kaupthing Bank, and 
Landsbanki3 .  In 2000, the banks’ assets were less than Iceland’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). By 2006, thanks in part to a booming domestic economy, they 
were over eight times GDP (Jännäri, 2009). With a newfound investment 
banking mentality, the banks collaborated with their clients in equity positions as 
well as serving as corporate finance consultants and providing lending to them 
(Special Investigation Commission, 2010: Ch. 6). Among these collaborations, 
Icelandic investors began taking controlling interests in established Danish 
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retailers, airlines, and real estate firms (Markaðurinn, 2005; Morgunblaðið, 
2005a, 2005b, 2006).   
In late 2005 and at the beginning of 2006, foreign analysts began to express 
doubts about the banks’ ability to sustain the funding for their growth. In 
addition, some raised concerns about the banks’ culture, risk management, 
dependence on wholesale financing, and lack of transparency in their ownership 
and holding structures (Jännäri, 2009). Although it was not the first analysis to 
raise concerns about Icelandic banking4,  the report issued on March 21st by 
Danske Bank (2006: 1–2) was the sharpest in its criticism. From its title 
(‘Iceland: Geyser crisis’) to its sweeping statements (e.g., ‘On most measures, 
the small Icelandic economy is the most overheated in the OECD area’), to the 
comparisons it made (e.g., ‘Iceland looks worse on almost all measures than 
Thailand did before its crisis in 1997’), the report drew the ire of many 
Icelanders (Jónsson, 2009). The Danske Bank analysts held that ‘there has been a 
stunning expansion of debt, leverage and risk-taking that is almost without 
precedents [sic] anywhere in the world’ and cautioned ‘we see a substantial risk 
of a financial crisis developing as an integral part of an Icelandic recession in 
2006-7’.  At the same time, the analysts admitted that ‘Iceland is not a core part 
of our research universe’, but decided to issue ‘this special report’ because of 
increased interest in Iceland and because ‘recent market jitters suggest that a 
material change of dynamics is in the air’. During the week following the 
report’s publication, each of the three major banks’ shares lost about 10% of their 
pre-report value and the Icelandic króna lost 4% in value against the U.S. dollar. 
235 
 
It is now well known that there were flaws in the Icelandic banking system that 
contributed to its spectacular collapse in the autumn of 2008 (Special 
Investigation Commission, 2010: Ch. 2). During the ensuing financial crisis, 
Icelandic commentators looked back on the events of 2006 and saw them now as 
warning signs, although the bitterness of the debate lingered. Thus, for example, 
the present Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland holds that ‘the 2006 crisis 
should have been used to stop the growth of the Icelandic banks before their 
assets became ten times Iceland’s GDP [in 2008]’ (Morgunblaðið, 2010). At the 
same time, the chief economist of Kaupthing Bank has written, ‘the Danske Bank 
analysts achieved their goal of becoming prominent Icelandic commentators on 
international newswires, and modesty was not one of their virtues’ (Jónsson, 
2009: 77). 
While these comments were made with the benefit of hindsight, it is noteworthy 
that the 2006 debate remains salient to the Icelandic community. This leads us to 
ask a second research question: What factors in the network that was constructed 
or activated to defend the notion of financial stability among the banks made it 
difficult for the public to ascertain whether the banks were stable in 2006?  
 
Method 
Sample selection and coding 
We focus on the first week after release of the Danske Bank report in order to 
show how quickly a defensive network can be activated or form to influence 
236 
 
subsequent efforts at evaluating the system. Working with a press-research 
service, we identified 31 news articles that mentioned the Danske Bank report 
and that were published by Icelandic sources during the first week after the 
report’s release5.    
As mentioned, actor-network theory holds that ‘actors’ can be people or other 
animate beings, or the tools people use to construct facts. This suggests that there 
are two broad categories of actors in this defensive network: people and the 
arguments they use. Thus, our analysis is based on a two-mode social network.   
Coding of people and arguments began with the native Icelandic author 
translating selected articles into English for the non-Icelandic co-author. Both 
authors then discussed these articles to agree on a coding scheme. The Icelandic 
author summarised all articles in detail for the co-author to code. The Icelandic 
author then reviewed the coding and proposed corrections. Both authors 
discussed all suggested changes to agree on a final coding. 
We classified people by nationality—Dane (d) or Icelander (i)—and by 
occupation. Occupational categories, abbreviations and counts include economist 
or analyst at a bank (‘bank analyst’, designated ‘n’, six Icelanders, three Danes), 
bank executive (“b,” four Icelanders, one Dane), non-bank business executive 
(“x,” three Icelanders), government official or politician (“p,” five Icelanders), 
academic (“c,” two Icelanders, one Dane), or newspaper editor or reporter (“z,” 
three Icelanders). Thus we identified 23 Icelanders and 5 Danes in the 31 
articles6.   
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Arguments are the rationalisations, speculations, or suggestions that people 
advance for the actions or positions taken by challengers, defenders, or others. 
Arguments fell into three broad categories: those based on data given in the 
Danske Bank or other formal reports (‘report-based’, seven items); those based 
on psychological affects or emotions (‘affective’, five items); and issues or 
suggestions that were raised for parties to consider and act upon (‘issues’, one 
item).   
We counted an argument only once per person per article. We separately 
identified each argument that a person made in an article. Similarly, we counted 
each person separately, whether or not that person made the same argument as 
another person in the same article7.  Table 1 shows the different arguments, 
together with their abbreviations and the number of times each appeared in the 
articles. Report-based arguments represent 63% of the total (53 appearances), 
affective arguments account for 36% (30 appearances), and issues 1% (1 
appearance).   
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
Analytical Approach and Results 
Implications of two-mode social network analysis 
Although two-mode social networks can offer insights into network structure and 
activity beyond those suggested by typical single-mode networks, there are limits 
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to the kinds of quantitative analyses that can be meaningfully applied to them 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005: Ch. 17). Therefore our quantitative analysis relies 
primarily on dividing the two-mode network into two single-mode networks: one 
for people and one for arguments. Our qualitative analysis, however, uses the 
two single-mode networks and the two-mode network.   
A two-mode network shows both people and arguments as nodes, which means 
the link or connection between the two can be interpreted as ‘appears with’. A 
single-mode network of people shows only people as nodes, connected by 
arguments. Thus one can read the links as ‘makes the same argument as’. The 
second single-mode network features arguments as nodes connected by people, 
building on actor-network theory’s view that the tools animate actors use to 
construct or defend a fact are also actors. Here, one can interpret the links as ‘is 
made by the same person as’. Arguments do not have to appear in the same 
article to be connected; an individual’s arguments are considered as being made 
within the time-period being analysed. For example, an Icelandic analyst need 
not have made two arguments in the same article or on the same day for them to 
be counted as two arguments connected by the same person. 
 
 
Measures used for quantitative analysis 
We used typical measures of network composition and actors’ positions in our 
analysis. Measures of network composition describe how many connections there 
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are, how closely connected members of the network are, whether there is a 
tendency to form subgroups within the network, and whether connections are 
mostly made between members with the same role (e.g., academic, analyst, or 
politician) or between members with different roles. The specific measures that 
we use are density, average shortest distance, reach, clustering, core/periphery 
formation, and diversity. Table 2 summarises the conceptual approach and basis 
of measurement for these, based on Hanneman and Riddle (2005) and 
Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
Insert Table 2 here. 
Measures of individual actors’ position within the network focus on the concept 
of centrality and complement the network composition measures. A ‘central’ 
person is one whose arguments are shared by a high number of other people or 
one who connects a high proportion of other people by the particular arguments 
he or she makes. This could happen if the central person makes many arguments 
that are used by many other people or if he or she simply offers a high number of 
arguments that scattered others also use. Similarly, a ‘central’ argument is one 
that connects a high proportion of other arguments. Our centrality measures are 
Freeman degree, closeness, Bonacich power (beta centrality), Freeman 
betweenness, and flow betweenness. Table 3 summarises the conceptual 
approach and basis of measurement for these indicators, again based on 
Hanneman and Riddle (2005) and Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
Insert Table 3 here. 
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We used UCINET (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) for our quantitative 
analyses. Illustrations of the network come from NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002), a 
visualisation package. 
 
Results 
Qualitative analysis. The 31 articles featured 28 people making 13 arguments. 
The two-mode network depicted in Figure 1 suggests the importance of both 
report-related and affective arguments. A number of people make economic-
technical (ectech) arguments, along with accusations of misinterpreted data 
(misint) and use of the wrong data (wrdata). In addition to these report-related 
items, charges of Danish envy (dnenvy) and that the Danes do not know Iceland 
(dkisl), both appeals to the emotions, seem to dominate. Note that politicians (ip) 
particularly use these two arguments and thus help connect these affective 
arguments to report-based ones. Report-based arguments, on the other hand, 
appear prominently in the bank analysts’ (dn, in) repertory, which is not 
surprising. 
A moderate amount of the possible connections are present in Week 1’s ‘people-
network’ (Figure 2)—that is, many people are making arguments in common. 
Bank analysts seem to represent one well-connected group, while politicians may 
be on the periphery, making arguments that connect others who would otherwise 
be rather isolated. Non-bank business executives (x) and newspaper 
commentaries or editorials (z) do not appear much at this stage. 
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Finally, the ‘argument-network’ for the first week (Figure 3) shows that affective 
arguments and report-based arguments are already well-connected—that is, there 
are people making both kinds of arguments early on. Only one issue, the need for 
better reporting or transactional transparency from the banks (transp), appears at 
this time. 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 here. 
Quantitative analysis of network structure. Visual depictions of networks are 
suggestive rather than definitive, in part because the software used can be 
manipulated to move nodes around in the drawing8.  Quantitative methods 
provide more details. 
Analysis of the people-network reveals that it is moderately dense (57% of all 
possible connections are present) and relatively compact, with an average 
shortest distance of 1.51 steps between actors, suggesting that it is easy to go 
from one ‘end’ of the network to the other. In fact, one quarter of the people in 
the network can reach three quarters of the network in one step—that is, one 
quarter of the individuals share at least one argument with three fourths of the 
rest of the people. The tendency to form groups, clustering, is high (87%). Nearly 
all of the individuals (92%) can be said to be in a single core group, and 64% of 
the possible connections among these individuals are present. Eighty two per 
cent of the people have 80% or more of their shared arguments take place with 
individuals who are not in the same role (analyst, bank executive, academic, etc.) 
as they. See the first column of Table 4 for details. A closer inspection shows 
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that eight people from four groups (ib7, ic4, in1, in4, in5, in11, in13 and ip6) are 
connected to at least 80% of the core’s members. 
The argument-network reveals a similar structure. The network is moderately 
dense (58%) and relatively compact (average shortest distance = 1.50 steps). 
Nearly one quarter of the arguments (23%) are connected to three quarters of the 
other arguments in one step, which means that nearly one quarter of the 
arguments are made in conjunction with 75% of the other arguments by the 
people in the network. There is a high tendency towards clustering (81%), with 
38% of the arguments in one core group that is completely internally connected. 
Thirty eight per cent of the arguments were made in conjunction with 80% or 
more arguments that were not of the same type (report-based, affective, or 
issues). Details appear in the second column of Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
Quantitative analysis of individual network actors. We chose normalised scores 
more than one standard deviation above the mean in determining central actors 
on the various measures. See the top half of Table 5 for a summary of ‘central 
people’. While no person is noteworthy on all centrality measures, there are 
prominent actors. In particular, four analysts (in1, in5, in11 and in13) and one 
politician (ip6) score high on three of the five measures. Equally important, 12 of 
the 28 people in the network can claim to be central based on at least one of these 
measures. 
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Both affective and report-based arguments offer candidates for ‘central 
arguments’. ‘Danes do not know Iceland’ (dkisl) scores high on all five centrality 
measures, as does ‘compensating data are missing’ (compdm). ‘Danes are 
envious of Icelanders’ (dnenvy), ‘they are misinterpreting the data’ (misint), and 
‘the wrong data are used’ (wrdata) are also prominent actors in the argument-
network, based on at least one of the centrality measures. Central arguments 
appear in the bottom half of Table 5.  
Another way of assessing centrality is to examine which actors make the network 
vulnerable to splitting up. Using KeyPlayer1 software (Borgatti, 2003), we found 
that fragmenting these networks to approximately one half of their cohesion—
equivalent to dividing the networks into two roughly same-sized sub-networks—
would require removing seven people from three groups (ib, in and ip) and three 
arguments, both report-related and affective, from the argument-network. 
‘Removing’ means discrediting the views of the people in the people-network or 
overcoming the arguments in the argument-network. 
Insert Table 5 here. 
Interpretation. Both the people-network and the argument-network at the end of 
the first week following the Danske Bank report’s release are dense, compact, 
and show a tendency toward clustering. Moderate numbers of both kinds of 
actors can reach an extensive portion of their respective network within one step. 
The cores of both networks are large and dense. A high proportion of people 
show a high proportion of their connections outside of their particular role. 
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This means that many people are connected by similar arguments and many 
arguments are connected by being made by the same individuals. Further, a 
moderate proportion of these connections are ‘close’—that is, arguments are 
made in common by a high proportion of other people. People in particular form 
a large core group, which means there are not many people who make just one or 
a few arguments. While core membership may be due to one’s role within an 
occupational group, the frequency of one’s public statements, or one’s 
availability for interviews, it is noteworthy that core members come from 
different groups and constitute a large enough number to make a challenge to 
their advocacy difficult. Finally, report-based arguments are likely to be made in 
conjunction with affective arguments, while arguments of either type are likely to 
be made by people of different roles. 
The centrality analyses suggest that a high proportion of people can be regarded 
as important to the network, where importance means these people offer many 
arguments or offer arguments that are shared by a large number of others. In 
addition, these central people come from four different groups (bank analysts, 
bank executives, politicians, and academics). At the same time, there are both 
report-based and affective arguments that are central—made in common with 
other arguments. Further evidence of the difficulties inherent in challenging these 
networks comes from the analysis of network vulnerability. Obviously, 
discrediting one quarter of the people or overturning one quarter of the 
arguments would be a large undertaking, particularly since a challenger could not 
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simply blame a particular perspective on an entire group (akin to saying, ‘Of 
course politicians would say that’). 
In sum, at the very start of its construction or activation, the network that arose 
around the idea of ‘financial stability’ was sufficiently closely interwoven—yet 
not very centralised—that anyone who would challenge the notion that the 
Icelandic banks were stable would have had to discredit many different role-
players and would have had to overturn both technical and emotional arguments. 
In other words, a challenger could not simply decry one group (e.g., politicians, 
bank executives or analysts) as a whole, since each group had representative 
‘central players’. Neither could a challenger be easily heard by dismissing 
arguments as emotional or as technical and arguing from the other perspective. 
Rather, a challenger would have to address both emotional and technical 
arguments at the same time.   
Finally, analyses of the networks through the end of 2006 show they kept the 
same structural pattern and generally produced highly similar diagnostic data, 
lending further support to the idea that the initial network activation or formation 
seen here set the defensive network’s foundation9.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our analyses show the difficulty the Danske Bank faced in trying to get its 
message heard. The defensive network made it hard for challengers to identify 
one group as the key advocacy force or one type of argument as the main basis 
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for the claims of the Icelandic banks’ stability. Therefore, focusing on the views 
of one group or on one particular style of debate in hopes of breaking the 
network apart, and thus communicating an alternative perspective, was 
problematic.   
It is important to bear in mind that none of this necessarily implies any 
wrongdoing on anyone’s part. Analyses of this sort cannot impute motives.  
Simply because many parties presented the same argument does not mean they 
conspired in their presentation. Neither does it mean that any party intentionally 
distorted any facts10.  We also acknowledge the necessary limitations of this 
study. We may not have captured all relevant newspaper articles. We confined 
our analysis to print sources, although anecdotally we know that other media 
outlets in Iceland were reporting on the debate along the same lines. We 
understand that important ‘behind-the-scenes’ discussions and activities were 
taking place during the time of the debate, focusing on suggestions made for 
improving the banking system. As these usually were not well publicised, our 
analysis could not include them.  
Defensive social networks arise naturally, according to actor-network theory. 
Their effects are especially pernicious in close-knit communities, since 
challenges are seen as affronts to accepted ways of life in the community and to 
trust in community members. In the social policy arena, community-based 
complex systems can support initiatives in local delivery of healthcare; social 
services such as food banks, childcare, and eldercare; transportation; and 
environmental monitoring and remediation. We believe defensive social 
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networks are likely to form in these areas to protect the interests of those 
responsible for the underlying systems, should the systems’ stability be 
challenged. Similar effects may be experienced in national complex systems, but 
often these systems are established with monitoring and review mechanisms built 
into them. This leads to the question of how defensive social networks can 
obscure or hamper such mechanisms—a question that is worth future research.  
Those designing or implementing social policy need to be aware of the structural 
elements of the networks that form or are activated around a policy issue. First, 
networks that arise to defend a community’s institutions can work against the 
best efforts at transparency. Without knowing the true state of a complex system, 
social policy can be misdirected, enactment of necessary improvements may be 
delayed, and the effects of implementation may be unknown or misinterpreted. 
Second, these defensive networks complicate communications ‘into’ the 
community and increase the chance that social policymakers will be treated as 
outsiders who neither understand nor care for the community’s needs. Third, 
defensive network structures cause policymakers to expend effort to get past 
network members to the community itself, thus decreasing efficiency, raising 
costs, and diverting time that could be better spent on policy design and 
implementation. 
Iceland represents a community closely knit by kinship ties, but ‘close-knit’ need 
not be determined solely by ethnic or historical background. Challenges by those 
outside the community to a ‘fact’ constructed within the community are likely to 
face the construction or activation of a defending network. If those entrusted with 
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the operation of complex systems—be they financial, judicial, legislative, or 
other—tend to defend the facts they have constructed, and if the defenders’ 
arguments come from different parties mixing emotional and rational appeals, 
citizens affected by those systems will not have any clear, unbiased way to 
understand whether the fact has any merit. In light of this, it is likely to prove 
valuable to design ways to map such networks quickly, as they are arising, in 
order to show the citizenry and others affected by the outcome of the debate who 
is participating in the discussion (and thus, who is not) and how the arguments 
are being framed. For example, in the Icelandic case it may have proven useful to 
citizens and legislators to show visually the ownership connections between 
companies, the connections between boards of directors, and the connections 
between media outlets, politicians, and companies. This is what the Special 
Investigation Commission (2010) included in its report on the 2008 bank failure, 
but of course only after the collapse. A similar public display and description, 
published before a debacle, can bring such taken-for-granted structures to light 
and open up worthwhile discussion or at least deepen understanding when 
debates occur. 
One way around the dilemma posed by defensive networks is to have the 
community agree to establish a group outside of the community that can serve as 
‘translators’ of the arguments presented. This group would function much as an 
arbitration board does, with the important difference that the group would not 
come to any decisions on behalf of the disagreeing parties, but would serve to 
present the arguments in a clear manner, identifying emotional components as 
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such. The design of such a ‘board of translators’ forms part of our current 
research agenda11.  While we are far from any complete picture of what the board 
would look like, we realise the community would need to choose members 
before a crisis occurs, members would have to be trusted by different segments 
of the community, and the threat of ‘capture’ by particular groups within the 
community would need to be addressed.  
Our study holds theoretical and practical implications. On the theoretical side, we 
have shown how a network such as actor-network theory posits can indeed form 
to defend against a challenge to a social ‘fact’. We have seen that non-animate 
actors (here, arguments) play a crucial role in that network and help explain the 
network’s tenacity. A worthwhile extension of this work is to examine whether 
such networks actually form in defence of the fact or merely get activated 
(having already been formed but lying dormant) when the challenge occurs. 
Activation in terms of the emotional arguments in the network suggests that there 
may be prejudices simmering below the surface in the community. It is advisable 
for policymakers and administrators to know of these—and of the connections 
between these arguments—when intervening in community systems.  
We also have shown how one can measure the structure of these networks while 
identifying key actors in them. An intriguing question that is worth future study 
is the extent to which members of the network identify spokespeople who are to 
be the most identifiable defenders of the fact, and who thus become some of the 
central actors in the network by design. All involved in social policy stand to 
benefit from knowing who these ‘designated representatives’ are, either in order 
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to interpret their statements as indicators of interest group sentiment or to weigh 
their statements for possible bias. 
One must remember that ‘challengers’ are simply those actors who are outside of 
the groups that hold a particular view. In the situation we analyse, these 
challengers could as easily be Icelandic citizens as well as Danes. It is 
worthwhile to ask what network elements—structural or participatory—turn ‘by-
standers’ to a debate into a new set of challengers. 
Obviously there is much work yet to be done in this area. As actor-network 
theory suggests, the construction and activation of networks both to challenge 
and to defend a fact is a natural occurrence. The least one can do is to make these 
networks visible in hopes of improving the quality of the debate and the 
accountability of the actors. 
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Notes  
1 Since it is not possible to tell whether these networks existed but were inactive 
before this event or formed in response to the event, we talk about their 
‘construction or activation’. 
2 The U.S. State Department notes, ‘Because of its small size and relative 
homogeneity, Iceland holds all the characteristics of a very close-knit society’ 
(U.S. Department of State, 2010). Iceland’s estimated population as of January 
2006 was 299,000 (317,000 as of January 2010). The country comprises 103,000 
square kilometers (39,600 square miles) in area (Statistics Iceland, 
http://www.statice.is, accessed September 2010).   
3 See Jónsson (2009) for a history of the Icelandic banking system. 
4 Fitch Ratings (2006) and Merrill Lynch (2006) had issued earlier reports. 
5 Contact the authors for a list of the articles used. We had hoped to map the 
‘challenger network’ as well by including Danish articles, but we found too few 
sources to allow this. 
6 While the Danes quoted in Icelandic newspapers tended to agree with the 
challengers, the newspapers featured their arguments either as further 
information for the debate or as a counterpoint to particular Icelanders’ 
arguments.  Therefore we include them in our study. 
7 A coding scheme for network analysis can also include differentiation of human 
actors by their overall attitude toward the situation. For example, this could be 
shown by distinguishing between a person who supports a particular argument 
and one who disagrees with the argument, or by separately identifying those who 
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believed the Icelandic economy was on perilous ground and those who thought 
otherwise. In fact, we found that less than 10% of the Icelandic human actors in 
the network expressed any reservations about the stability of the financial 
system, and none of those had concerns about the ‘hard landing’ predicted by 
Danske Bank. Since this is too small a proportion upon which to draw any 
meaningful conclusions, we did not code actors by their overall attitude. We 
thank our colleagues for the suggestion, however. 
8 Our illustrations use NetDraw’s default drawing condition, which approximates 
a multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) technique. MDS places nodes so that the 
distances between them correspond as closely as possible to the proximities 
shown in the input data (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002). As Borgatti et al. 
(2002) note, MDS solutions are not unique—thus our caution in interpreting the 
graphic display. 
9  Contact the authors for data related to subsequent periods in 2006. 
10 But see the report of the Special Investigation Commission to the Icelandic 
Parliament (2010) for their conclusions on wrongdoing in events leading to the 
2008 collapse. 
11 Iceland’s National Economic Institution (Thjóðhagsstofnun) was formed in 
1974 to monitor economic policies, but was dissolved in 2002. Recently, a 
Parliamentary Review Committee has suggested that the Icelandic Parliament 
establish a similar group. Although our suggested ‘board of translators’ would 
have a different mandate, we offer these examples as signs that the idea of such a 
board is not unreasonable. 
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Table 1.  Argument Types, Abbreviations & Counts 
  
 
Report-based (‘rational’), n = 53 
economic-technical (ectech, n = 19) 
‘They are misinterpreting the data’ (misint, 15) 
‘The wrong data are used’ (wrdata, 7) 
‘Bad comparisons are made’ (badcmp, 4) 
‘Compensating data are missing’ (compdm, 4) 
‘The reports take a questionable approach’ (oddapp, 3) 
‘Another report disagrees’ (contrp, 1) 
 
Affective (‘emotional’), n = 30 
‘Danes do not know Iceland’ (dkisl, n = 12) 
‘Danes are envious of Icelanders’ (dnenvy, 9) 
‘Icelanders are risk-takers’ (isrisk, 4) 
‘The media’s approach is questionable’ (mediaq, 3) 
‘Danes are competing with Icelanders’ (dncomp, 2) 
 
Issues, n = 1 
‘Icelandic banks should be more transparent’ (transp, n = 1) 
 
 
Notes. Arguments are expressed in terms typically found in the newspaper 
articles. Counts are tallies of the number of appearances of the argument. 
Mentions by the same person in different articles and mentions by different 
people in the same article are each counted separately and included in the total 
shown. 
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Table 2.  Measures of Network Composition 
 
 
Measure 
Conceptual approach 
Basis for measurement 
  
Density 
Networks can be described by how connected actors are. 
Proportion of possible connections that are present 
  
Average shortest distance  
Networks can be described by how compact they are—the average shortest 
distance between every pair of actors. 
Average of the shortest distance (geodesic difference) between each pair of 
actors 
  
Reach 
Networks can be described by how closely connected actors are. 
Number of others connected to an actor within x steps (here, 1 step = shared 
argument or person) 
  
Clustering 
Networks can be described by their tendency to form subgroups—clusters of 
‘better-connected’ actors. 
Proportion of connections shared by subgroups of actors 
  
Core/periphery formation 
Networks can be described by the size of a single group that is well-connected 
and the number of actors not in this well-connected group. 
Proportion of connections between actors 
  
Diversity 
Networks can be described by the tendency of actors within an affiliation group 
to communicate within or outside of that group. 
Proportion of an actor’s connections that are made with those not in the actor’s 
group (here, occupational group) 
  
 
Sources.  Hanneman & Riddle (2005); Wasserman & Faust (1994). 
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Table 3.  Measures of Centrality 
 
Measure 
Conceptual approach 
Basis for measurement 
  
Freeman degree 
A central actor can share messages with many others. 
The number of ties that involve the actor 
 
Closeness 
Messages from a central actor do not have to travel through many intermediaries to 
reach others. 
The inverse of the sum of the distances from the actor to all other actors, standardized 
  
Bonacich power 
Messages from a central actor reach those who can relay the message to many others. 
Ties between the actor and others who have a high number of connections 
  
Freeman betweenness 
A central actor can facilitate or impede messages sent directly from one actor to another. 
Proportion of direct paths between other actors on which the central actor lies 
  
Flow betweenness 
A central actor can facilitate or impede messages sent from others directly or indirectly. 
Proportion of all flows between actors that involve the central actor 
  
 
Sources.  Hanneman & Riddle (2005); Wasserman & Faust (1994). 
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Table 4. Network Characteristics 
 
 People  
(n = 28) 
Arguments  
(n = 13) 
   
Density 57% 58% 
   
Compactness 77% 78% 
   
Percent of network reaching 
75% of others in one step 
 
25% 
 
23% 
   
Clustering 87% 81% 
   
Percent of actors in the core 92% 38% 
   
Density of the core 64% 100% 
   
Percent of actors with 80% or 
more of their ties occurring 
outside of their group 
 
 
 
82% 
 
 
 
38% 
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Table 5.  Central People and Arguments 
  
 
  Measure of Centrality 
       
 
Network 
 
Group 
 
Closeness 
Bonacich 
Power 
Flow 
Betweenness 
Freeman 
Degree 
Freeman 
Betweenness 
       
People       
 ib -- -- 2 7 -- 7 
 ic 4 -- -- -- -- 
 in 1 4 5 11 13 1 5 11 13 -- 1 5 11 13 -- 
 ip 6 6 4 8 6 4 7 8 
       
Arguments       
 rational compdm compdm compdm compdm compdm 
  misint misint -- misint -- 
  -- wrdata -- -- -- 
       
 affective dkisl dkisl dkisl dkisl dkisl 
  -- -- dnenvy -- dnenvy 
       
 
Note. Numbers in the people-network cells identify group members. 
 
  
Figu
 
  
re 1.  Two-mode Network of Pe
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